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ABSTRACT 
 
The Weapons of the “True Warfaring Christian”: Right Reason and Free Will in 
Seventeenth-Century Literature.  (August 2009) 
Nancy Rochelle Bradley, B.A., Sam Houston State University;  
M.A., Pennsylvania State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Paul A. Parrish 
 
Milton writes in Areopagitica of the “true warfaring Christian” who can 
“apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, 
and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better.”  Though many reformers 
saw both human nature and the faculty of reason as depraved after the fall, Milton and 
other radical writers in the period emphasized the role that reason can and should play in 
the experience of spiritual warfare.  The dissertation therefore begins by considering the 
theological contexts within which writers of the English Reformation understood evil 
and human encounters with evil, especially in the form of temptations, but also in the 
form of disturbing dreams and satanic presences.  It then considers some epistemological 
problems as related to the experience of such conflicts: reason, especially right reason; 
knowledge, conscience and memory; and free will.   
Focusing on the texts of John Milton, Aemilia Lanyer, Richard Norwood, and 
John Bunyan, this study shows that these radical religious writers refuse to conform to 
the general tendency in Reformation theology to discount the use of reason.  Eve‟s 
iv 
 
dream in Milton‟s Paradise Lost reveals the proper use of right reason in spiritual 
warfare, while the actual temptation scenes in Paradise Lost and Lanyer‟s Salve Deus 
Rex Judaeorum point to a fundamental failure of reason in the fall.  Norwood‟s 
Confessions, Milton‟s Comus, and Milton‟s Samson Agonistes portray the triumphs of 
human reason over evil and temptation, though there remains an awareness of the 
constraints placed upon reason by their fallen nature such that reason needs the aid of 
divine grace to function as right reason.  Milton‟s Paradise Regained and Bunyan‟s 
Pilgrim’s Progress point to the extraordinary victories gained by Christ and Christian 
through the use of right reason and memory to direct the will toward the highest goods.  
These texts offer a counter-voice to those who would dismiss the possibilities of the 
powers of right reason.  Despite the awareness of the inherent limits of fallen reason, 
these radical reformists generally find reason an indispensable tool in spiritual battles 
that helps direct their wills to the highest good. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the Judeo-Christian tradition, spiritual warfare is evident from the earliest 
records of that tradition—the Hebrew Bible accounts of the fall of Adam and Eve, the 
trials of Job, the weakening of Samson; the New Testament accounts of the temptation 
and crucifixion of Jesus, the doubts of the disciples, and the persecution of early 
Christian communities.  But accounts of spiritual warfare have not been limited to sacred 
texts.  Priests, theologians, preachers, hagiographers, and laypersons since the advent of 
Christianity have been aware of the reality of spiritual warfare in the day-to-day lives of 
Christians.
1
 
With the Reformation, however, new dynamics of spiritual warfare were 
introduced.  Many of the reformers‟ revolts against the Catholic Church were perceived 
as having spiritual implications for both the individual believer and the entire body of 
Christian believers.  But aside from the obvious struggle between Catholic and reformer, 
the discourse even within the ranks of the reformers recommended a realization that no 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of Modern Language Association. 
1
 As I argue here, it is remarkable that some of the greatest and most complex literature of all 
time, poetry in particular, and especially Milton‟s, has gone unappreciated as literature foundational to the 
topic of spiritual warfare, even though there is no shortage of rather prosaic and popular literature that 
touches upon the issue even in our own time.  Such an interest and concern for spiritual warfare is not 
irrelevant to modern Christians.  A quick search for books on “spiritual warfare” on amazon.com revealed 
10,922 items on 21 June 2009, including such titles as T. D. Jakes‟ Overcoming the Enemy: The Spiritual 
Warfare of the Believer (2003), Beth Moore‟s Praying God’s Word: Breaking Free from Spiritual 
Strongholds (2000), Pat Hulsey and Ray Beeson‟s Strategic Spiritual Warfare (2006), Cindy Trimm‟s The 
Rules of Engagement: The Art of Strategic Power and Spiritual Warfare (2005), and Richard Ing‟s 
Spiritual Warfare (2006), where he “shows you all of the techniques available to you in your full arsenal 
of weapons” (synopsis). 
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matter what became of Rome, the individual Christian would be in a fight for his or her 
soul on many fronts.   
Milton therefore writes in Areopagitica of the “true warfaring Christian,” whom 
he describes as that Christian who “can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits 
and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is 
truly better” (1006).  In Areopagitica, Milton is fighting in particular against the position 
of his fellow Puritan believers who sought to suppress the promulgation of dissenting 
religious views as he advocates against press censorship.
2
  But he also counters the 
reformers‟ (and especially the Puritans‟) general denigration of the use of reason as 
being faulty and unreliable, instead putting a surprising emphasis on the exercise of the 
mind—reason and judgment—and the will in choosing good over evil.3  For Milton, 
access to dissenting writing allows the Christian to exercise and strengthen the mind‟s 
ability to reason and distinguish between good and evil, an important virtue and a 
significant aid in the spiritual battles the Christian must inevitably encounter.  The 
overriding concern in this study is therefore the peculiar role that reason, or the failure of 
reason, plays in the remarkably complex phenomenon that is spiritual warfare, 
particularly as imagined or conceived by some of the radical writers of the Reformation.
4
 
For writers, both Anglican and Puritan, of seventeenth-century England, with 
their particular apocalyptic world-views of both the problems of their own government 
                                                 
2
 Milton does not, of course, want to see Catholic writings allowed to be in print. 
3
 Milton‟s word choices in truth point to the importance of choosing not only that which is good, 
but that which is truly better—that is, eternal goods at the expense of temporal goods, ,which may not be 
evil per se, but are still inferior to the eternal good of God. 
4
 Milton‟s argument about the warfaring Christian also points to his understanding of the 
fundamental importance of using reason, and more particularly right reason, in undertaking such spiritual 
battles.  
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and their fears of infiltration by the Catholic Church, spiritual warfare was a profound 
and meaningful part of their Christian experiences.
5
  Their literature reveals much about 
the way they conceived the problems of the existence of evil, their spiritual battles, the 
use of reason, and the abilities of their wills to overcome the evils which they perceived 
around them, but it is in the texts of religiously radical writers where the emphasis on the 
use of reason is most surprising, if only because of the pervasiveness of the Puritan 
mistrust of reason.  Indeed, some of the most prolific writers of the seventeenth century 
were radical religious writers who rejected entirely the use of reason—writers such as 
Lawrence Clarkson, who insists on “the vast difference of Faith from Reason, … and 
how from Faiths royal Prerogative all its seed in Adam was saved, and all Reason in the 
fallen angel was damned” (190).  For the most extreme of these writers, there is no 
positive use of reason in the spiritual life of the Christian. 
The writers examined in this project stand in stark contrast to the views 
promulgated by radical Protestants such as Clarkson.  While these writers, as well as less 
obviously religious writers, understood that human reason is limited in significant ways, 
they yet found it an indispensable tool for any serious issue confronting humanity, even 
in matters of faith and spiritual experiences, particularly in their conceptions of spiritual 
warfare. 
While I would also place John Milton among these writers who emphasize the 
use of reason, there is a trend in recent Milton scholarship to emphasize the radical 
                                                 
5
 “Warfaring Christians” must face all sorts of spiritual trials, but those trials are intended as 
opportunities to strengthen the virtue of godly people, for an untested virtue—a “fugitive and cloister‟d 
virtue,” as Milton describes it—is essentially and spiritually worthless (Areopagitica, 1006). 
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aspects of Milton‟s writing, thus aligning him with the more radical writers of the 
period.
6
  Yet I would argue that throughout his major texts, Milton emphasizes again and 
again the fundamental role that reason should play in the spiritual life of humans, and in 
their spiritual battles against evil, thus holding a position against the dominant radical 
voices of the period.   
A conversation between Adam and Eve in Paradise Lost provides an excellent 
example of the relationship between the human will and right reason as Milton saw it.  
Milton has Adam instruct Eve on the nature of the human will and reason: 
But God left free the Will, for what obeyes 
Reason, is free, and Reason he made right, 
But bid her well beware, and still erect, 
Least by some faire appeering good surpris‟d 
She dictate false, and misinforme the Will 
To do what God expresly hath forbid.   
(9.3.351-56) 
Adam here admonishes the not-yet fallen Eve even as she pleads with him to let her 
work separately from him on this particular morning in Eden.  Only moments later, she 
will leave him to be tempted, successfully, by Satan.  The most striking element of this 
speech, in terms of its theological significance, is Adam‟s awareness and 
acknowledgement of the relationship and tension that exists between will and reason, 
                                                 
6
 The scholarship of David Loewenstein, Kristin Poole, Jeffrey S. Shoulson, Walter Lim, Barbara 
K. Lewalski, Joan S. Bennett, and Thomas N. Corns offers a sampling of the interest in Milton‟s radical 
qualities. 
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even in his prelapsarian state.  He informs Eve—or more properly, reminds her—of what 
she should already know: that reason should immediately and spontaneously inform the 
will to reject rightly that which is false, and that she, Reason, must be vigilant lest she be 
deceived by something that only appears to be good.  Even before the fall, Adam is well 
aware that reason has the potential to fail in what it is supposed to do.  Reason can be 
deceived by “false appearances,” make false judgments about those appearances, and 
hence draw the will away from the highest goods.
7
  Furthermore, there is implicit in 
Adam‟s speech the injunction for Eve to remember that using reason in this way to direct 
her will to good is what she is required to, so that memory is also linked to the use of 
right reason when facing trials and temptations. 
Milton clearly emphasizes the importance of reason, and more specifically right 
reason, in such encounters with evil.  Milton here points to the need for a certain 
diligence and watchfulness on the part of reason, a discernment between what is truly 
good and what only appears to be good, and he further outlines the way in which reason 
should direct the will rather than allowing baser, lesser faculties to do so.  In this way, 
this episode in Paradise Lost serves as a paradigm for this study of the problem that the 
intersection of evil and reason presents to notions and representations of spiritual 
warfare in seventeenth-century literature and Reformation theology—for both the ways 
in which Milton understood the relationship between reason and will in spiritual conflict, 
and the ways in which other writers address this relationship as well.   
                                                 
7
 “Deceived” is also the word that Milton uses to describe the way in which Adam and Eve fall 
into sin.  See Book III where God distinguishes between the sins of the fallen angels and the sins of fallen 
man: “The first sort by thir own suggestion fell, / Self-tempted, self-deprav‟d: Man falls deceiv‟d / By the 
other first: Man therefore shall find grace, / The other none” (129-32). 
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This study therefore explores the philosophical and theological contexts within 
which writers of the English Reformation in the seventeenth century understood evil and 
human encounters with evil, especially in the form of temptations, but also in the form of 
disturbing dreams and in alleged satanic presences.  This is not intended to be a source 
study, as such: my intention is not to show or suggest direct influence (for example, that 
Milton was directly influenced by Augustine in the writing of Paradise Lost).  Rather, I 
propose this dissertation as a study in what might be called theological historicism—the 
historical development and context of particular aspects of Reformation theology of the 
period, as represented and accounted for in both imaginative literature and accounts of 
personal spiritual experiences.
8
 
Religion and theology in the seventeenth century are a messy business, as it is 
exceedingly difficult to divide up the issues neatly between Catholic and Reformers (and 
still further among the Reform sects).  I would suggest, however, that the theological and 
philosophical texts which I present in this study form a significant part of a tradition, and 
exemplify that tradition, such that the literary writers of the seventeenth century treated 
in this study are seen to be responding to, drawing from, and engaging with, that 
tradition as well, even as they draw out their own implications from that tradition.  This 
study also suggests that the radical Protestant texts which I analyze reveal important 
aspects of the Reformation theology of seventeenth-century England, including ways 
that complicate the traditional notions of English Reformation theology, especially 
                                                 
8
 I do not use the phrase “theological historicism” in the theological sense—as a particular branch 
of study of religion or theology—but as a modified form of historicist literary study.  It might also be 
considered a theological history of ideas, but again, with a dual emphasis on both artistic representations 
and accounts of lived experiences of those theological ideas and principles. 
  7 
 
among radical sects, but even among Anglicans which itself is predominantly Calvinist 
and therefore suspicious of reason. 
Though the concept of reason pervades this dissertation, the most important 
concept of reason is that of right reason as informed by a long tradition of Christian 
thought.  I will not concern myself here with the changing perceptions of reason as the 
culture of the seventeenth century became more secularized and “enlightened.”9  I also 
do not intend to engage the particulars of the debate about how religious beliefs might be 
reconciled with the “new religion” of reason.  Instead, this study is interested in the ways 
in which religious writers, especially those operating within a theological system that 
called into serious question the use of reason, continue to rely on reason—and insist that 
others do so as well—even in spiritual matters, particularly matters of spiritual warfare.  
Reason, for these writers, comes to be seen as a significant tool in the encounters with 
tempters and temptations, as the exercise of reason guides the will to the good of God. 
The second chapter, “Theological Contexts: Evil, Spiritual Warfare, and 
Reason,” therefore, sets out some of the key issues regarding spiritual warfare, starting 
with the problem of the existence of evil and the necessity of engaging evil in spiritual 
warfare.  I then consider a cluster of epistemological problems as they relate to the 
experience of spiritual warfare: reason, especially right reason; knowledge, and its 
relatives, conscience and memory; and free will.  Questions about the limits of human 
reason and knowledge are of utmost significance to debates about spiritual warfare in 
                                                 
9
 See Raymond D. Tumbleson‟s article on the “science” of Anglican theology near the end of the 
seventeenth century.  Many of the secular philosophers (such as Locke or Hume) saw religion as separate 
from the work of reason, as they cast doubt upon the revealed truths of religious beliefs.   
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this theological history as they reflect one of the operating premises common to both 
Catholic and Reformer: the nature of the effect of the fall on human reason and whether, 
and to what extent, the defect in human reason complicates the use of reason in spiritual 
battles or whether the use of reason should be limited as well.  Accordingly, I conclude 
this chapter with a brief and very general consideration of the differences between the 
Catholic and reform views of reason.
10
   
The three subsequent chapters examine various representations of spiritual 
warfare by Puritan (or presumed radical) writers and the ways in which these writers 
conceive of the use of reason in such warfare.  Here, the concern is with the ways in 
which these issues are represented and resolved in the literary texts and what these 
representations suggest about conceptions of reason in Reformation theology.  
Throughout these chapters, there is also a running thread concerning the problem of 
satanic or demonic dreams in various texts.  Dreams pose their own particular problems 
in spiritual warfare because neither reason nor will can function as they should when a 
person is dreaming.   
This study follows Milton especially because the joined themes of spiritual 
warfare and the use of reason are so prominent throughout his major works, such that he 
functions much as an outspoken advocate of the importance of reason in spiritual 
warfare, which is particularly relevant considering the multitude of voices in the period 
                                                 
10
 I generalize the Catholic and reform positions, with the understanding that any generalizations 
are precisely that, where examples can be found to counter such generalizations.  But there is a purpose to 
these generalizations, as they are useful in identifying the over-arching tendencies of the various groups, 
their perceptions of the issues at stake, and the ways in which they address those issues in general. 
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dismissing the value of reason.
11
  Milton is therefore discussed extensively in each 
chapter, but he is read alongside other writers who share, at least to some extent, his 
ideas on reason and will: Aemilia Lanyer, Richard Norwood, and John Bunyan, with 
more than occasional glances at Augustine and Aquinas.  While Milton‟s work, 
especially his late poetry, provides the most compelling insights for the “true warfaring 
Christian,” and portrays so well how so much is at stake when a Christian, or any person, 
struggles with matters of utmost spiritual significance, Milton was not alone among 
radical writers during this time in emphasizing that the Christian should consider the 
importance of reason in spiritual warfare and the problems associated with what could be 
called the principle of defective reason.  
Chapter III, “The First Temptation: The Failure of Reason,” focuses on Milton‟s 
Paradise Lost and Aemilia Lanyer‟s Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum, both of which portray 
the first temptation, that of Adam and Eve.  Both Milton and Lanyer depict the fall of 
Adam and Eve as a consequence of the failure of human reason, and they both suggest 
implicitly that the fall might have been prevented had Adam and Eve exercised reason 
rightly, especially while human reason was in its purest form.  Moreover, it is because of 
Adam and Eve‟s failure that spiritual warfare becomes a necessary part of human 
existence and that human reason itself becomes limited. 
The fourth chapter, “After the Fall: Reason Informed by Grace,” analyzes 
Richard Norwood‟s Confessions, Milton‟s Comus, and Milton's Samson Agonistes.  
Here, the focus shifts toward the function of reason in light of the fall and in a fallen 
                                                 
11
 Milton figures largely throughout the dissertation, with parts of each chapter devoted to his 
major poems, but my argument does not rely entirely on Milton‟s texts. 
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world.  Each text represents characters relying on reason in various ways and to different 
degrees in the encounters with evil and temptations.  But these texts all emphasize the 
theological position that after the fall, reason must be informed by grace in order to help 
the person properly in moments of spiritual warfare.  Though the characters/persons in 
these texts triumph over the temptations and spiritual battles in which they become 
engaged, there remains an emphasis on the constraints placed upon reason by their fallen 
nature such that reason is insufficient to the task alone, and needs the aid of divine grace 
if it is still to be useful in spiritual warfare. 
Chapter V, “The Heights of Human Reason,” offers readings of Milton‟s 
Paradise Regained and John Bunyan‟s The Pilgrim’s Progress.  This chapter considers 
the final objectives in undergoing spiritual warfare with reason aided by grace.  In these 
texts, we can see the ultimate point of spiritual warfare, as the victors not only win 
particular battles in the spiritual war against evil, but they win in the proper way so as to 
be allowed to enter into heaven, into God‟s presence.  Pervading these two texts in 
particular, however, is the notion that the victories of the protagonists in both are gained 
by the right use of reason and will in conjunction with acute memory—they remember 
and do what they ought to do—in order to overcome what would otherwise be 
significant weaknesses on their parts.  Thus in these texts we see more fully how the 
proper function of right reason also depends significantly on the proper use of memory. 
It is my purpose, then, to show that these radical writers and their texts refuse to 
conform to the general tendency in Reformation theology to discount the use of reason.  
Instead, they place a strong value on the use of reason in the spiritual battles which they 
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represent, resulting in a marked paradox in radical Protestant theology of the seventeenth 
century.  While there are yet many Puritan writers, even if not as extreme as Lawrence 
Clarkson, who mistrust and denigrate the use of human reason, these writers reveal that 
even among more radical Christians, reason could also be redeemed and found useful in 
the spiritual life of the believer.  Despite the suspicion of reason because of the inherent 
limits of fallen reason, these radical reformists generally find reason an indispensable 
tool in spiritual battles that can help them direct their wills to the highest goods—and to 
God.  Their voices offer a counter-voice to those who dismiss the possibilities of the 
power of right reason. 
12 
 
CHAPTER II 
THEOLOGICAL CONTEXTS: THE PROBLEMS OF EVIL, SPIRITUAL 
WARFARE, AND THE USE OF REASON 
 
Before looking at literary representations of spiritual warfare in the seventeenth 
century, it will be useful to outline in brief the problems that are evident in what I 
conceive as the intersection of evil and epistemology and that are fundamental to this 
study.
1
  This chapter, then, will first examine the theological problems of evil and sin, 
followed by a consideration of some of the epistemological concerns as they pertain in 
particular to the questions of evil.  It will conclude by looking at the ways in which evil 
and epistemology intersect on the supposition that humanity is living in a fallen world 
and as they become manifest in the religious debates of the seventeenth century.  I am 
limiting this discussion mainly to two thinkers whom I consider foundational to the 
development of Christian doctrine, St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, and the 
ancient philosophers who influenced them and the western philosophical traditions at 
large, Plato and Aristotle, and I relate their work on evil and epistemology to the 
elements of spiritual warfare as implicit or explicit in the work of Milton.
2
   
                                                 
1
 John S. Feinberg is mindful that “there is in fact no such thing as the problem of evil, for at best, 
the expression „the problem of evil‟ stands for a host of distinct problems that confront theologies” which 
believe that God is omnipotent and good and that evil also exists (19); moreover there are as many 
“problems of evil” as there are such theologies, since different theological systems define these terms in 
different ways (24).  This study obviously cannot address all such problems, so it will focus on those 
problems which are most directly relevant to its subject of spiritual warfare. 
2
In a general sense, it can be argued that Plato and Aristotle established the two foundational 
traditions of western philosophical thought.  In Christian thought, these two lines can be seen as developed 
respectively by Augustine and Aquinas (though not without some common positions), which can then be 
seen as being particularly influential, respectively, with reformers and counter-reformers (Catholics).  The 
reform theologians (such as Calvin and Luther) significantly appropriated Augustine for their theology, 
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The Problems of Evil and Spiritual Warfare 
Recognizing the seeming inevitability of spiritual warfare which human beings 
must undergo raises first and foremost the question of why: Why must humans 
encounter and contend with evil in the world?  Or, why does God allow human beings to 
be tested in such a way?  Or, even more fundamentally yet, why does God allow the 
existence of evil in the world?  Answering these questions has been the task of many 
thinkers and writers, including Milton, when addressing the problem of evil.
3
  Feinberg 
distinguishes between the religious problem of evil and the theological/philosophical 
problem of evil, suggesting that the two are almost entirely disconnected because he sees 
the theological defense of the existence of evil as offering little comfort to the person 
confronting a “crisis of faith” in a religious question of evil (21).  Yet I would suggest 
that coming to the idea of spiritual warfare via an understanding of the theological 
problem of evil allows a better appreciation as to why spiritual warfare is necessary and 
even beneficial, so I shall begin here. 
Traditionally, the problem of evil has been identified logically through the 
attempt to reconcile the following three statements: 
1) There is an all-powerful and all-knowing God. 
2) This God is wholly good, indeed, perfect. 
                                                                                                                                                
while the Catholic theologians of the counter-Reformation revived an interest in Aquinas‟s though to 
counter the work of such reformers.   
In this chapter, I will focus primarily on the interpretations of these problems that Milton seems 
to offer, though as drawn from these other thinkers.  I will leave it to later chapters to develop these ideas 
as they relate to other writers of the seventeenth century, in addition to giving greater attention to Milton. 
3
 Milton undertakes to develop and explain his understanding of Christian doctrine in his treatise 
on the subject, On Christian Doctrine.  Here he asks such questions as whether something sinful can 
originate in God, and he answers: “When matter or form has gone out from God and become the property 
of another, what is there to prevent its being infected and polluted, since it is now in a mutable state, by the 
calculations of the devil or of man, calculations which proceed from these creatures themselves?” (1177). 
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3) Evil yet exists in the world. 
While it is impossible to establish with absolute certainty that all three premises are true, 
most thinkers have set out to show that there is some interpretation of the three premises 
that does not put them into absolute contradiction with one another.  In what follows, 
some of the possible interpretations are developed more fully, although it is inevitable 
that not all of the possible resolutions of these problems can be addressed here, nor is it 
necessary that they be.
4
 
One attempt to deal with the problem of evil is simply to call into question God‟s 
existence entirely, or at the very least his existence as an omnipotent and benevolent God 
(thus rejecting both the first and second premises).  An omnipotent and benevolent God, 
it is argued, would not allow the existence of evil in the world, so there must not be such 
a God.
5
 
Yet even (or especially) if one acknowledges God‟s existence, the three claims 
cannot be easily, or entirely rationally, reconciled.
6
  Most religious thinkers have sought 
to call into question, or to qualify in some way, only one of the three premises rather 
than denying the existence of God outright.  To maintain that God is omnipotent and yet 
allows evil to exist would be to imply that He must not be wholly good (rejecting 
premise two).  On the other hand, to maintain that God is wholly good and yet allows 
                                                 
4
 John S. Feinberg emphasizes that what is most important in considering the logical problem of 
evil is to remain internally consistent with the theological position taken.  This is especially important for 
those who want to attack the defense offered by a particular theological position; they must attack a 
position or view that the theist actually holds, say a particular conception of God or evil, rather than 
imposing their own definitions of terms onto the theist‟s argument (27). 
5
 This is essentially Epicurus‟ argument against the existence of God.  It is not really a solution, 
however, for a Christian thinker whose purpose in reconciling these claims is theodical: the ways of God 
would not need to be justified if there were no such God. 
6
 See Dennis Danielson, Milton’s Good God, 7-9; and Susan Neiman, 35-36. 
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evil to exist would be to suggest that He is not all-powerful (rejecting premise one), a 
position which leads to the dualistic worldview of Manichaeism.   
None of these solutions is particularly tenable for orthodox Christian thinkers, 
such as Augustine and Aquinas, so their traditional response to this problem has been to 
posit that evil does not actually exist (thereby rejecting premise three), or rather to define 
evil in such a way that its existence does not contradict the first two premises regarding 
the nature of God.  Thus it is argued that evil does not, properly speaking, exist as a 
substance, in a positive state, but only as a privation.  Moreover, even though it appears 
that evil exists in great and unbearable abundance, God can bring good out of such evil 
through his benevolence and omnipotence.  This has been the position of orthodox 
theism in order to insist on both God‟s omnipotence and His benevolence, which 
constitute the very nature of God.  Both Augustine and Aquinas are of this position, as 
is, I think, Milton.
7
  Yet underlying this position is one of the most fundamental 
theological problems: how to define evil very particularly in such a way that the 
omnipotence and benevolence of the Supreme Being do not have to be called into 
question.   
In the attempt to define evil, thinkers have categorized evil into three species: 
metaphysical evil, natural evil, and moral evil.
8
  Properly speaking, the first type of evil, 
metaphysical evil, is not actual evil at all.  The term metaphysical evil is generally taken 
                                                 
7
 This is not to say, however, that such evil is necessary for God‟s goodness, but that he, through 
his omnipotence, can bring good out of the evil resulting from the free choices of created beings, which in 
itself is also a good created by God. 
8
 Dennis Danielson, Milton’s Good God, provides a concise summary of the various types of evil, 
pp. 3-7.  In considering the problem of evil in terms of Milton‟s theodical purposes, Danielson devotes 
most of his attention to questions of moral evil. 
  16 
 
to “denot[e] the essential dependency, finitude, imperfection, and limitation of all 
created things”; that is, it is assumed that insofar as all created things are not God, Who 
is necessarily the absolute Good, and is indeed perfect, then individuated things are not 
wholly good insofar as they are potentially corruptible, which is to be in some sense evil 
(Danielson, Milton’s Good God 5).9  Hence, Augustine comes to define evil as a 
privation of the good.  For Augustine, evil is very real but is often hard to fathom or 
even recognize because it does not exist as a thing—or as a product of an efficient cause, 
to put it in Aristotle‟s language.  To claim that evil is a privation of the good serves as a 
reminder that, as God pronounced in Genesis, while all of creation is good, evil may yet 
become the case as a negative state, a privation, of goods that God would ordain should 
be the case, either through acts of commission or omission.
10
            
The category of metaphysical evil serves two important functions in discussing 
the problem of evil.  First, this category of evil helps provide an etiology of evil in that 
the imperfections and mutability of a yet good creation are also the conditions upon 
which moral and natural evil can enter that created world, without holding God 
accountable for that evil.
11
  Perhaps more significantly for the purposes of theodicy, 
however, the category of metaphysical evil also provides an ontology of evil, a way to 
                                                 
9
 Such a definition of evil thus provides a means to reconcile a good and omnipotent God with the 
existence of evil in the world. 
10
 For example, the murder of one man by another “generates” privations of the good even while 
everything in the deed was good: the gun was good, the bullet was good, his aim was good, etc.  Yet, in 
that sin of commission, the world is deprived of that which the murdered man might generate by his art; he 
and his friends and family are deprived of all of their communal relations; the state is deprived of a citizen, 
etc.  So, too, with sins of omission: laziness is evil as it “generates” all kinds of privations of the good that 
God would otherwise ordain to be the case.  Watching television for hours, not just for some recuperative 
entertainment, is evil, a case of laziness, a sin of omission, as in that laziness one is not exercising one‟s 
higher faculities for ends that extend beyond the person‟s merely private inclinations. 
11
 Etiology is the study of the causes of things.  Ontology is the study of being or existence.  See 
Dennis  Danielson, Milton’s Good God, for further discussion of these aspects of metaphysical evil. 
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give an account of the nature of evil—of what evil is.  Though evil has no substance, 
because it does not exist except as a privation of the good, metaphysical evil constitutes 
not merely the lack of a good, but also the lack of a good that it ought to have—“not the 
absence of a goodness that a thing has never and could never possess, but rather the lack 
of a goodness in some sense original to it” (Danielson, Milton’s Good God 6).  Yet if the 
definition of metaphysical evil depends upon the notion of the limitation of created 
beings and things, the question remains as to what goodness can be original to created 
beings, and indeed the created world, if they are created already limited, and hence evil, 
in some sense? 
In response to that particular problem, Augustine talks about the original 
goodness of created beings in his Confessions.
12
  He emphasizes there that even beings 
that suffer corruption—those that can be potentially corrupted—are originally good 
because God made all things and beings good.  There are no substances that God has not 
made, and there are therefore no substances that are not good (which also explains 
further why evil is not seen as created and is therefore defined as a privation rather than 
a substance itself and why God cannot be seen as the creator of evil).  Still, all these 
created beings would be incorruptible only if they were either supremely good, as only 
God is, or entirely evil as nothing is, so it is the nature of created things and beings to be 
susceptible to corruption but not entirely or inherently corrupt.  This is not to suggest 
that created beings, and the created world, are necessarily going to be corrupted, but 
rather that the possibility is always already potentially there in their nature as created 
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 See Augustine, Confessions, 7.12.  All citations of Augustine will be by book and chapter 
numbers unless otherwise noted. 
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beings.  Yet if there were not also some original goodness in them, a goodness that is in 
them since their origin and creation, there would likewise be nothing in them to be 
corrupted.  So whatever suffers corruption (as both the fallen angels and humans do, and 
indeed as all earthly creation does) must be deprived of some, but not all, good, for 
things deprived of all their good become wholly evil and therefore cease to exist, to have 
being.
13
 
It is the potential corruptibility of the created world that constitutes its 
metaphysical evil, and that same potential corruptibility also gives rise to the natural, or 
physical, evil in the world.  At the simplest level, natural evil can be defined as that evil 
which exists in the world in the form of disease, general suffering, natural disasters, and 
the like.  Augustine defines natural evil as evil that is suffered, rather than done, but 
there are still some fine distinctions to be made in the consideration of natural evil.
14
   
John S. Feinberg divides natural evils into four categories.
15
  The first category of 
natural evil is actually related to moral evil in that it is attributable to human agency—it 
is “evil done” rather than “evil suffered.”  This category includes such physical evils that 
result from one person‟s actions done to another.  Examples include birth defects 
resulting from an expectant mother‟s abuse of alcohol, a person deliberately infecting 
another person with a sexually transmitted disease, or a person abusing a child so 
                                                 
13
 G. R. Evans describes evil thusly: “Only when evil works upon created things do they change, 
and such change must be for the worse, because evil is stealing its very existence from the good; only by 
making good things like itself can it exist at all.  It has a borrowed existence, by inhering in something 
which exists; its effect upon its host is to diminish its existence, and to push it further and further in the 
direction of non-existence.  It is impossible for absolute evil to exist at all, for if it has entirely deprived its 
host of goodness it will have no existence left; host and parasite will disappear together” (154). 
14
 See Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will. 
15
 See pp. 192-93. 
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severely that the child grows up severely mentally ill.  The next three categories of 
natural evil are not direct results of human actions, so are not directly related to 
questions of moral evil.
16
  The second category of natural evil includes disorders or 
physical deformities which have their causes within human beings, as through genetic 
malfunctions.
17
  The third category of natural evil includes natural disasters that occur in 
the natural world but are outside the purview of human beings (in contrast to genetic 
mutations).  The final category of natural evil includes diseases that are caused by 
viruses and bacteria (rather than genetics).   
While Feinberg‟s division of natural evil into four distinct categories seems, at 
least in part, unnecessary, it is useful to distinguish between those in the first category 
and those in the latter three.  The existence of the first group of natural evils can be 
addressed as part of the question of moral evil below, but the other types of natural evil, 
as evils that cannot be directly attributable in origin to the wrongful choices or actions of 
rational beings, need to be handled separately, as they pose their own particular problem 
within the larger theological problem of the existence of evil. 
Within Christian tradition, natural evil is largely seen as having its origin in the 
fall and its effects, namely the fall of nature that occurred simultaneously with the fall of 
                                                 
16
 This is to say that people who drown in a flood or die from cancer are not at fault for the evil 
that befalls them; these natural evils (in the form of disaster and disease) are not connected to the moral 
choices that the individuals or those around them have made. 
17
 These distinctions and examples are primarily Feinberg‟s.  I do not mean to raise any kind of 
issues surrounding disabilities or offend those with disabilities.  The issue is not whether a person with a 
birth defect or physical limitation is “normal” but with something much more fundamental.  Would it not 
be a better world if no one had to struggle with physical or mental limitations?  Without considering 
particular persons, does the very existence of such limitations in the world not constitute a kind of natural 
evil? 
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Adam and Eve.
18
  While nature has not sinned in the same sense that Adam and Eve 
have, the world in which they live is now, like them, a fallen and corrupt world rather 
than a wholly good one; there have been “negative consequences for the natural order” 
of the world, as recounted in Genesis (Feinberg 195).
19
   
In Paradise Lost, Milton describes not just the fall of man but also the fall of 
nature.  Milton paints pictures of the first natural evils as inevitable consequences of, and 
corresponding to, the fall of humankind.  After Eve eats the forbidden fruit, “Earth felt 
the wound, and Nature from her seat / Sighing through all her Works gave signs of woe, 
/ That all was lost” (9.782-84).  And again after Adam eats, 
Earth trembl‟d from her entrails, as again 
In pangs, and Nature gave a second groan,  
Skie lowr‟d and muttering Thunder, som sad drops 
Wept at compleating of the mortal Sin 
Original.   
(9.1000-4) 
While nature “sighs” at Eve‟s initiation of the original sin, nature‟s response to Adam‟s 
completion of that sin is much stronger—earthquakes and thunderstorms, and by 
extension other natural disasters, or natural evils, now plague the earth.  The earth feels 
the wound of Adam and Eve‟s sins as deeply as their own souls do, and responds 
accordingly. 
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 Here I shall not enter the debate about the historical figures and events of the Fall.  The writers 
and thinkers with whom I am engaging talk of, and believe in, a fall of humankind, and of Adam and Eve, 
whether literally or symbolically, and I refer to them within that general Christian context. 
19
 Genesis records the curse on Adam: “cursed is the ground because of you; in toil you shall eat 
of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles it shall bring forth to you …” (Gen. 8.17-18). 
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Though natural evil is not generally attributable to the wrongful actions and 
choices of human beings, other Christian thinkers, like Milton, do not see natural evil as 
entirely disconnected from the wrongful actions of created, rational beings.  Aquinas 
also notes the connection between the first human sins and natural evil.  Distinguishing 
between malum poena (“evil of penalty”) and malum culpa (“evil of fault”), Aquinas 
deems natural evil a malum poena, which means he does not see natural evil as the direct 
result of sinful actions of humans today.
20
  Yet Aquinas still argues that the evils 
naturally occurring in the world—pain, sickness, disasters, etc.—are ultimately part of 
the consequences of the sins of Adam and Eve in that they (and their offspring) are 
thereafter deprived of paradise.  Though the first natural evils enter the world with the 
fall of After the fall of Adam and Eve, after the fall, these disasters are an inevitable part 
of the fallen world, a fallen world that has become other than the entirely good (though 
potentially evil) world that God had created.  
While natural evil may be “evil suffered,” it must be suffered as punishment for 
the generally sinful condition of humankind; it is seen as part of the penalty (hence “evil 
of penalty”) that humans must pay for their sinfulness.  Though natural evil is part of the 
punishment of human beings for what constitutes their now sinful nature, such evils are 
not generally seen as a punishment for the particular sins of any human beings.  Indeed, 
a virtuous person may yet suffer great natural evil, without having merited such a 
penalty himself; likewise, a sinful person may live a long life without suffering any such 
evil.  Feinberg emphasizes that “because we all have disobeyed God in Adam as well as 
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 See Brian Davies‟ introduction to Aquinas, On Evil, 21. 
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during our time on earth, things like disease and death can and do occur.  Even people 
whose basic pattern of life is to follow God may suffer from these evils (think of Job).  
None of us is sinlessly perfect” (195).  Natural evil is thus a penalty regarding all of 
humankind, rather than a penalty toward particular persons.
21
    
Yet natural evils such as diseases and human illness should also be considered 
from the perspective of God‟s divine justice in the punishment of human sin.  When 
Michael begins sharing the visions of the future with Adam after the fall in Paradise 
Lost, he urges Adam to  
ope thine eyes, and first behold  
Th‟ effects which thy original crime hath wrought  
In some to spring from thee, who never touch‟d  
Th‟ excepted Tree. 
(11.423-26) 
Michael informs Adam that his descendants will inherit the same punishment, namely 
death, as he, but without having committed the first sin—disobeying God‟s 
commandment not to eat the forbidden fruit.  The punishment of death comes to Adam‟s 
descendents by default, rather than as direct punishment.  Yet Adam‟s descendants are 
not entirely free of blame.  They will not be undeserving of the punishments that they 
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 I would stress that there is no particular causal relation between one‟s actions and what one 
suffers on earth per natural evils.  However, there has always been some blurring of the lines on this point, 
particularly in the popular imagination.  Consider, for example, beliefs in the late sixteenth century 
regarding the plague where it was thought that the plague was the hand of God striking down the sinful 
and degenerate.  The line is further blurred when considering diseases that are contributable to particular 
choices (such as venereal diseases).  It is important to remember that the existence of the diseases are not 
contributable to the particular sins of a particular person, even if certain actions and choices make one 
more susceptible to the experience of that disease.  There are too many people who also make those same 
choices and yet do not experience such disease to argue for such a causal relation. 
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will receive, for from Adam‟s sin “derive[s] / Corruption to bring forth more violent 
deeds” (11.427-28), and Adam‟s descendents will willingly participate in those deeds.  
This is already evident to Adam in the first vision to which he is treated, that of his son‟s 
murder of his brother, and this is also the first sign of Adam‟s comprehension of what it 
means to die, which he has already been told is his punishment for his sin but of which 
he has no understanding as of yet.  Michael then makes known to Adam the myriad ways 
that death can come to humans so “that thou mayst know / What miserie th‟ inabstinence 
of Eve / Shall bring on men” (11.475-77): 
all maladies 
Of ghastly Spasm, or racking torture, qualmes 
Of heart-sick Agonie; all feavorous kinds, 
Convulsions, Epilepsies, fierce Catarrhs, 
Intestin Stone and Ulcer, Colic pangs, 
Dæmoniac Phrenzie, moaping Melancholie 
And Moon-struck madness, pining Atrophie, 
Marasmus, and wide-wasting Pestilence, 
Dropsies, and Asthma‟s, and Joint-racking Rheums. 
     (11.480-88) 
Adam is properly horrified at what awaits him and his descendants, even going so far as 
to ask why humans should not lay down their lives immediately rather than live to wait 
for and endure such horrors.  He also questions why humans, made in God‟s divine 
likeness, should suffer such gross disfigurement.  But Michael‟s reply quiets Adam‟s 
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short-lived rebellion against what awaits.  Michael reminds Adam that Adam himself has 
already perverted his own likeness to God, perverting “pure Natures healthful rules / To 
loathsom sickness” (523-24), such that in a sense, Adam can hardly even appeal any 
longer to his being made in God‟s likeness.  Given this newfound understanding of 
disease and death, Adam answers, “I yield it just … and submit” (11.526). 
In these words lies the key to the more complete answer to the question of why a 
good and all-powerful God would allow the existence of natural evil in the world.
22
  
Natural evil exists in the world as an instance of God‟s justice, and God must be a just 
God, for an unjust God could not also be a good one, and God‟s goodness is one of the 
three basic premises with which we began this discussion and that classical theodicy 
seeks not to call into question.
23
  When Adam and Eve disobeyed God‟s commandments, 
it was necessary for God to punish them, and by extension all humankind, in order to 
uphold His justice.
24
  From this view of natural evil as a means for punishment of sins 
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 This question is one place where Feinberg‟s distinction between the theological and the 
religious problems of evil may be deemed to meet.  The person who suffers natural evils is likely to ask 
this very question, whether the answer provides comfort or not.  Granted, he is likely asking this question 
with regards to specific instances of natural evil, rather than with regards to natural evil at large, but the 
implications remain the same. 
23
 Whatever defense is offered, there is a common strategy in offering a defense: “in creating a 
world, God had to choose between actualizing one of two good things.  The two are mutually 
contradictory, so God couldn‟t do both, because the theist‟s notion of omnipotence doesn‟t allow God to 
actualize a contradiction.  Regardless of the theology, one of the two options will be removing evil.  
Depending on the theology, the other option will specify some other valuable thing God could do in 
creating a world….  Once the theist sets up these two options, he argues that God cannot do both 
conjointly.  If he removes evil, he cannot create the best of all possible worlds, metaphysically speaking” 
(Feinberg 489-90).  It is then argued that the good of the “other valuable thing” outweighs the good that 
would  be a world without evil.  Moreover, God cannot then be held accountable for failing to do what He 
could not do, namely create both of the mutually exclusive worlds.  See John S. Feinberg‟s “Strategy of 
Theodicy and Defense-Making,” The Many Faces of Evil, 489-90. 
24
 Indeed, justice is an eternal good, as part of God‟s being.  But of that, more later.  The inverse 
of this point is that God‟s justice would also have demanded great rewards for Adam and Eve if they had 
remained obedient. 
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committed by the first parents, God cannot be blamed for the effects of natural evils 
because they exist at root from human choices.
25
 
Furthermore, God is the author of these evils only insofar as evil suffered is “a 
necessary concomitant of certain goods and that God can be said to have brought it about 
only in the sense that he brought about those goods,” a view which also draws upon an 
understanding of God as just (Davies 22).  God must allow natural evil if He is to 
achieve the greater good of justice with regard to human sins and the fall.  Aquinas states 
in On Evil that “there are two kinds of evil, one that is truly and absolutely evil, and one 
that is apparently and in some respect evil but, in reality, absolutely good” (11.1).  
Natural evil clearly belongs to this second category; though it appears to humans to be 
evil, in truth it is an absolute good because it works in and towards God‟s justice in 
dealing with human sin.  Accordingly, natural evil loses the quality of evil that would 
call into question either God‟s benevolence or omnipotence.  Though God does indeed 
have the power to remove natural evil from the world, He refuses to do so not because 
He is a malevolent God but because it serves the greater good of justice toward his 
creation.
26
  Likewise, He could not choose to create a world without evil at the expense 
of the greater good of a created world which is endowed with free creatures who can 
choose to obey and can therefore be rewarded. 
Like the natural world, rational beings were also created with the capacity for 
corruption, of being corrupted (because they are not supremely good).  For Aquinas, 
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 This point raises the issue of free will as a good created by God: was God therefore right in 
creating humans with free will who could introduce such evils?  But this question will be addressed below 
in considering the Free Will Defense. 
26
 Feinberg‟s defense is a variation of this argument: evil exists because the alternative world is 
not really the best one. 
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humankind‟s original perfection is qualified in that it is also potentially corruptible.  And 
as with the created world, this inherent limitation constitutes the metaphysical evil of 
such beings.  But for created beings, the source of such potential corruption is internal, 
in their wills and desires, rather than external.  As such, their metaphysical evil, their 
capacity to be corrupted, is the condition for the possibility of moral evil.  Moral evil is 
here defined as that evil which proceeds from the direct choices, actions, and even habits 
of rational agents.  One key element of this definition is the emphasis on reason.  Only 
rational creatures, humans and angels, are capable of moral evil, because they have been 
granted by God the free will to choose, and the reason to help them choose rightly.
27
   
This study is primarily concerned with the category of moral evil because it is 
most clearly related to the phenomenon of spiritual warfare and the function of reason in 
human encounters with evil in its various forms, particularly sin and the temptation to 
sin, sin being the most significant manifestation of the human susceptibility to 
corruption.  Sin is also the most obvious type of moral evil in that it proceeds directly 
from the choices and actions of rational agents, and in the process further corrupts such 
rational agents by moving them progressively further away from their original goodness.   
Augustine and Aquinas provide similar definitions of sin—primarily as the 
voluntary movement of the will to abandon or neglect higher things in the choice and 
pursuit of inferior things.
28
  Sin can also be defined in terms of the choice of lesser, 
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 While I may often refer only to human beings in what follows, it must be remembered that 
these same principles apply also to the higher order of beings, namely the angels, both fallen and unfallen.  
The unfallen angels are also capable of corruption, but they have chosen of their own free will, with the 
aid of right reason, not to be corrupted. 
28
 See Augustine, On Free Choice, 3.1.  Aquinas phrases it as a deformed act which “is at 
variance with the requisite rule of reason or of God‟s law” (On Evil, 2.2). 
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temporal goods at the expense of eternal goods, namely, God and the Truth, the seven 
virtues (wisdom, courage, moderation, justice, faith, hope, and charity), and the eternal, 
that is, unchanging first principles by which all sciences proceed.  The element of choice 
is crucial to both definitions, and Augustine points to the will as the primary source of 
this movement and choice: “Now we admit that this movement belongs to the will alone, 
and that it is voluntary and therefore blameworthy; and the only useful teaching on this 
topic is that which condemns and checks this movement and thus serves to rescue our 
wills from their fall into temporal goods and turn them toward the enjoyment of the 
eternal good” (On Free Choice 3.1).29  That sin is therefore a form of moral evil is rather 
obvious: the will alone directs the choices and actions of rational beings to commit sins 
and other moral evils.  Yet sin is also a form of metaphysical evil in that the will reveals 
its own limitations and finitude in its movement away from God, the greatest good, and 
the will reveals the limitations and finitude of reason in not being able better to guide the 
will toward the highest good.   
Even allowing, then, that moral evil originates not with God but rather with his 
rational creatures, we can still ask why He created beings in such a way that the 
existence of moral evil would originate in them.
30
  One answer to that question comes 
down to the issue of freedom that allows rational agents to make moral choices.  Still, it 
is asked, why did God make the will free to fall away from the good, to do evil?  What 
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 See also 3.3. 
30
 This question raises the issues of both human freedom and God‟s omniscience or 
foreknowledge, which will not be addressed here in much depth, as having less to do directly with the 
problem of evil.  In sum, the question is if God foreknew what humans would do with free will, was He 
still right in giving them that freedom?  For those thinkers such as Milton who value human freedom, 
God‟s foreknowledge of human sin does not alter the value they place on human freedom, as after all, a 
free will is God‟s greatest gift to his creatures. 
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justification is there for creating beings in such a way that He would thereby also have to 
allow the existence of evil in the world?  The answers to these questions, at least for 
Milton and some others, including Augustine, lie in what is often called the “Free Will 
Defense.”  For these thinkers, human freedom is of fundamental importance to an 
understanding of both God and humankind, and the relationship between them. 
The basic argument of the free will defense proceeds as follows.  Evil, 
particularly moral evil, originates in the abuse of free will by rational agents, namely 
angels and humans.  Given their contribution to the existence and problem of evil, God‟s 
justification in creating them with such freedom to commit evil deeds is initially 
questioned, since, in His omnipotence, He could have created angels and humans 
without free will to do evil.  Despite the evil actions and choices of these beings, 
however, advocates of the free will defense maintain that the very existence of such 
beings as created by God—that is, as free creatures capable of evil rather than 
automatons capable of only good—is a great good, and more importantly, a greater good 
than a world in which evil does not exist at all, so that God is indeed justified in creating 
these beings as He did.   
In On Christian Doctrine, Milton relates the free will defense to a justification of 
God‟s punishment of sin: 
As a vindication of God‟s justice, especially when he calls man, it is 
obviously fitting that some measure of free will should be allowed to 
man, whether this is something left over from his primitive state, or 
something restored to him as a result of the call of grace. … But if [God] 
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turns man‟s will to moral good or evil just as he likes, and then rewards 
the good and punishes the wicked, it will cause an outcry against divine 
justice from all sides.  (1193-94) 
Milton recognizes that without free will, humans would be able to call God unjust in His 
actions toward His creatures; indeed He would even be unreasonable in demanding 
something they could not give and in punishing them for something over which they had 
no control.  Yet Milton also ties free will to the notion of grace, at least after the fall 
(when humans are no longer in their primitive state).  Milton does not conceive of 
human beings as being capable any longer of acting independently in choosing the good 
over evil.  Rather, as Milton views humanity and Christianity, humans are in need of 
divine help from God if they are going to be able to choose good over evil because of 
their fallen nature. 
So while it is clear that God cannot control these creatures‟ choices because He 
created them with free will, with the consequence that God is responsible for neither the 
evil generated by their abuse of that free will, nor the evil generated by His just 
punishment of that abuse, it is less clear why the creation of such free agents is a greater 
good than a world without evil.  Yet, that problem is resolved with consideration of the 
relationship that God seeks to have with His creation, especially with His rational 
creatures, which demands obedience, freely enacted. 
Milton‟s God essentially expounds upon this aspect of the free will defense in 
Paradise Lost.  In Book III, God reveals the importance of free will, not only for 
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humans, but also for the higher orders of created beings, as they relate to their Creator.
31
  
As if offering a miniature treatise on the relation between metaphysical evil and moral 
evil, Milton‟s God insists that angels, and later humans, were created “Sufficient to have 
stood, though free to fall” (3.99), emphasizing that there was absolutely no necessity in 
their fall to evil.  Though these rational creatures were created inherently capable of 
corruption, such corruption was not inevitable, and indeed they were equally capable of 
avoiding such corruption. 
Even more importantly, Milton has his God explain why He gave His creatures 
this free will: 
Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell. 
Not free, what proof could they have givn sincere 
Of true allegiance, constant Faith or Love, 
Where onely what they needs must do, appeard,  
Not what they would?  what praise could they receive? 
What pleasure I from such obedience paid, 
When Will and Reason (Reason also is choice) 
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoild, 
Made passive both, had servd necessitie, 
Not mee. 
(3.102-11) 
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 Milton‟s God is initially talking about the fallen angels, but His words apply equally to fallen 
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Milton conveys this world-view for himself in On Christian Doctrine, where he writes 
that “if religious matters were not under our control, or to some extent within our power 
and choice, God could not enter into a covenant with us, and we could not keep it, let 
alone swear to keep it” (1194).  God can experience no pleasure from, nor give any 
reward for, a forced and necessary obedience to His laws, and He makes it clear He 
wants to do both—be pleased with and reward His creatures.  A world in which evil 
exists alongside creatures who are freely and willingly faithful to God and keep His 
covenant is an immensely greater good than a world without evil that is such only 
because of a forced obedience.
32
  God has given His creatures a free will so that they can 
give sincere proof of their love and faith in God and His goodness, and so that they 
would be capable of having a personal and conscious relationship with their Creator. 
Yet in order for there to be such a relationship, it is also necessary that the 
creatures be tested in some way, that they be given opportunity to make choices.  And so 
God allows His rational creatures to be tempted.  Milton shows God allowing Satan to 
work as a tempter even before the fall, both in Heaven and on earth.  The confrontation 
between Lucifer/Satan and Abdiel near the end of Book 5 reveals Satan to be the tempter 
of angels.  Abdiel recognizes the sinfulness of Satan‟s arguments against God‟s reign, 
and he makes his choice to return to the throne of God.  Abdiel‟s arguments against 
Satan also function as a moment of choice for the other angels; Abdiel has shown them 
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 It could also be argued that the converse is also true: that creatures who are faithful to God in 
such a world filled with evil are also a greater good than creatures who are faithful in a world without evil, 
but this comes close to the doctrine of the “Fortunate Fall.”  However, this particular formulation avoids 
the “fortunate fall” aspect because the premise of the forced obedience in the latter case is still implied. 
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the truth concerning Satan, and they must choose for themselves at that moment whether 
to follow Satan or return to God:  
Cease then this impious rage, 
And tempt not these, but hast‟n to appease 
Th‟ incensed Father, and th‟ incensed Son, 
While Pardon may be found in time besought. 
(5.845-48) 
Though Abdiel has pointed out the blasphemous and false nature of Satan‟s arguments, 
none of the other angels chooses to follow Abdiel back to God, choosing instead to 
remain with Satan.  With this scene, Milton emphasizes yet again the importance of free 
will in the choice to sin against God.  None of the fallen angels can claim they fell by 
deception, for Abdiel revealed the full truth to them, and after his revelation of the truth, 
the fallen angels are truly apostate, unredeemable when they still choose to follow 
Satan.
33
 
God even more obviously allows Satan to work as the tempter of humans to sin, 
and His reasons for doing so are twofold.  First, temptation allows humans the 
opportunity to be obedient, to show their allegiance toward God and His commandment, 
for which they could be duly rewarded.  Second, God thus allows Satan‟s free will to run 
its course, while also making Satan‟s sins work for His greater good.  This is evident in 
Paradise Lost in the moments after Satan is captured by Gabriel at the ear of Eve, where 
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 The fallen angels are unredeemable because they fell undeceived, unlike humans who fall by 
Satan‟s deception, though still with their free will.  Though the angels are initially deceived by Satan, 
Abdiel ends that deception by stating the truth to them; their choice to remain with Satan rather than leave 
with Abdiel marks the real moment of their fall. 
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Satan delivered her dream of sin.  Gabriel removes Satan from the Garden so as to 
engage in battle with Satan directly, but the signs in the Heavens reveal that Michael 
must release Satan, thus leaving him free to make his way back into the Garden to 
complete his temptation of Adam and Eve, to engage them in spiritual warfare.  The 
entire fall of humankind could presumably have been prevented in this moment, but 
God‟s plan for humankind includes or incorporates Satan‟s temptation as the means by 
which Adam and Eve, and indeed all humans, can prove their “true allegiance” to God.  
God approves of spiritual warfare.   
Like the angels, Adam and Eve are deemed “sufficient to [stand], though free to 
fall” (3.99).  God has given them all that is necessary for them to withstand Satan‟s 
temptation in the Garden.  In addition to reason and free will with which God has 
endowed them in creation, Milton‟s God also sends Raphael to Adam and Eve to impart 
particular knowledge of their enemy and what he insidiously desires.  Armed with this 
knowledge, Adam and Eve are in principle fully capable of withstanding Satan‟s 
temptation.  They are actually more than fully capable at this point.  Raphael‟s lessons 
were truly unnecessary for them to remain unfallen, but Milton‟s God offers it to them 
so they clearly have no excuse but their own perverted wills when they succumb to 
Satan‟s deceptions.  Milton‟s Adam and Eve can therefore claim no ignorance about 
God‟s expectations of them, and yet they still choose disobedience, and with that choice, 
they damage the relationship they originally shared with their Creator.  Concomitantly, 
the extent of and need for spiritual warfare dramatically increase in order for them to 
reestablish that relationship with God. 
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Both before and after the fall, God allows His creatures to be tempted in order to 
test and strengthen those who overcome such temptations.  And even after the fall, when 
humans have already proven themselves to be disobedient, God yet desires free, willing 
obedience from his human creatures.
34
  So the extent of and even need for spiritual 
warfare increases such that even those who are seemingly made weaker by temptation 
can be brought closer to God once they acknowledge their sinfulness.
35
  Spiritual 
warfare therefore plays a significant role in working through the problem of evil, for 
such evils are ultimately necessary to achieve what God wants and intends for human 
beings as His creatures—God is able to bring about what He wants for His creatures 
through the evils they must face because of the nature of human sinfulness.  Evil exists 
in the world because of the abuse of the will God gave to His human creatures, but 
through those same evils He is able to effect His plan for the created world. 
While this line of argument can be used to address various forms of evil which 
humans encounter in their spiritual and physical lives—e.g., diseases and disasters which 
cause a person to suffer—this study is primarily concerned with forms of spiritual 
warfare that involve sin or the temptation to sin.  Insofar as Milton and others are 
fundamentally concerned with the temptations of human beings to sin against their God, 
why they are so tempted, and what they can do to try to prevent or overcome such 
temptation, more might be said about the nature of temptation. 
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 That God does not desire the same obedience from the fallen angels is due largely to His 
foreknowledge that the fallen angels, and Satan in particular, will never willingly give Him such 
obedience, a fact which Milton‟s Satan also acknowledges as he makes his way to earth out of the depths 
of Hell.  This is not the place for a long discussion which could ensue concerning the nature of God‟s 
foreknowledge of the sins of both humans and angels.  But God‟s desire for human obedience also has to 
do with the way that humans were deceived in their fall, while the angels were not. 
35
 Consider Adam and Eve‟s heartfelt repentance in Book XI. 
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Created as moral beings, humans (and all rational creatures) are susceptible to 
temptation and sin, and therefore to an exacerbation of the corruption of their original 
goodness.  But humans have also been given the opportunity, even after the fall, to 
become perfect as the “children of God,” or better, to return to the state of perfection, 
albeit qualified perfection, that Adam possessed by the original grace of God at creation.  
Such perfection becomes possible, however, only when a person has met, mastered, and 
overcome temptations to make right and godly choices.
36
  The soul then engages in the 
arduous work of “soul-making,” striving to achieve that perfection which God intends 
and wants for his creation, the very reason for which He endowed them with a free will, 
and the reason He allows them to encounter evil and to be tempted.
37
 
Spiritual warfare is thus a significant part of the godly person‟s spiritual life and 
relationship with God, so that it becomes of utmost importance to know how to engage 
in spiritual warfare in such a way as to emerge successful from it.  Human beings are 
bound, then, to encounter and master temptation in order to enter into a more profound 
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 John Hick writes that the second stage of the divine creative process, that of creating spiritual 
beings who can enter into fellowship with God, “cannot be performed by omnipotent power as such.  For 
personal life is essentially free and self-directing.  It cannot be perfected by divine fiat, but only through 
the uncompelled responses and willing co-operation of human individuals in their actions and reactions in 
the world in which God has placed them.  Men may eventually become the perfected persons whom the 
New Testament calls „children of God,‟ but they cannot be created ready-made as this.  The value-
judgment that is implicitly being invoked here is that one who has attained to goodness by meeting and 
eventually mastering temptations, and thus by rightly making responsible choices in concrete situations, is 
good in a richer and more valuable sense than would be one created ab initio in a state either of innocence 
or of virtue” (168-69).  The particular force of Hick‟s argument could, however, lead one to the notion of 
the “fortunate fall,” which I would prefer to avoid.  Even if the “child of God” is in a better state having 
overcome temptation than that of Adam and Eve‟s original innocence or virtue, that is not to say that 
Adam and Eve would not have been in a yet greater state having willingly continued in that innocence and 
virtue, if they themselves had overcome the original temptation.  Moreover, I do not read Milton as 
advocating the idea of the fortunate fall, nor am I alone.  See, for one, Dennis Danielson‟s chapter, 
“Paradise Lost and the Unfortunate Fall” in Milton’s Good God. 
37
 A point of great debate in the idea of “soul-making” is the means by which humans strive to 
attain perfection—can they achieve such alone, or must they have divine help, in the form of grace?  
Furthermore, to whom has God made such grace available—to everyone or only to the elect? 
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and perfect communion with God.  Augustine identifies seven progressive steps towards 
perfection, though he never claims that such can achieved in this lifetime: “We begin to 
run the perfect course, then, by loving God; through holiness we come to knowledge; by 
knowledge we come to fortitude; by fortitude we learn counsel; counsel leads us to 
understanding, and understanding to wisdom” (Evans 158).  The key to spiritual warfare 
for rational beings therefore lies largely with the human ability to reason and with the 
ability to attain, and to retain, the right kind of knowledge: thus we move to questions of 
epistemology. 
 
Reason, Knowledge, and Will 
At its broadest, epistemology is defined as the study of knowledge.  Within the 
scope of epistemology is a wide array of questions and problems, such as questions of 
certainty, the nature of belief, whether an ultimate reality is knowable, and notions of 
truth.  The epistemological questions with which this study is primarily concerned are 
three that are intertwined: How is human knowledge obtained?  How reliable are some 
forms of knowledge, hence, what is the nature and role of ignorance?  And how does 
knowledge relate to questions of ethics, or, that is, what is the relationship between 
knowledge and right action?  Reason will be shown to play a significant role within each 
of these areas, in particular as they relate to the theological concerns outlined above.
38
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 Before continuing, I should clarify the way in which I use the term “reason.”  By reason, I 
mean that mental faculty with which human beings are endowed and as it is linked to language, 
consciousness, and logic.  Among religious thinkers, it is the ability to reason that makes humans made in 
the image of God. 
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Philosophers have long sought to answer the question as to how knowledge is 
obtained, with widely varying answers.  Given the heavy influence of the ancients 
regarding many basic things human, even as late as the seventeenth century, there were 
still essentially two main avenues by which to address the question as to how knowledge 
is obtained: empiricism, which derives largely from Aristotelian philosophy, and 
rationalism, which derives from Platonic philosophy.
39
   
According to Aristotle, all knowledge is derived from sense perception and 
experience; essentially all we can know with any certainty is what we rationally and 
logically derive from what our senses tell us about the world around us.  According to 
Plato, however, the senses are not to be trusted, for real knowledge comes more properly 
via the intellect.  Moreover, Plato teaches that while humans can gain limited knowledge 
of many things, the highest knowledge is that of divine, eternal things, and such 
knowledge is not available through the senses, but only through reason.   
Following Plato, Augustine distinguishes between scientia, or knowledge of 
things in the visible, sensible realm of being, and sapientia, or wisdom, knowledge of 
eternals such as God and Truth.
40
  While Plato‟s theory of knowledge appears to be 
grounded in the notion of the recollection of eternal ideas, anamnesis, and therefore a 
belief in the preexistence of the soul, and indeed, the inherent immortality of the soul, 
Augustine, qua Christian, who must hold that the soul is not inherently immortal, but a 
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 This is said quite broadly, with the recognition that particular ideas concerning the acquisition 
of knowledge cover a broad spectrum between the ideas of Plato and Aristotle.  It is also said without 
regard to the more modern notion of constructivism which holds that all knowledge is constructed out of 
perceptions and experiences.  Of more relevance to the topic in the seventeenth century is the emergence 
of skepticism, which seeks to call all human knowledge into doubt (such as Descartes‟ famous claim of 
cogito ergo sum; all he can know with any certainty is that he is a thinking being). 
40
 See Augustine, On the Trinity, 12.14. 
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creature, cannot maintain with Plato the thesis of the inherent immortality of the soul and 
therefore the automatic knowledge of eternal essences.  Accordingly, Augustine 
emphasizes the need for divine revelation or illumination in the attainment of such 
knowledge.
41
  And Aquinas develops the idea of the need for divine revelation even 
more systematically in Summa Theologica.  As a follower of sorts of Aristotelian 
philosophy, Aquinas greatly privileges the use of deductive reason in the pursuit of 
knowledge, yet he also emphasizes the limits of reason in the pursuit of divine 
knowledge, considered a much higher order of knowledge, which is ultimately obtained 
with the help of divine revelation rather than through reasoning alone: “it was necessary 
for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made 
known to him by divine revelation” (1.1.1)42  And yet it cannot be overemphasized that 
Aquinas does not entirely discount the use of reason in the pursuit of even the highest 
knowledge.  In Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas states: “There is a twofold mode of 
truth in what we profess about God.  Some truths about God exceed all the ability of the 
human reason. … But there are some truths which the natural reason also is able to 
reach” (1.3.2).43 
Both Augustine and Aquinas thus privilege the human ability to reason as a 
means of gaining knowledge while they also warn about reason‟s limitations: thus their 
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 In On Genesis, Augustine distinguishes between the objects of the intellect and “the light by 
which the soul is illumined, in order that it may see and truly understand everything, either in itself or in 
the light.  For the light is God himself, whereas the soul is a creature; yet, since it is rational and 
intellectual, it is made in his image.  And when it tries to behold the Light, it trembles in its weakness and 
finds itself unable to do so.  Yet from this source comes all understanding it is able to attain” (in The 
Essential Augustine, 97). 
42
 Cited by book, question, and article. 
43
 Truths that must be revealed by revelation are such truths as the Trinity, but reason reveals that 
God exists and that He is one. 
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claims of the need for divine illumination for access to those truths beyond our usual 
employment of reason, truths that must be revealed by God and accepted on faith, which 
truths of faith are yet compatible with reason if not derived from reason alone. 
Once divine knowledge has been attained, reason must play a further role in 
helping to guide humans to act in accordance with that knowledge.  Aquinas suggests 
that while God has given creatures the freedom to obey Him or to turn away from His 
commandments and from His perfection, the will alone does not allow God‟s creatures 
to make such choices regarding their actions, for the ability to act originates not merely 
in the will itself but in the ability to understand and to reason.  Aquinas identifies four 
acts of reason insofar as reason directs human actions: 1) “an understanding whereby a 
person correctly esteems the ultimate end”; 2) “deliberation about what is to be done”; 
3) judgment about what is to be done; and 4) a command to act (On Evil 15.4).
44
  
Humans are capable of knowing, at least to some degree, the highest goods, the highest 
of which is God, and their ability to reason should help them to act with those highest 
goods in mind.
45
   
With proper understanding, then, creatures can pursue goods and good ends or 
goals consciously and intelligently.  But the converse is also true: the failure to 
understand properly can lead to the pursuit of the wrong ends or goals, leading to 
improper actions.  The failure of reason to lead to proper actions, actions which are 
directed toward the realization of highest goods, is therefore a chief cause of sin.  
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 Also see Brian Davies‟s introduction, 24. 
45
 God‟s commandments are part of these highest goods, for acting in accordance with the 
commandments He has given is to live a life of virtue and good. 
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Aquinas, following Aristotle‟s formulation of the four causes, formal, efficient, material, 
and final, thus considers the failure of reason, or improper reasoning, to be the 
“instrumental efficient cause” of evil—the instrument or means by which a person 
commits a sin (On Evil 2.6). 
Despite some basic differences between the thought of Plato/Augustine and 
Aristotle/Aquinas regarding how divine knowledge is attained, Aquinas yet agrees in 
principle with Plato‟s assessment of the use of right reason.  In fact, it could be argued 
that with Plato, and the principle of nemo sua sponte peccat, one can see the beginning 
of the tradition of the idea of right reason.
46
  Plato‟s emphasis on the pursuit of the 
highest knowledge was never merely for the sake of knowledge itself.  Rather, the 
pursuit of the highest knowledge had ultimately an ethical dimension, in effect, the 
avoidance of ignorance.  For according to Plato, and the principle of nemo sua sponte 
peccat, no one would willingly choose the bad or the evil because such a choice does 
harm to one‟s self.  But for Plato, evil begins in a kind of ignorance of what goods there 
are and what goods are to be chosen.  On the other hand, for Plato, knowledge of the 
good (and of its deficiency, evil), would much more likely produce moral virtue, for it 
would be unnatural to know the good (especially the truly good), and yet not also seek to 
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 Posed traditionally in Latin rather than in Greek, nemo sua sponte peccat is roughly translated 
as “no one willingly does himself harm.”  Cicero is actually the first philosopher to use the term “right 
reason” (or recta ratio) in his Tusculan Disputations.  He uses the term to emphasize the proper use of 
reason: to improve onself with the goal of attaining moral and intellectual perfection.  But this sense of 
reason originates in the work of Plato (see the Timeaus) and is further developed by Aristotle (see the 
Nicomachean Ethics).  In his prose, Milton uses the term in Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, where it is 
paralleled with the Law of nature (1059); and in Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, where God, in human 
form, is “commensurate to right reason” (954).  Man is said to be made in God‟s image, but more 
specifically, it is in his reason, and more specifically yet his right reason, that he mirrors God. 
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do the good.  To be thus virtuous requires the knowledge of what virtue is, or to be good 
requires knowledge of what the good is. 
Aquinas takes this conception of knowledge of virtue and knowledge of the good 
further by suggesting that there is a certain obligation to pursue and attain such 
knowledge of the good to keep one from a sinful state: “being ignorant of things that one 
is not bound to know involves no moral wrong, but the ignorance whereby one does not 
know things that one is bound to know involves sin.  And everyone is obliged to know 
the things that guide human persons in their actions” (On Evil 3.7).  Ignorance is itself 
seen as a sin when the person has not sought to know what one ought.  For this reason, 
Aquinas distinguishes carefully among not knowing, ignorance, and error.  Error most 
clearly has the nature of sin since it consists of an act of “assenting to false things as 
true” or “mak[ing] judgments about things of which the person is ignorant” (On Evil 
3.7).  Ignorance has the nature of sin only when a person does not know what ought to 
be known to guide one to right action. 
Considering it an obligation to know certain things in order better to overcome 
temptation, human ignorance can be viewed as perhaps the most significant detriment to 
the person who must engage in spiritual warfare, for one is not likely to emerge 
victoriously from such battles when undertaken without the proper weapons.  The 
constant exercise of reason, then, is one of the primary means of overcoming ignorance 
and gaining and retaining the right kind of knowledge which will lead to right actions.  
This is what it means to say that God has given human beings the faculty of reason to 
  42 
 
help them do good, rather than evil, with the free will with which He has also endowed 
them.   
However, the function of mere reason, or reason alone, will not necessarily help 
humans obtain the kind of knowledge needed to live a life of virtue rather than sin.  Pure 
reason is concerned primarily (or only) with obtaining knowledge of things and their 
nature.
47
  While knowledge is the aim or final cause of (pure) reason, right action and 
moral virtue is the end of right reason.  To achieve this end, right reason is comprised of 
the simultaneous functioning of reason and a certain moral sense, both of which have 
been given to humans by God to guide them properly.
48
   
This moral sense has been described in various ways.  First, it includes a certain 
prudence in judgment.  Augustine writes of prudence that “all its vigilance [is] spent in 
the discernment of good from evil things, so that no mistake may be admitted about what 
we should desire and what avoid” (City of God 678).  And, of course, what should be 
desired are the highest, eternal goods, and what should be avoided are the lesser, 
temporal goods.
49
  Aquinas likewise emphasizes the need for understanding and 
prudence to accompany the exercise of reason, deeming prudence “the right reason about 
things to be done” (Summa Theologica 2.58.4).50  Milton, too, makes similar connections 
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 See Richard Arnold‟s similar distinction between “right reason” and “pure reason.”  In truth, 
“reason” can assume a variety of meanings.  William Kerrigan writes that “„Reason‟ is …a whorish term 
in the Renaissance lexicon,” which can mean simply the mind, the power of logic, or faculty which one 
uses to to determine right from wrong (223). 
48
 The term “moral sense” is perhaps anachronistic, as it was coined as a theoretical term by the 
Earl of Shaftesbury at the end of the seventeenth century.  I use the term in its very general sense here. 
49
 Here the problem of evil clearly begins to merge with the epistemological questions 
50
 Aquinas continues his analysis of the relationship between intellectual and moral virtue: 
“Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art, but not 
without understanding and prudence. … Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far 
as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also 
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in his conception of right reason, “whose function it was to discern the chief good, and 
which was, as it were, the life of the understanding” (On Christian Doctrine 1193).  But 
the notion that best encapsulates the idea of a moral sense is that of “conscience.”  
Etymologically, the word “conscience,” from cum scientia, means “with knowledge,” so 
to act according to one‟s conscience is to act with and according to what one knows of 
good and evil, or to act in accordance with the highest goods which one should know 
and always desire.
51
 
Aquinas stresses the cum-scientia sense of conscience perhaps more than any 
other Christian thinker, and therefore emphasizes the role of reason with faith perhaps 
more than any other, and Milton appears to take a similar stance.
52
  Indeed, these two 
principles would seem to be the driving force of his On Christian Doctrine, where he 
seeks to lay out the Christian doctrine that is revealed to him through reading of the Holy 
Scriptures with the guidance of the Holy Spirit.
53
  His aim in thus “puzzl[ing] out a 
religious creed” is to provide a foundation of knowledge that can “effectually wipe away 
those two repulsive afflictions, tyranny and superstition, from human life and the human 
mind” and show that he was “concerned not for religion but for life‟s well-being” 
(1158).
54
  Battling the threat of tyranny and superstition is indeed a form of spiritual 
                                                                                                                                                
does prudence” (2.58.4).  While the exercise of reason alone can lead to intellectual virtue, moral virtue 
also needs the work of understanding and prudence. 
51
 Looking at Samson Agonistes as a casuist text, Camille W. Slights writes this about conscience: 
“The conscience, casuists agree, is that part of practical understanding that applies moral law to individual 
actions, judging past actions and legislating future ones….  The primary task of the conscience, then, is to 
remove doubt through a clear understanding of the moral nature of human actions” (396). 
52
 James Obertino notes that “Milton agrees with Aquinas about the primacy of reason in 
maintaining one‟s position within the City of God” (26). 
53
 See On Christian Doctrine, chapter 1 (1160). 
54
 This section is of the treatise is titled “John Milton: Englishman.” 
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warfare for Milton, and he seeks the knowledge that will also help his conscience direct 
him away from such. 
And in Reason of Church-Government, Milton rather personally reflects upon the 
remarkable power of conscience in his own life as he reminds himself first of the dire 
personal consequences if he does not heed his own conscience in working toward the 
reformation of the church: “But were it the meanest under-service, if God by his 
Secretary conscience injoyn it, it were sad for me if I should draw back, for me 
especially, now when all men offer their aid to help ease and lighten the difficult labours 
of the Church” (925).  He must do what his conscience tells him to do, no matter how 
menial or insignificant the task might seem to be.  Likewise, he appeals to the 
consciences of all Christians to do their part in the spiritual battle being waged for the 
life of God‟s church.  He then concludes the tract with an acknowledgement of his own 
spiritual battles concerning his early refusal to serve the Church of England as a priest, 
which employment his parents initially intended for him, for when he had  
com[e] to some maturity of years and perceav[ed] what tyranny had 
invaded the Church, that he who would take Orders must subscribe slave, 
and take an oath withal, which unlesse he took with a conscience that 
would retch he must either strait perjure, or split his faith, I thought it 
better to preferre a blameless silence before the sacred office of speaking 
bought, and begun with servitude and forswearing.  (925) 
 Viewing the English Church at the time as full of tyranny, Milton‟s conscience would 
not let him take such an oath to become a minister within that tyrannous church.  And 
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indeed, his conscience instead led him to fight against that tyranny and its other 
manifestations of tyranny in England. 
Similarly, in Book III of Paradise Lost, Milton‟s God tells the Son that He  
will place within them [Adam and Eve] as a guide  
My Umpire Conscience, whom if they will hear,  
Light after light well us‟d they shall attain,  
And to the end persisting, safe arrive.  
(3.194-97) 
Presumably, Adam and Eve‟s conscience need only be heeded in order to keep them in 
their state of innocence and let them live eternally in paradise.  And yet neither of them 
heeds their conscience when confronted with the actual temptations.  Adam in particular 
allows Eve to guide his reason down the improper path to choose the temporal goods of 
her companionship over the eternal good of his relationship with God.   
 
Effects of Original Sin: The Limits of Reason and the Work of Memory 
When Milton‟s God tells the Son that He has placed His “Umpire Conscience” 
within Adam and Eve, He is referring primarily to their prelapsarian state.  We are left, 
then, with two questions: how right reason functions differently in the prelapsarian and 
fallen states, and how this shift in the function of reason is related to the mark of original 
sin upon humans as it is conceived by Christian thinkers. 
In the prelapsarian state of human existence, there would seem to be little need 
for the distinction between pure reason and right reason.  The problem with Adam and 
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Eve‟s use of reason in the Fall is not a failure of reason per se but rather the failure to 
“[keep] strictest watch, as she was warnd” (9.363) and which allows them to be deceived 
by a “faire appeering good” (9.354).  Reason is meant to direct the will to right action, 
since knowing and recognizing the good should make one will to do that good, as even 
Plato had argued.  However, if reason chooses something that it only thinks is good but 
actually is not good, then the will still becomes involved in sin rather than virtue.  Adam 
and Eve both knew already who Satan was and what he intended for them, yet both 
allowed themselves to be deceived by Satan‟s arguments.  Adam and Eve did not heed 
what reason had told them; they did not let reason guide their wills toward the good they 
already knew.  Instead, they accepted the false arguments offered first by Satan to Eve, 
and then by Eve to Adam.   
Though Adam and Eve were deceived by Satan‟s false argments, their 
acceptance of those arguments was yet willful.  Therefore, one of the effects of the fall 
was that fallen humans found their ability to reason severely hampered.
55
  Milton ties the 
failings of human reason (especially in fallen humans) to God‟s punishment of the first 
humans‟ failure to heed reason: thus a consequence of the fall, the first failure in 
spiritual warfare, is spiritual death.   
In every war there is death.  While death is the punishment for the first sins, 
death is not to be understood only in physical terms.  In On Christian Doctrine, Milton 
identifies four kinds of death which constitute God‟s punishment for sins, one of which 
is spiritual death.  A significant part of spiritual death is “the extensive darkening of that 
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 In a similar way, Milton‟s Eve essentially wills her own trial with her insistence on working 
alone despite Adam‟s entirely reasonable arguments against it. 
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right reason, whose function it was to discern the chief good, and which was, as it were, 
the life of the understanding” (1193).  Sin, particularly as derived from Adam and Eve‟s 
repudiation of reason, caused reason to lose the ability to discern the divine light.  
Accordingly, reason still functions, but only with great labor.  Reason is unable to know 
the good directly or to direct the will toward the good without further aid.  Thus, the 
faculty of reason in fallen humans is no longer unquestionably “pure,” and it is only 
“right” on occasion.  The postlapsarian mind is too easily misinformed by the “faire 
appeering good” (9.354): mere appearance that directs the will away from the highest 
goods, and certainly away from the “life of the understanding,” and toward lesser goods 
which are chosen at the expense of the higher goods.
56
 
In On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine contrasts the wisdom and rest which 
belonged to created human nature with the painful and defective reason which belongs to 
humanity in its current state.  This state of ignorance, however, is yet a case of God‟s 
justice as just punishment of sin: 
It is indeed the most just penalty for sin that we should lose what we were 
unwilling to use well, since we could have used it well without the 
slightest difficulty if only we had willed to do so; thus we who knew what 
was right but did not do it lost the knowledge of what is right, and we 
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 At this point, theologically, Milton‟s warning about the “faire appeering good” seems to echo 
certain elements of the Bible that warn about the attractive appearance of some forms of evil.  And 
philosophically, or epistemologically in particular, Milton sounds like his famous contemporary Descartes 
who, early in the Meditations on First Philosphy, dismisses the imagination (or in Milton‟s Paradise Lost, 
the fancy) as a source of genuine truth.  Milton, the poet, would not dismiss the fancy categorically like 
Descartes dismisses the imagination.  Yet, in the spirit of the debate about right reason and free choice, 
there are certainly intersections between and among the Bible, Milton, and champions of reason like 
Descartes. 
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who had the power but not the will to act rightly lost the power even 
when we have the will.  (3.18) 
By thus distinguishing between humanity‟s original nature and its punishment in the 
fallen state, Augustine  avoids placing blame for humanity‟s sinfulness and seemingly 
willing ignorance on its Creator—God created humans with a good nature and to be 
intelligent, so that man‟s natural actions would only be good ones.  But with the willful 
choice not to use the knowledge given by the Creator, humans can no longer see 
immediately, intuitively as it were, how they ought to be (that is, good); nor do they have 
the power to be what they ought to be with facility, even if they see the good.
57
 
Aquinas similarly links ignorance and failure of reason to original sin: 
There is in original sin something formal, namely, the lacking of original 
justice, which belongs to the will.  And original justice, which united the 
will to God, produced an overflowing of perfection into other powers, 
namely, that knowledge of truth enlightened the intellect, and that the 
irascible and concupiscible appetites received direction from reason.  Just 
so, when original justice was taken away from the will, the intellect‟s 
knowledge of truth and the irascible and concupiscible appetites‟ 
direction by reason are deficient.  (On Evil 164) 
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 Here we come again to the problem of evil—is God to be held responsible for the moral evil in 
the world?—and as with the problem of natural evil, an understanding of God‟s justice exculpates the 
Creator for the existence of moral evil.  While humans apparently cannot help but choose to do moral evils 
in their fallen state, this ignorant state in which they commit these sins is part of the just penalty placed 
upon human beings by God. 
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And Milton makes the point of re-evaluating the terminology regarding the 
doctrine of original sin in his own treatise, On Christian Doctrine, where he writes in 
Chapter 11: 
Apparently Augustine, in his writings against Pelagius was the first to call 
this ORIGINAL SIN.  He used the word original, I suppose, because in 
the origin or generation of man this sin was transmitted to posterity by 
our first parents.  But if that is what he meant, the term is too narrow, 
because this evil desire, this law of sin, was not only inbred in us, but also 
took possession of Adam after his fall, and from his point of view it could 
not be called original.  (1191) 
Yet, all of Adam and Eve‟s posterity, by virtue of Adam and Eve‟s sin, has this mark of 
evil “inbred in us.”  Evil becomes such an inherent and inescapable part of fallen human 
nature that any evil that comes into the mind of fallen humans invariably leaves yet 
another “spot or blame” of sin.  This is because the mark of original sin is such that it 
makes postlapsarian persons, on some level, signatories to the presence and willful 
accumulation of evil.
58
 
 These estimations by Augustine, Aquinas, and Milton seem to depict a rather 
hopeless circumstance.  It would seem that humanity is a lost cause, utterly incapable of 
right reason or action in a fallen state.  But there is a remedy.  According to Augustine, 
even if this state of ignorance is the mortal inheritance of humans and thus part of their 
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 C. A. Patrides observes that “Augustine‟s interpretation of original sin, and particularly his 
graver views on predestination and the deprivation of free will, were accepted neither widely nor at once” 
(101).  Though his ideas were eventually accepted in the Western Church, it was in the Reformation that 
“Augustinianism returned to reassert itself in even harsher terms in the theology of the Reformers, notably 
Luther and Calivin” (101). 
  50 
 
fallen (though, importantly, not created) nature, and even if it is punishment for a sin 
they themselves did not immediately commit, it is still the individual‟s sin to refuse, by 
one‟s own will, to apply oneself to act in accordance with right reason that, by the grace 
of God, is still essentially operative in the world and, by grace, always available.  It is 
the individual‟s sin to remain willingly in ignorance of such.  What humans have even in 
this fallen state is “the power to search diligently and piously if [they] will to do so” (On 
Free Choice 3.22).  Moreover, even if this state of ignorance and difficulty were the 
natural state of the human soul, it would still be a sin willingly to refuse even the attempt 
to rise from that state to the happiness that would come with wisdom and rest. 
With this active search for the proper kinds of knowledge, there is also an 
injunction to the faculty of memory, for it is the task of memory to recollect at the proper 
times what has been learned that will help direct the will toward the good.  Augustine 
writes extensively about the tremendous power of memory in Book X of his 
Confessions: 
I remember that I distinguished between those true doctrines and the false 
things said against them.  … I both remember that I have often 
understood these things, and I store away in memory what I now discern 
and understand, so that hereafter I may remember that I have understand 
at the present time.  I have remembered that I have remembered, just as 
hereafter, if I shall recall that I have now been able to remember these 
things, I shall in truth recall it by the power of memory.  (10.13.20) 
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Augustine links that which is known to that which is remembered.  Knowledge and 
experiences should be stored in the memory so that they may be recollected at moments 
when that understanding is again needed.  For Augustine, memory, as a power of the 
mind, is fundamental in the relationship he can and will have with God, for he can only 
know God if he remembers God, and he can only remember God by his memory: 
Behold, how far within my memory have I traveled in search of you, 
Lord, and beyond it I have not found you!  Nor have I found anything 
concerning you except what I have kept in memory since I first learned of 
you.  For since I learned of you, I have not forgotten you.  Wheresoever I 
found truth, there I found my God, truth itself, and since I first learned the 
truth I have not forgotten it.  Therefore, ever since I learned about you, 
you abide in my memory, and I find you there when I recall you to mind 
and take delight in you.  (10.24) 
Fallen humans, pitifully, must remember, in a sense, in order to know God, so that 
memory works in conjunction with right reason.  Remembering God—keeping God in 
one‟s mind, recollecting that good which God wants one to do—is to act with that moral 
sense which defines right reason. 
Yet Augustine is also aware that memory, like reason, is not infallible, for it 
remembers not only the good, but also that which is less desirable and even that which is 
evil.  And remembering evil, while failing to remember the good, may lead one to more 
sin.  Augustine refers especially to his memories of sins he has known and committed 
which emerge primarily when he sleeps.  Sleep offers special dangers via the powerful 
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faculty of memory, because memory is working independently from reason at those 
times.  The potential dangers of sleep and dreams suggest that memory can be a 
powerful detriment in spiritual warfare when one fails to remember the good and instead 
recalls only evil.  Yet, too, memory for fallen humans is a necessary condition for the 
awareness of fallen humans desirous of a return to an immediate appreciation of the 
good.  When it works as it should, memory is a crucial element in the work of right 
reason, even, or especially, after the fall. 
 
Reason in the Reformation 
Milton and many others were eager to argue that the fall transformed human 
nature itself because it transformed the nature of reason itself, so it is useful to retrace 
some of the early modern theology that addresses these epistemological concerns and the 
particular ways in which humans can yet overcome the deficit of reason.  Because Adam 
and Eve failed to heed the right reason with which God endowed them in their creation, 
their progeny find their use of reason significantly hindered.  Adam and Eve‟s progeny 
are not “sufficient to stand”; they are not capable of standing on their own, for they have 
lost the natural inclination to choose good over evil through their own wills as directed 
by reason because their natures are now tainted by the sins that have been committed. 
The valuation of reason, as just one issue, has long been considered widely 
varied among Catholics and Protestants.  It can be stated in the most general of terms 
that there is a tension in post-Reformation thought between the respective merits of 
reason and faith, with Protestants leaning toward an emphasis on blind faith and 
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Catholics toward an emphasis on rational faith.  Additionally, the belief in the utter 
depravity of human beings, which some trace back to Augustine or Paul but gained 
special prominence during the Reformation, particularly in the theologies of Martin 
Luther and John Calvin, further complicated the debates.  Indeed, in England, much of 
the Reformation was driven by Calvinist theology, especially among the Puritan 
reformers, but even in the Church of England, which among other beliefs stresses the 
innate depravity of human beings and their inability therefore to withstand with their 
own wills the temptations presented to them.  Indeed, humans were essentially seen as 
lacking the freedom to do anything but evil. 
The recognition of a certain obscuring of reason as an effect of the fall became 
almost a commonplace of theology among many Christian thinkers.  We can observe 
how almost pervasive the notion of fallen reason became when we consider much of the 
literature of the reformers.  The reformers in general betray a marked distrust of the 
faculty of reason; they view reason in the fallen state of humanity as unreliable and 
untrustworthy.  Because reason is thus at least darkened, or simply perverted, many 
reformers find it doubtful that reason can even recognize evil as such, much less be 
trusted to guide the will toward good.
59
  The reformers came to question what kinds of 
knowledge humans can attain through the work of reason and what relation such 
knowledge can have to the human will.  Most significantly, Luther and Calvin viewed 
the perversion of reason in such a way that they were led to doctrines that clearly 
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 Obertino notes this key difference between the Catholic and reform views: “Aquinas 
emphasizes the power of good to continue in the natural order despite the workings of evil. … His 
emphasis on the continuing power of goodness despite evil contradicts Luther‟s belief that Satan is the 
master of the world and Calvin‟s idea that human nature is totally depraved.  And Milton follows Aquinas 
in both these matters” (29). 
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privilege faith over reason, even on occasion denigrating the use of human reason in 
spiritual life. 
In Bondage of the Will, Luther argues that “If you regard and follow the 
judgment of human reason, you are forced to say, either there is no God, or that God is 
unjust” (Sec. 166).  God is ultimately unknowable via reason.  Therefore, instead of 
focusing on what can be discovered by reason, as, for example, in various attempts to 
prove or demonstrate God‟s existence, Luther suggests that all attention should be 
directed toward the suffering of Christ, by which humans are given God‟s grace.  Luther 
recommends abandoning the work of reason and awakening a faith in God‟s truth, for it 
is only through pure childlike faith that the Christian can find the greatest assurances of 
salvation.  The work of reason is therefore limited only to revealing human limitations 
and impotence relative to God‟s power and His mercy.  From this position on reason, 
Luther promotes wholeheartedly the notion that salvation happens by faith alone—no 
ability to reason will earn a human being salvation.  God grants salvation to those who 
accept by faith alone that He alone can grant salvation.
60
  It is only through God‟s 
redeeming grace that humans become able once again to choose good over evil with 
their own wills.
61
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 John Schwindt highlights what he considers to be the absurdities associated with Luther‟s 
theology which “replac[ed] the traditional optimistic Catholic theology of similitude … with a dialectical 
theology based upon the paradoxical opposition of nature and grace, reason and faith, man and God.”  
Such a theology renders the Christian “an absurd hero who constantly confronts absolutely impossible 
things” (9). 
61
 There are traditionally two categories of grace in Christian theology: prevenient grace and 
subsequent grace, each with further subdivisions.  Prevenient grace is believed to be given by God to 
enable humans to be redeemed; subsequent grace is that which accompanies humans to preserve and 
uphold their actions to be pleasing to God.  Jackson Campbell Boswell suggests that “Milton made little 
distinction between them” (83).  A further element of debate is also introduced by Calvin‟s doctrine of 
irresistible grace, which does not allow that humans can resist the grace offered by God, so their choice to 
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Compared with Luther, Calvin‟s response to the role of reason relative to faith 
might seem more measured.  Calvin sees reason as vastly inferior to the exercise of faith, 
yet he allows that reason has a certain power to illuminate faith because the human mind 
has an innate awareness of divinity.  Still, Calvin insists that the particulars of faith are 
beyond the scope of human reason.  Calvin therefore remains staunch in his position that 
acts of human reason—through argumentation, disputation, and the like—are not viable 
means to build one‟s faith in God.  Instead, the believer should rely solely on the 
testimony of the Holy Spirit in interpreting and living out the Holy Scriptures.
62
   
It would seem, then, that there would be little room for the experience of spiritual 
warfare for those who follow Luther and Calvin, for in a strong sense there is essentially 
                                                                                                                                                
accept that grace is not truly a free choice.  But Milton also seems to reject that notion of grace.  Boswell 
offers Satan‟s refusal of God‟s grace in Books I and II, as well as God‟s treatment of grace in Book III of 
Paradise Lost as evidence of Milton‟s beliefs that “Man‟s will is entirely free … but God can and does 
plant ideas and ideals in man‟s subconsciousness in the hope that he will choose the eternal good rather 
than the infernal vile” (94).  Benjamin Myers talks extensively about prevenient grace in Paradise Lost, 
particularly as concerns the repentance and conversion of Adam and Eve: “The conversion scene can be 
fully understood only against the backdrop of the Fall, and , correspondingly, the Fall is seen in its proper 
light only when it is viewed in relation to the ensuing intervention of the grace of God.  „Man‟s First 
Disobedience‟ … [has] subjected human nature to a radical corruption. … [But] the gracious providence 
of God does not leave human nature in its fallen state, but brings forth good from evil by triumphing over 
the power of original sin and liberating the human will from its dark enthrallment” (21).  Myers also points 
out that Protestants tended to view prevenient grace as preparing and transforming humans for the work of 
salvation, whereas Catholics viewed prevenient grace as “aid[ing] and enabl[ing] them to prepare 
themselves” (23).   
62
 In contrast to these Reformist tendencies, the Catholic Church could be seen as reviving, partly 
through the works of Aquinas, the interest in reason as a means to develop and further one‟s faith in and 
relationship with God.  Faith (supernatural knowledge) and reason (rational knowledge) are seen as 
complementary rather than contradictory, for they have the same aim: Truth.  In Summa Contra Gentiles, 
Aquinas maintains that “there is a twofold mode of truth in what we profess about God,” some of which 
truths are beyond the ability of human reason (such as the nature of Trinity) and some which natural 
human reason is able to attain (1.3.2).  Moreover, though he allows that humans can come to know truths 
about God through reason, he also insists that reason is not the only means available for discovering these 
truths, for several reasons.  One of these reasons is his own recognition that “the investigation of the 
human reason for the most part has falsity present within it, and this is due partly to the weakness of our 
intellect in judgment” (1.4.5).   
See Raymond Tumbleson for a discussion of the Anglican Church‟s move toward this position on 
reason and knowledge of God as well in the last decades of the seventeenth century.  Interestingly, 
Anglican writers use this particular rhetoric of reason most vociferously in their anti-Catholic polemic, 
particularly as concerns the use of reason to know God and to believe in transubstantiation. 
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no freedom of the will for fallen humans because, as fallen, they can choose only sin.  
However, by way of God‟s grace, the fallen human will is again capable of choosing 
good over evil, though that does not mean it will always choose so.
63
  And in that 
possibility also lies the arena for spiritual warfare.  For Reformers, even a so-called 
knowledge of God is not really achieved by reason, as that knowledge requires a leap of 
faith independent of reason and understanding.  But once the believer has come to know 
God by faith, God‟s grace enables the mind to function properly and be a source of 
comfort in the spiritual life, particularly insofar as grace enables the mind to recollect 
apposite Scriptures, and interpret them properly, at just the time that one is encountering 
spiritual trials.
64
   
                                                 
63
 William Walker makes a similar argument about the relationship between reason and free will 
after the fall, but he emphasizes a certain loss of freedom if reason is not obeyed, which corresponds to 
civil freedoms: “though, as a result of God and the Son, reason is restored in fallen man, he does not 
necessarily enjoy the freedom that depends upon it.  For … fallen man is, as Adam and Eve were, free to 
disobey his reason, free to permit passion and desire to overrule it.  And if, out of this freedom, he does 
disobey reason and allow it to be governed by appetite, he forfeits the freedom to believe and act, and he 
suffers the special punishment God reserves for that forfeit: the loss of civil liberties” (158). 
For a different view, consider Albert Fields‟s argument that to overcome evil, humans must know 
that part of themselves that corresponds to the nature of God—that is, the faculty of reason.  Fields writes 
that “the immediate problem of Adam and Eve is that they are caught in the backwash of their discovery 
of the darker side of self, and, in their submersion, are temporarily blinded to the aspect of self-like-God.  
Eve, the first to succumb, is … subverted by the unreason of Satan” (397). 
64
 Christopher Hill distinguishes between the “old” reason (defined by proper logic and 
associated, in Hill‟s argument, with forms of authority and tradition) and the “new” reason (reason aided 
by the light of grace, essentially “right reason”), which became the basis for the interpretation of the 
Scriptures by radical reformers.  Kathleen M. Swaim argues that “Reason itself is fallen, but its new role is 
to aid in the return to the original state and truth, and it mediates between the reality and the absolute, 
between experience and the divine plan” (134).  Kristin Pruitt McColgan notes that Milton “provide[s], in 
Book 10 [of Paradise Lost], a pattern „to repair the ruins of our first parents‟ by showing how they 
reestablish a relationship between themselves and God based on reason, faith, and „the soul / Of all the 
rest,‟ love”; after their judgment for their sins, “their minds [are] better able to use reason in the service of 
faith, their faith in a prophetic future stronger for the „suffering for Truth‟s sake‟involved in reaching it 
(“Reason, Faith,” 201-2). 
Citing Douglas Bush‟s The Renaissance and English Humanism, William Kerrigan describes the 
ideals of “Christian humanism” in similar ways: “proclaiming the historical compatibility of faith and 
humanistic learning, [Christian humanism] had as its major content ratio recta or „right reason,‟ the belief 
that knowledge of the good acquired through the patient study of the Bible and classical culture could be, 
and must be, exemplified in the conduct of life, making the completed person a living embodiment of his 
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Yet I have noted how Milton is, in a sense, the Reformer‟s reformer, insofar as 
he disowned not only what he regarded as the pretenses of the papacy, but also other 
Reformers‟ almost wholesale rejection of the role of reason in spiritual life, and he 
emphasizes that role of reason to a much greater extent than other reform thinkers
65
  
Milton clearly saw temptation as a necessary part of the believer‟s spiritual life—it is a 
consequence of the fall insofar as it becomes necessary to reestablish humans‟ 
relationship with God.
66
  He writes in Areopagitica of the need for a tested virtue: “I 
cannot praise a fugitive and cloister‟d vertue” (1007).67  Yet, in comparison with Luther 
and Calvin, Milton does not believe the Christian survives such tests passively, by grace 
alone.  He also fundamentally believes that active reason, still aided by grace but also 
directing the will toward right action, is an important tool for virtue to be upheld when it 
is tested out in the world rather than safe at home, untried. 
With an emphasis among reformers on the depravity of human nature, there was 
also a concomitant devaluing of the notion of right reason, though not entirely without 
qualification.  Arnold explains: 
This sense of total depravity can be said to have had a dual effect on the 
concept of right reason.  On the one hand, if reason is “totally blind and 
                                                                                                                                                
knowledge” (218-19).  Kerrigan goes on to suggest that Bush‟s conception of Christian humanism has 
survived in the notion of “Protestant poetics” that has since gained critical attention (221). 
65
 Consider Milton‟s urging for the Puritan Parliament of the Interregnum to renounce the 
licensing act essentially because it would limit the free exercise of reason that he saw as necessary for an 
ongoing reformation. 
66
 Benjamin Myers writes about Milton, “the conversion of human beings is, moreover, not 
simply a once-for-all event that confirms them in a regenerate state.  On the contrary, the initial experience 
of conversion is only the first step in a dynamic and lifelong process” which involves countless spiritual 
battles and the constant need of God‟s grace (29-30). 
67
 Areopagitica is yet another place where Milton clearly emphasizes the role of reason in the 
Christian‟s life.  There, he expresses his desire that reason be given the opportunity to exercise its 
judgment in determining which books offer the best substance for one‟s mind. 
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stupid,” as Calvin says, then right reason as a guide to living is discarded, 
because right reason needs a clear rational faculty as well as a developed 
moral sense.  On the other hand, if humankind needs to rely totally upon 
God in Christian life, then perhaps the intimation in Luther and Calvin is 
that God will guide humankind in daily living, if they are sensible enough 
to follow God‟s teachings.  This would imply at least a remedial intellect 
as well as moral conscience and thus right reason.  (9) 
In general it can thus be observed that Protestant thinkers rejected or severely doubted 
the function of right reason.  Reason was seen as having little role in a person‟s salvation 
as compared with the importance of blind and irrational faith.  Indeed, reason was seen 
as a cause of deception which would lead a person away from a pure faith in God.  
Calvin and Luther both speak out against the blindness to divine truths that result from 
an over-reliance on the rational intellect.  Belief in the total depravity of humankind 
taught that any knowledge obtained through human endeavors alone must inherently be 
flawed.   
We can see the extreme implications of such beliefs perhaps most obviously in 
the case of Lawrence Clarkson.  Here is a man whose entire spiritual life consisted of a 
movement from one theological position to another because each one failed to explain a 
theological problem in his mind.  His rejection thus always stemmed from a use of 
reason—a new position or church explained rationally something that had bothered him 
in his previous beliefs—but he thereby entered an endless cycle of searching for faith by 
reason.  In his mind, Clarkson believes that reason keeps leading him to further error, so 
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to escape such repeated errors, he comes to believe that the truth for which he has been 
searching is found only by rejecting outright and consciously all things rational.  This, 
however, leads him to the startling revelation that he is the one true disciple of Christ!   
Most reformers did not move to the same extreme as Clarkson of rejecting all 
uses of reason, but they generally did see reason as inherently flawed and deceptive.  
And yet, even within these Calvinist traditions, we can find thinkers and writers who 
privilege the human intellect and the ability to reason as a means to engage successfully 
in spiritual warfare, as already evidenced by Milton‟s concern in Paradise Lost with the 
human capacity to reason.  Such an emphasis is also evident in his Areopagitica where 
the business of the reformation depends initially upon the free exercise of reason and 
judgment.  Thus while Calvinist thinkers generally tend to dictate that faith alone is the 
means by which human beings are justified to God, some reform thinkers attempt to 
qualify that notion in crucial respects.  Richard Hooker, for example, is commonly 
viewed as the first to advance “within the post-Reformation English Church the use of 
reason as an essential ingredient in order to act as a counterpoise to Calvinism‟s appeal 
to Scripture and Rome‟s appeal to tradition” (Atkinson 1).68 
With the advent of the Reformation and its privilege of faith over reason and 
even attack on reason, however, Catholic thinkers, after several centuries of skepticism, 
once again sought out and emphasized Aquinas‟ ideas on reason as a means to counter 
the influence of the presumed irrationality of Reformation theology.  This is perhaps 
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 Atkinson argues that Hooker advances an appeal to reason in matters of faith, or the idea that 
reason can inform one‟s faith, following the thought of Aquinas.  While Hooker is perhaps the most 
obvious example of an English Protestant theologian who exalted the place of reason in one‟s relationship 
with God, only the most extreme of the Reformers rejected all uses of reason, such as Lawrence Clarkson 
reveals in his spiritual autobiography. 
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most readily evident in the work of Ignatius of Loyola and the founding of the Jesuits.  
Jesuit priests were highly educated in classical studies and in theology, and they 
advocated the use of spiritual exercises and examinations of conscience to help 
Christians live virtuously and imitate the life of Christ. 
An emphasis on reason in Catholic writings is not particularly surprising, yet it is 
quite striking that many Reformist writers, even among Puritans, emphasize to varying 
degrees the place of reason in both daily and spiritual life, and especially in spiritual 
warfare as it is imagined and represented in the literature of the seventeenth century.  
Though perhaps unexpected, Reformist writers remained interested in the use of reason 
and invested in the idea of reason as a significant tool in the spiritual battles which they 
expected to endure.  Such an emphasis therefore gives us new insight into a paradoxical 
element of Reformation theology of the seventeenth century.  Moreover, the literary 
texts studied here open the way for larger reflections on the way in which these issues of 
doctrine meet the Christian in the trenches of everyday life. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE FIRST TEMPTATION: THE ABUSE AND FAILURE OF REASON 
  
In the Christian tradition, the human engagement in spiritual warfare begins with 
the first temptation of the first humans, Adam and Eve.  Although Adam and Eve are 
engaging an enemy they can see and hear, Satan in the form of the serpent, the battle is 
fundamentally a spiritual one.  The outcome of this particular battle has far-reaching 
implications for both Adam and Eve, and for all of their progeny: from their ejection 
from Eden, to the effects of the first sin on the very nature of humans, most especially 
the defect in the way in which they are able to relate thereafter to their Creator. 
The issue of the effects of the fall of Adam and Eve is not the only point of 
controversy regarding the first sin of humankind.  Many different Christians also have 
conflicting notions regarding the very underlying causes for Adam and Eve‟s failure.  
However, most Christians view Adam and Eve as possessing the requisite tools to 
withstand the temptation of Satan.  Most Christians must maintain that premise, for to 
argue otherwise would be to argue that, in some sense, Adam and Eve would have been 
essentially already fallen even before the fall occurred.
1
   
The prime instrument Adam and Eve had at their avail in their prelapsarian state 
was the faculty of reason, or better, the faculty of right reason, which God intended they 
                                                 
1
 Such a debate surrounds Milton‟s representation of the fall, epecially concerning Miton‟s Eve 
and her narcissism when she prefers her own image rather than Adam‟s person.  Then there is also the 
question of whether God intended that they should fall—that they were predestined to do so. 
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use so as to guide their wills into alignment with His will.
2
  Any serious investigation 
into the first temptation of humankind therefore must consider very particularly the 
failure of human reason when reason was at its human best—that is, as reason 
functioned when it and all of the other faculties functioned to the best of their capability, 
before those faculties became defective and limited by the very sins committed when the 
first humans failed to heed the direction of those faculties. 
Two of the most compelling studies of the role of reason in the fall of Adam and 
Eve are in John Milton‟s Paradise Lost and Aemilia Lanyer‟s Salve Deus Rex 
Judaeorum.  Milton‟s epic telling of the fall is arguably the most ambitious account of 
the fall in all of seventeenth century literature, and perhaps of all time.  Lanyer‟s project 
is provocative in its originality in many ways, not the least of which is its portrayal of 
female virtue in particular.  While Paradise Lost and Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum differ 
in both aim and scope, these two works share some significant radical theological 
inclinations.  But most obviously, and perhaps most profoundly, they both possess the 
common argument that the failure of reason was fundamental to the events of the fall, 
and that had the first humans heeded reason in its purest form, the fall might very well 
have been avoided.
3
   
Paradise Lost and Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum also share another basic but 
important element.  Albeit in different ways, both texts also point to a specific kind of 
                                                 
2
 Even among those Christian sects that view human reason as unreliable and untrustworthy, the 
general suggestion is that it is so because of the effects of the fall, not that it was always so.  There must 
necessarily be some exceptions to this generalization, however.  I would also suggest that reason itself was 
also right reason in the prelapsarian human condition. 
3
 It might also be interesting to compare their representations of gender, but that is outside the 
scope of this current project. 
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temptation and spiritual warfare that is posed in the form of dreams: either those dreams 
in which Satan or demons, as agents external to the self, tempt a person in sleep; or those 
dreams of temptation which originate internally in the human soul, that is, from one‟s 
sinful condition or evil desires.  The issue of temptation by or in dreams will provide a 
particular avenue of investigation into the nature of the fall in Salve Deus Rex 
Judaeorum and Paradise Lost relative to other literature on spiritual warfare, including 
Augustine‟s Confessions and the Confessions of Richard Norwood, especially as all of 
the above address questions of free will and right reason in the phenomenon of evil. 
 
“Nor can I like / This uncouth dream”:  Eve’s Satanic Dream 
That which dominates the imagination—at least when one considers the nature of 
the fall—is the apparent inevitability of the fall.  Yet, Milton‟s Paradise Lost offers a 
striking, hypothetical example of the triumph of reason over temptation in the 
prelapsarian world.  Milton‟s remarkable poetry offers a kind of critique of pure reason 
relative to the fall to suggest that the case of the fall could have been otherwise.  The 
temptation, with the right use of reason, could have been resisted.
4
 
The centerpiece of the action in that hypothetical resistance to temptation in 
Paradise Lost comes in the presentation of Eve‟s satanic dream.  Satan, at Eve‟s ear, 
puts a dream in Eve‟s mind.  We learn the content of this “uncouth dream” when Eve 
arises to tell Adam about it (5.98).   
                                                 
4
 Again, Richard Arnold points out Milton‟s careful distinction between pure reason, that “pure 
syllogistical or enthymemic reasoning,” and right reason, that reasoning which “simultaneously unites the 
intellectual or ratiocinative faculty and the moral or spiritual sense” (ix). 
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Eve says that she dreamt “of offence and trouble which my mind / Knew never 
till this irksom night” (5.34-35).  She proceeds to present various episodes: Adam‟s 
voice seemed to call her forth from their bower; she beheld the sight of an angel before 
the forbidden tree; the angel addresses the forbidden tree; then the angel eats, or rather 
“taste[s],” the forbidden fruit (5.65).  At that point Eve relates that she was by “damp 
horror chil‟d / At such bold words voucht with a deed so bold” (5.65-66).  Eve proceeds 
by reporting, however, that her own horror at the angel‟s eating of the forbidden fruit 
does not stop her, in her dream, from also tasting the fruit then offered to her by the 
angel himself: “the pleasant savourie smell / So quick‟nd appetite, that I, methought, / 
Could not but taste” (5.84-86).   
But Eve‟s reaction to her dream is a substantial part of Milton‟s argument about 
right reason.  Milton‟s poem argues, in essence, that Eve maintains her innocence and 
integrity despite this dream, and Eve‟s waking revulsion toward her actions in her dream 
is testimony to that maintained innocence: “O how glad I wak‟d / To find this but a 
dream!” (5.92-93).  Moreover, Milton uses the dream of Eve (a poetic device of Milton‟s 
making, as it is not found in the Bible) as the premise for his argument that reason, if 
rightly employed, could have prevented the eventual fall.
5
  Milton‟s poetic invention in 
this case has a relation to classical theological debates about reason, free will, and 
personal identity.  I argue that Milton uses the invention of Eve‟s dream and her reaction 
to it to reassess the element of skepticism in spiritual warfare as manifest especially in 
St. Augustine‟s account of his own disturbing dreams.  
                                                 
5
 C. A. Patrides writes that while Milton utilizes all the traditional elements of Eve‟s temptation 
in Paradise Lost, her demonic dream is his addition to this tradition (105). 
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Milton was no doubt a student of Augustine, and in his Confessions Augustine 
composes perhaps the most famous treatment of the problem of the will in relation to 
personal identity and the problem of evil.  Augustine writes at some length of his own 
tempting, and sometimes sinful, dreams.
6
  In light of his being tempted in dreams 
seemingly instigated by Satan or demons, and apparently succumbing to such 
temptations in some manner at least some of the time, Augustine poses a series of 
virtually summary questions: 
At such times am I not myself, O Lord my God?  Yet so great a 
difference is there between myself and that same self of mine within the 
moment when I pass from waking to sleep or return hither from sleep!  At 
such times where is reason, by which a man awake resists those 
suggestions, and remains unshaken even if the very deeds themselves are 
urged upon him?  Is it closed, together with my eyes?  Is it asleep, 
together with the body‟s senses?  How is it that even in sleep we often 
resist, and mindful of our resolution, persist in it most chastely, and yield 
no assent to such allurements?  Yet so great a difference obtains that, 
when it happens otherwise, we return on awaking to peace of conscience.  
                                                 
6
 Augustine also addresses the issue of dreams in Book 12 of his Literal Commentary on Genesis, 
which Gareth B. Matthews suggests is Augustine‟s “most determined effort to escape responsibility for 
„unchaste‟ dreams, an issue that seems to have concerned him throughout much of his priestly life” (On 
the Trinity, 68n).  Elsewhere, in Thought’s Ego in Augustine and Descartes, Matthews suggests that 
Augustine‟s effort there is ultimately unconvincing (102).  The note in On the Trinity is in response to 
Augustine‟s assertion that there are times, as in beguiling dreams while asleep, when “not even reason 
itself can distinguish whether the body itself is seen without, or something of the kind is thought within” 
(11.4). 
  66 
 
By that very contrast we discover that it was not ourselves who did what 
we yet grieve over as in some manner done within us.  (10.30) 
Milton‟s early modern poetic presentation of Eve‟s dream sounds remarkably similar to 
Augustine‟s early medieval account of spiritual warfare relative to the dream 
phenomenon, or what Gareth Matthews has called “the moral dream problem.”7  
Of course, the primary difference between Milton‟s account of Eve‟s dream and 
Augustine‟s account of his own dreams lies in the two cases‟ temporal position relative 
to the fall.  Milton argues, partially through Adam‟s support of Eve after she relates her 
dream, that Eve remains in a state of innocence despite her satanic dream.  For Milton, 
moreover, it seems that any potentially negative effects of Eve‟s first battle with Satan in 
her dream are suspended because she is still sinless and still a legitimate citizen in a 
prelapsarian world. 
Here we have Milton‟s argument in praise of reason.  Had Eve employed her 
right reason, she could have prevented the fall when she was later tempted more 
materially by Satan in the form of a serpent.  If she had recalled her temptation in the 
dream, and her revulsion toward it, she could have avoided succumbing to the more real 
temptation the second time.
8
 
Moreover, and just as important, Milton‟s real point is that he is supplying us 
with a commentary on the human condition after the fall.  In a sense, a key to salvation, 
                                                 
7
 See Matthews, Thought’s Ego, ch. 8. We post-Cartesians, of course, have a certain advantage in 
reviewing the parameters of “the moral dream problem.”  Descartes‟ Meditations on First Philosophy is 
the most famous, or infamous, appeal to reason as the means by which to distinguish truth from error, 
especially as relative to dreams or that which might amount to the same, the merely (re)presentational.  
But even before Descartes, Milton was appealing to reason as the means by which Eve could have avoided 
evil by noting that the serpent was no mere serpent. 
8
 Even here we can see the role that memory plays in the work of right reason. 
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or at least a key to the maintenance of moral virtue, again lies with the use of reason.  
For Milton the effect of the fall was deleterious, but it did not cause a complete defect in 
the able use of reason as some Calvinists or Puritans maintain.  For Milton, reason is still 
a gift of God, and its right use is a necessary component in the maintenance of true piety. 
 Moreover, while Milton seemingly cannot abide the Calvinist or Puritan claim 
that reason was rendered wholly defective after the fall, his implicit criticism of 
Augustine‟s dream deliberations suggests that the Catholic line also offers no definitive 
answer to the issue of the relation of personal identity to the will in the context of evil.  
And in “the moral dream problem,” Milton seems to have exposed a rare moment of 
Augustinian weakness, not merely moral but also intellectual weakness.          
 According to Gareth Matthews, the central issue in the “moral dream problem” 
lies with the question: “Am I morally responsible for what I* do or think in my dreams?” 
(Thought’s Ego 90).  The answer to that question, according to Matthews, seems to 
depend on how one considers the relation between the self more properly understood and 
the self of the dream, the latter of whom Matthews designates as “I*.”  Although 
Augustine questions whether these two selves are the same, it appears to me at least, in a 
rare obfuscation in Augustine‟s work, that he really provides no definitive answer, as he 
both aligns himself with and attempts to distance himself from the self of the dream.  In 
contrast, Eve seems more clearly able to distance her real self from the dream Eve. 
Matthews insists, based on the opening two lines of the passage I quoted from 
Augustine, that Augustine views himself and the self of his dreams as the same—
”myself and that same self of mine.”  Yet, one could also argue, from the last line in the 
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above quotation from Augustine, that “we discover that it was not ourselves,” that 
Augustine moves toward seeing himself as separate or removed from that “self” of his 
dreams.  The case could be made that Augustine sees his proper self as separate from the 
dream-self insofar as he did not actively will to have this dream or to commit these sins; 
and yet, therewith, Augustine sees his proper self and the dream-self as the same at some 
level insofar as he yet considers himself somehow, even if not entirely, responsible for 
the sins therein committed.     
As Matthews notes, “even someone who denies that I am my dream self … may 
yet suppose that I am responsible for the content of my dreams” (Thought’s Ego 105).9  
Indeed, Matthews argues that Augustine admits responsibility for the sins of his dreams 
by expressing his grief, apparently taken here by Matthews to be a sign of guilt, over 
what was “in some manner done within us.”10  Matthews seems to dismiss entirely the 
counter-argument that a person is not necessarily or wholly responsible for his/her 
dreams and can remain innocent of the sins committed in such dreams.  After all, despite 
Augustine‟s expression of grief, there is also his own expressed claim of “return[ing] on 
awaking to peace of conscience,” which would imply that he feels, to some degree, that 
he is innocent of those sins committed in his dreams.  While a clear Augustinian verdict 
on “the moral dream problem” may still be out, Milton‟s Eve-dream episode in Paradise 
                                                 
9
 Emphasis is his. 
10
 I have some trouble with Matthews‟ easy conflation of grief and guilt—compare Milton‟s 
description in Paradise Lost of the angels‟ grief over man‟s fall: “Th‟ Angelic Guards ascended, mute and 
sad / For Man” (10.18-19), so that “dim sadness did not spare / That time Celestial visages, yet mixt / With 
pitie, violated not thir bliss” (10.23-25).  Milton makes it clear here that the angels can grieve over man‟s 
sin without feeling guilt for that sin. 
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Lost at least suggests the possibility that the dreamer does not have to be identified with 
the dream-self, nor to be responsible for what is dreamt and done.
11
 
Milton‟s employment of Eve‟s dream is so rich that other issues have arisen aside 
from the difficult question of personal identity and evil relative to it.  Some critics have 
questioned whether Eve‟s dream is a sign of some inherent weakness or strength, while 
others have suggested that Eve‟s dream is an indication that Eve was then and there 
already in a fallen state.12  Yet other critics argue for Eve‟s continued innocence at this 
point in Milton‟s narrative, despite her dream of sin, with varied readings of the dream 
as either foreshadowing her fall or showing what strength she does have.
13
   
                                                 
11
 Moreover, Milton, in effect prior to the eventual influence of Descartes concerning the role of 
rational judgment as an exercise utterly independent of the (re)presentational, while not providing a 
manifest resolution to “the moral dream problem,” at least yet praises reason, and even argues, if 
implicitly, that reason is an indispensable partner in spiritual warfare, not a hopelessly defective faculty as 
a consequence of the fall. 
12
 David Aers, Reid Barbour, and William G. Riggs all point to weaknesses on the part of Eve in 
her experience of this dream.  David Aers has recently argued in a Freudian reading of Eve‟s dream that 
Eve is both excited and frightened by her dream because it reveals “resentments and aspirations she had 
not known before the dream, but ones she recognizes, however ambivalently, as her own” (90).  Aers thus 
argues that with her angel-temptation dream, Eve is already fallen.   
By contrast, Reid Barbour does not argue that Eve is fallen because of her dream; but he suggests 
that Milton was trying to present Eve as nonetheless weak even in the prelapsarian state given that she is 
prone to unusual visions.  Barbour in effect suggests that Milton offers a kind of indirect appeal to reason, 
as Eve‟s weakness is a mark of her gender superimposed on the otherwise basically rational form of 
human beings.   
William G. Riggs also sees Eve‟s dream as a sign of her weaknesses.  He argues that, via the 
angel-temptation dream, Satan is able to manipulate Eve by mirroring Eve‟s very first experience as a 
human where, in Milton‟s poem, she arises from Creation as a rather vain-glorious person who preferred 
her own company to Adam‟s.  Riggs‟ conclusion suggests another defense of reason, but that Eve‟s reason 
was overwhelmed by Satan‟s cleverness; that Eve‟s ability to distinguish between Eve‟s self and dream 
self was ultimately lost because of Satan‟s abuse of language. 
13
 Josephine A. Roberts, Diane McColley, and Kristin Pruitt McColgan are among those who 
have taken this position.  Josephine A. Roberts and Diane McColley argue similarly that Eve‟s satanic 
dream reveals her continued innocence.  McColley even suggests that Eve‟s dream was a “new 
opportunity for obedience” which could have strengthened her resolve in the real temptation (26).  Neither 
McColley nor Roberts sees Eve‟s dream as a way for Milton to comment on Eve‟s, or woman‟s, inherent 
weakness, and I am in agreement with them that Milton does not use Eve‟s dream as a means to suggest 
some inherent frailty in Eve or women in general. 
McColgan also believes that Eve is still sinless at the point of her dream, and her argument seems 
to be the ultimate position Augustine would maintain, even if he was not entirely committed to a clear 
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But as I have already indicated, Milton had greater issues in sight than mere 
foreshadowing of the fall or even questions of Eve‟s potential strength.  He was 
interested in core theological issues that had ultimate, even doctrinal significance for the 
Christian of the seventeenth century.  Again, I see Milton arguing against the Calvinist 
suspicion of human reason as an entirely defective faculty as a result of the fall.  
Therewith, Milton is arguing against the consequent extreme predestination position of 
the Calvinist, for whom there could be no significant spiritual warfare, none at least that 
would involve the individual soul trying to employ right reason so as consciously to 
choose the good and eschew the bad, and to view rewards and punishments, in this life 
and the next, as a result of such choosing and eschewing, for each person has already 
been determined to be saved or damned.
14
   
More analysis of the particulars of Eve‟s dream will serve to reveal even more 
implications for spiritual warfare guided by reason as Milton understands it.  Eve‟s 
reasoning here is particularly interesting as she attempts to distance herself from the Eve 
of her dream even as she analyzes the actions of that Eve.  There are certain ambiguities 
                                                                                                                                                
conclusion.  McColgan argues that Eve was still in a state of innocence in her dream because the dream, as 
such, renders her free will unable to act or choose, and, absent the phenomenon of the use or abuse of free 
will, the event does not meet the test of being a genuine temptation.  Yet even given this reading of the 
dream, McColgan concludes that Milton meant for the dream episode to be a foreshadowing of Eve‟s 
eventual, actual fall (“„God Is Also in Sleep‟: Dreams Satanic and Divine in Paradise Lost”).  
Despite what we might consider a misplaced emphasis on Milton‟s textual strategy, McColgan‟s 
conclusion appears to be most definitive conclusion we can draw even from Augustine‟s text with its 
different but quite similar context.  Augustine claims that he walked away from the dream problem with a 
clear conscience.  But recalling Aquinas‟ discussion of conscience as “cum-scientia,” we can yet conclude 
from Augustine‟s claim that the dream phenomenon itself does not seem to give the mind obvious 
occasion to employ “scientia,” to employ reasoning with respect to the will because the reason is not 
awake to do so.  This seems to be the best we can say for Augustine, were we to force a conclusion for 
him. 
14
 And yet, as can be seen in the many spiritual autobiographies of Calvinists in the period, 
spiritual warfare was considered a real and important part of one‟s spiritual experience, and the weapons 
of such warfare—such as reason—would also be of great relevance. 
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in Eve‟s telling of her dream, but the ambiguities serve to emphasize the point Milton 
makes about reason in different ways.  Initially, it is not entirely clear whether it is Eve 
herself or the Eve of her dream who is chilled by “damp Horror” at the sin committed by 
the angel (5.65), but such horror would be proper for both.  Similarly, in one sense, 
Milton‟s employment of the word “methought” suggests a failure of reason on the part 
of the dream Eve; if she truly thought she had no choice but to eat the fruit, then she 
certainly failed to use her reason as she ought.  But this word could also be read as 
referring to Eve‟s own actions of her mind in retelling her dream to Adam—”I, 
methought, / Could not but taste” (5.85-86)—signaling her own thoughtful reflection on 
and reasoning analysis of the actions of the Eve in the dream.  In thinking about the 
events of the dream, Eve‟s reason seems to tell her that the dream-Eve had no choice in 
her dream but to taste of the fruit offered by the angel but forbidden by God, which only 
serves to emphasize the real Eve‟s powers of choice and ability to reason.  And despite 
the provocative ambiguities of these lines, this reading that privileges Eve‟s thoughtful 
response to the dream-Eve‟s failure of reason also serves to highlight what will be her 
own eventual failure of reason in the real temptation—not a foreshadowing of her fall, 
but an emphasis on what she was truly capable of doing but failed to do. 
Although Eve does not understand why she had no choice in the dream, why she 
“could not but taste” the fruit offered to her by the angel, she concludes correctly that 
she really did not have any choice.  That is, given the perspective provided by Milton, 
we know, even if Eve does not, that the Eve of the dream, like the sleeping and dreaming 
Eve, is controlled by Satan.  In the dream phenomenon, Eve is not directed toward virtue 
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or sin by an active freedom of the will.  In large part, it seems that what truly horrifies 
Eve when she awakes from the dream is not merely that the sin the dream Eve 
committed might be her own.  What seems to horrify Eve just as much is that in the act 
she had lost her freedom to act as she knew she should.  Thus, the realization that her 
freedom was not truly lost because the entire episode was but a dream simultaneously 
offers a great measure of relief and joy to Eve. 
Here we can see key similarities between Eve‟s account of her satanic dream and 
the questions that Augustine raises about his dreams.  Like Augustine, Eve also 
understands that there is “so great a difference” between the Eve of her dream, who 
willingly tastes the forbidden fruit, and her real self, who is horrified.  Even if her two 
selves are the same, the “real” Eve would not willingly consent to such disobedience, at 
least not in her prelapsarian viewpoint.  Eve is able to identify herself with the Eve of the 
dream only up to the moment when she eats the forbidden fruit, at which point the “real” 
Eve is properly horrified because in her dream she does not, to cite Augustine, “resist, 
and mindful of [her] resolution, persist in it most chastely, and yield no assent to such 
allurements,” as resistance to evil, resolve, and persistence in chastity are positions she 
should have maintained even in a dream.
15
  The real Eve, as it were, is not able to 
identify with the Eve who willingly and eagerly tastes the fruit.  Yet like Augustine, she 
is also quite happy to “return on awaking to peace of conscience” when she realizes that 
                                                 
15
 Consider Kristin Pruitt McColgan‟s point that “both the pattern and the content of the vision 
demonstrate how skillfully Satan produces the drama of the self on the stage of Eve‟s imagination, writing 
the script, directing the action, playing the lead, even using „more pleasing light‟ of evening (V, 42) to 
contribute to effect” (138, emphasis is mine).  Though McColgan allows that Satan is able to reflect Eve 
back to herself in the content of her dream, she still stresses that the dream is entirely instigated by Satan 
and not Eve, whereas William G. Riggs suggests that Satan plays upon Eve‟s desire for affinity by 
mirroring her first experience, which he takes for a sign of her weakness. 
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she herself did not actually commit this grievous sin.  Though she is disturbed by the 
dream itself, Eve‟s conscience is clear in reassuring her that she has no need to feel 
guilty for the lapse she experiences in her dream. 
More important, however, is the recognition that Eve‟s sinful dream in no way 
originates from Eve‟s own person, which is not as clearly the case for Augustine.  
Augustine admits that the source of his dreams is his memory, in which “there still live 
images of such things as my former habits implanted there.”16  There is no doubt about 
the source of Eve‟s dream for the reader, even if Adam and Eve do not know its source.  
Before hearing what the dream is, the reader has already witnessed Satan, in the previous 
book,  
Squat like a Toad, close at the eare of Eve;  
Assaying by his Devilish art to reach  
The organs of her Fancie, and with them forge  
Illusions as he list, Phantasms and Dreams. 
(4.800-03)
17
   
 
                                                 
16
 Augustine, Confessions, 10.30. 
17
 Jane M. Petty has argued that Eve‟s dream here is the result of natural stimuli, of which her 
sense and fancy are still aware even as she sleeps, so that Adam‟s actual voice is the source of the first 
dream.  In insisting that Eve‟s dream has such a simple, natural cause, however, Petty seems to deny the 
possibility of any external, “unnatural” cause—that is, Satan.  In such a reading, then, Petty discounts 
entirely the discovery of Satan “Squat like a toad” at the ear of Eve in the previous book, where the 
narrator plainly tells the reader that Satan is responsible for inspiring this evil dream in Eve.  In contrast, 
John S. Diekhoff stresses the role of Satan in Eve‟s dream and in Paradise Lost at large.  For Diekhoff, 
Satan is not simply “a metaphor for man‟s evil impulses.  He is the source of them and a real agent in 
Milton‟s fable” (6).  With this emphasis, Diekhoff argues against both Petty and Aers; that is, he stresses 
that her dream is consciously Satan‟s rather than unconsciously hers. 
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William Myers has suggested that here Satan attempts to “convert the „act‟ of thinking 
into something that merely „happens‟ in Eve.18  Such a reading privileges the idea that 
Eve‟s freedom is essentially overridden by Satan‟s will in this dream because she is not 
free to act, much less to think, thus absolving her of any responsibility for this dream.  
The dream originates in Satan‟s will rather than Eve‟s insofar as it originates in his 
actions (speaking the dream into her ear and forging false illusions in her imagination), 
even if it “happens” in Eve‟s mind. 
Adam reaches a similar conclusion after listening to Eve, though he, too, does 
not know the actual source of the dream.  Adam rightly believes that the evil of the 
dream could not have originated in Eve, for she “can harbour none, / Created pure” 
(5.99-100).  In terms of its theological implications, Adam‟s response to and 
interpretation of Eve‟s satanic dream is even more significant than Eve‟s narrative of her 
dream.  Adam‟s response seeks to answer theological questions the dream introduces.  
The core theological issue in this instance comes in the remarkable line: “nor can I like / 
This uncouth dream, of evil sprung I fear; / Yet evil whence?” (5.97-99).19  Adam, by 
reason, correctly knows this newly discovered evil could not have originated in the 
sinless Eve.  Yet, Adam also correctly realizes it must have originated somewhere.  
                                                 
18
 Myers, 36.  Consider, too, Matthews‟ observation in Thought’s Ego that for Plato, “a bad 
dream is, in a way, something that happens to me, rather than something I do; but I can bring it about that 
bad dreams do not happen to me—that I do not have them.  Their occurrence is, therefore, indirectly, even 
if not directly, my fault” (92).  While this may be true for fallen humans, it cannot be true for Eve, in this 
instance, for two reasons—because she has not yet sinned and because Satan puts the dream in her mind. 
19
 Some critics, such as C. A. Patrides and David Aers, have argued that Adam‟s answer reveals a 
lack of understanding of the real significance of Eve‟s dream.  Patrides suggests that “Adam errs in his 
curious conviction that Eve abhorred her dream” (106), while Aers argues that Adam does not engage in a 
genuine dialogue with Eve about her dream but rather proceeds in a proto-Freudian analysis informed 
primarily by his own fears, to the neglect of Eve‟s own account of her dream.  It appears to me, however, 
that Adam‟s response reveals the theological and moral significance of Eve‟s dream, particularly when 
read in light of Augustine‟s Confessions. 
  75 
 
Before finally turning to give solace to the distraught Eve, Adam ponders the question of 
the origin of evil from various angles.  He offers explanations of, or apologies for, Eve‟s 
dream, apologies in which the central issue is the use of reason. 
First, Adam tries to account for Eve‟s dream through his understanding of the 
faculties of the soul.  He relates this psychology, which highlights the importance and 
eminence of reason, to Eve: 
But know that in the Soule 
Are many lesser Faculties that serve  
Reason as chief; among these Fansie next 
Her office holds; of all external things, 
Which the five watchful Senses represent, 
She forms Imaginations, Aerie shapes, 
Which Reason joyning or disjoyning, frames 
All what we affirm or what we deny, and call 
Our knowledge or opinion; then retires 
Into her private Cell when Nature rests. 
(5.100-09) 
In the hierarchy of faculties, as Adam accounts for them, reason rules the soul, with 
fancy or imagination next in rank.  Fancy works from the perceptions of the senses, but 
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reason still supervises the work of the fancy.  It is the function of reason to tell the soul 
whether the work of fancy is true or false.
20
   
Thus far, Adam‟s psychology is virtually identical to Augustine‟s.  In Adam‟s 
words, presented to Eve, reason is the faculty by which a person “frames / All what we 
affirm or what deny.”  In Augustine‟s words, reason is the faculty “by which a man 
awake resists those suggestions” of sin.  More significant is Adam‟s belief that reason 
“retires / Into her private Cell” when a person is asleep, leaving fancy free reign to form 
whatever imaginations she wants.  In that dream state, reason is unavailable to judge that 
those fancies are false. 
Adam‟s point here is quite similar to Augustine‟s claims about dreams in On the 
Trinity, Augustine‟s clearest statement on “the moral dream problem.”  There Augustine 
writes that sleep is one of several kinds of moments when “not even reason itself is 
permitted to discern whether the body itself is seen without, or only something of the 
kind thought of within,” that is, whether what is perceived is real to the physical senses 
or only to the mind‟s eye.  Augustine continues a few lines later, “it makes a very great 
difference, whether the senses of the body are lulled to torpor, as in the case of sleepers, 
… [so] the intention of the mind is forced by a kind of necessity upon those images, 
which occur to it, either from memory, or by some other hidden force through certain 
spiritual commixtures of a similarly spiritual substance” (11.4).  From this understanding 
                                                 
20
 Consider the correlation here to Aristotle‟s understanding of the faculties of the soul and the 
objects of those faculties.  “Thinking” is the faculty which belongs only to the rational souls, the souls of 
humans.  The task of reason/thinking is to make judgments about essences and combine judgments and 
propositions into arguments.  The next highest faculty is Imagination, but it belongs not only to rational 
souls, but also to passionate souls.  It is the faculty by which people draw inferences from the world 
around them, and it is also the faculty by which people dream. 
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of the soul, Milton‟s invention of the voice of Satan at Eve‟s ear may surely be 
considered “some other secret force.”  It is such “secret force” that presented to Eve‟s 
mind images that she was unable to distinguish from reality because of the retirement of 
her faculty of reason during sleep.  
That which returns as an overriding issue, then, is the issue of free will.  And that 
is the case whether the issue is that of Eve‟s dreams in a prelapsarian state of innocence, 
or Augustine‟s dreams in a fallen state of guilt.  Eve is especially perplexed when she 
perceives and watches those images of sin in her dream that did not allow for any use of 
free will.  While her reason is “retire[d] / Into her private cell,” her will is unable to 
direct her mind away from the perceived images.  Therefore, she could awake relieved 
as she remained sinless even after dreaming of such sins, believing that, awake, her 
reason would again be available to guide her soul and would indeed keep her from 
committing such sins. 
The next part of Adam‟s response to Eve‟s dream, his apology for her, considers 
the further implications of “sleeping Reason”: 
Oft in her absence mimic Fansie wakes 
To imitate her; but misjoyning shapes, 
Wilde work produces oft, and most in dreams, 
Ill matching words and deeds long past or late. 
Some such resemblances methinks I find 
Of our last Eevnings talk, in this thy dream. 
(5.110-15) 
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Milton provides here a quick treatment on the role of mimesis among the faculties.  
When reason is asleep with the body, the fancy or imagination attempts to imitate the 
functions of reason.  But as imagination is an inferior faculty, it cannot imitate reason 
fully or accurately, or with proper precision.  The result of this exercise in inferior 
imitation is the “Wilde work” of the dreams of the sleeping person.21  With regard to the 
wild work of his own dreams, Augustine is greatly distressed that the images of his 
dream have “So great a power … over my soul and my flesh that these false visions 
persuade me when asleep to do what true sights cannot persuade me to when awake” 
(Confessions 10.30).
22
  Augustine attributes these wild and powerfully compelling 
images to the memories of his previously sinful life.  As noted above, Augustine admits 
that in his memory “there still live images of such things as my former habits implanted 
there” (10.30).   
Similarly Adam attributes at least part of Eve‟s dream to her memories.  Of 
course, in a prelapsarian state, Adam and Eve could not have memories on the order of a 
fallen person, such as Augustine.  But Adam and Eve could have the memory of the 
possibility of sin from the conversation they shared in the middle of Book IV concerning 
the tree of knowledge, the “only sign of our obedience” (4.428).  In that conversation 
Adam advises Eve to  
not think hard  
One easie prohibition, who enjoy  
                                                 
21
 William B. Hunter notes that according to popular dream and demon lore of the seventeenth 
century, demons could not tempt humans through the faculty of reason but rather only through the lower 
faculties of fancy or imagination. 
22
 Augustine, Confessions, 10.30. 
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Free leave so large to all things else, and choice  
Unlimited of manifold delights.  
(4.432-35)
23
   
But, as Adam does not know that Satan was the source of Eve‟s dream, Adam 
must still admit he cannot fully account for so much detail in Eve‟s dreams.  As Eve 
could not have remembered anything of any real detail from the mere possibilities of sin 
as broached in her conversation with Adam, Adam exclaims with wonder about the 
“addition strange” in her dream (5.116).  Yet Adam remains perplexed because he is 
incapable of explaining in full the details of Eve‟s dream.  But as he cannot trace an 
efficient cause of those details, Adam can arrive at no other conclusion than his belief 
that Eve is still innocent because she herself was not actually tempted to choose wrong.   
So, Adam turns to comfort Eve with the certainty of her continued innocence as 
he resolves his remaining concerns about Eve‟s free will and choice in her dream:  
yet be not sad. 
Evil into the mind of God or Man 
May come and go, so unapprov‟d, and leave 
No spot or blame behind:  Which gives me hope 
That what in sleep thou didst abhorr to dream, 
Waking thou never wilt consent to do. 
                                                 
23
 It is also in this conversation that Eve relates to Adam her memories of her creation—her sense 
of “much wondring where / And what I was” (4.451-52), her initial preference for her own image in the 
water rather than Adam, and her willing choice to “yield” to Adam‟s “manly grace / And wisdom” (4.489, 
490-91).  Satan, of course, eavesdrops on this entire conversation between Adam and Eve, which allows 
Riggs to argue that Satan plays on Eve‟s desire for affinity, which she displays in her creation narrative, 
both in her dream which he inspires and in her actual temptation. 
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(5.116-21) 
In response, then, to the question of Eve‟s free will, Milton‟s Adam makes the striking 
claim that evil can enter the mind of man with no consequent guilt accruing to the 
person, and evil can even enter into the mind of God.  However, when it does so, it does 
not de facto leave a stain of sin if such evil is “unapprov‟d” by the will, that is, if evil‟s 
presence there remains unsanctioned by the will.
24
  Thus Adam suggests that Eve‟s 
reason was not engaged when the evil in her dream entered her mind; and, in a sense, her 
will was retired also.  Yet, her free will, when engaged relative to the content of the 
dream in arising from the dream, acted properly in her rejection of the dream, which 
rejection, though ex post facto, was made evident as sincere in her manifest abhorrence 
of the experience of the dream.  Again, her will, guided by reason, did not consent to that 
sin.  So she remained sinless despite her dream of sin. 
Like Eve, then, Adam also experiences a certain “peace of conscience” in the 
recognition that Eve did not, at least not with her active reason, willingly choose to eat 
the forbidden fruit (Augustine, Confessions 10.30).
25
  Eve‟s active reason, which 
functions when she is awake, guides her conscience and ultimately her will to reject 
what she has done in her dream.  It is at the moment of her waking, when she can choose 
with genuine freedom whether to accept or reject the actions in her dream, that her 
                                                 
24
 The OED Online records Milton‟s as the first use of the word “unapproved” as meaning “not 
approved or sanctioned.”  <www.oed.com>. 
25
 McColley suggests that Eve‟s dream is significant not as a temptation but as one of several 
“preparatory tests of virtue that exercise the faculties of will, understanding, and imagination” (26).  She 
goes on to suggest that “for Milton, the keenness, the creativity, the liberty, and therefore the vulnerability 
of the subordinate faculties and the calling to keep them free by the exercise of right reason and upright 
will are among the risky opportunities for independent virtue that fill life in Paradise with challenge and 
delight” (27). 
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reason and will come fully into play once again.  Although her reason was asleep while 
she dreamt, once she is awake, her power of reason, and specifically right reason, 
immediately informs her free will to reject that which she dreamed as false, which she 
does.
26
 
Adam‟s peace of mind about Eve‟s dream—and her right response to it—seems 
almost complete, as Adam is satisfied that Eve could not and did not sin by way of her 
dream because her reason and will, retired during her sleep, did not have the opportunity 
to consider the images involved in the dream or to respond accordingly.  Because the 
content of dreams is not chosen and is therefore not a product of the will, Adam can 
claim that evil can enter the mind of man or even God without causing any residue sin 
because of a lack of consent, and that seems to be the case with Eve.  Therefore she 
remains sinless despite her dream of sin.
27
 
 Such a claim as Adam makes must be qualified, however, at least insofar as Eve is 
concerned, if not for God.  Here, that is, we must be conscious of distinguishing between 
subjects in a prelapsarian or postlapsarian state.  Although prelapsarian Eve could 
remain sinless in her dream due to the retirement of her reason and will, the problem is 
                                                 
26
 Such a reading, of course, anticipates Adam‟s admonition to Eve in the moments before the fall 
(addressed to some extent in the previous chapter) when he reminds Eve that reason should be “well 
beware, and still erect, / Least by some faire appeering good surpris‟d / She dictate false, and misinforme 
the Will / To do what God expressly hath forbid” (9.353-56). 
27
 Myers has interpreted the entirety of Adam‟s response to Eve‟s dream in such a way as to make 
Adam imply that reason‟s retirement during sleep suggests a concomitant retirement of the will, where no 
genuine, consequential choice is possible.  Reason‟s retirement, and the concomitant retirement of the will, 
“leaves the lesser faculty of Fancy, which is incapable of choice, to imitate reason by framing affirmations 
and denials” (36, emphasis is mine).  Myers‟ argument that Fancy is “incapable of choice” implies that 
when Fancy is in complete control when a person is asleep, free will is thus rendered ineffectual and 
incapable of action.  Myers further adds that “it is only because the rational will can thus be detached from 
evils perceived by the other faculties that it can remain uncontaminated by what it knows as a 
consequence” (36). 
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more complicated for postlapsarian persons.  Unlike Eve, and especially unlike God, 
fallen humans have already been marked by the “spot or blame” of evil—that is, by 
original sin.  Here again Milton‟s poetry was attempting to perfect Christian doctrine.  
But the point to emphasize here is that in the prelapsarian state, evil had not yet taken 
possession of Adam and Eve.  It only becomes the case for them and their posterity, after 
their obedience and fall.  “Original sin” is not original to them in their creation.  They 
are not created with an inherently evil desire.  Neither do they live according to a law of 
sin until after the fall, only after which point does evil desire become inherent.  Eve 
alone can remain sinless and innocent after a satanic dream of sins committed, whereas 
fallen humans, such as Augustine, because of that taint of original sin, must bear some 
weight of responsibility for their dreams. 
 
“What Weaknesse offerd, Strength might have refusde”: An Apology for Eve’s Fall 
Between Eve‟s dream and the dreams of Augustine—and the different 
implications of responsibility in their respective dreams—lie the important events of the 
temptation and fall that change fundamentally the dynamics of the moral dream problem 
and, more generally, set the very parameters of spiritual warfare.  These are the events 
that actually bring about the defect of reason in postlapsarian humanity.  Among many 
treatments of the fall in theological and literary texts, Aemilia Lanyer‟s account in Salve 
Deus Rex Judaeorum and Milton‟s accounts in Paradise Lost share a remarkable 
emphasis on the role that reason plays in the first consequential encounter in the spiritual 
war with Satan, the dynamics of the dream of Milton‟s Eve notwithstanding.  Though 
  83 
 
contextualizing their accounts of the fall in different ways, both Milton and Lanyer point 
to a failure of reason to prevent the events of the fall, as well as the effects of the fall on 
the faculty of human reason and the development of human relationships. 
Though it is difficult to identify Lanyer‟s religious beliefs with any certainty—
scholars place her anywhere from Puritan to Lutheran—I would suggest at the very least 
that there is a certain radical quality in her theology as she undertakes in this poem her 
own Biblical exegesis, and she reads and interprets the Biblical story of the fall in such a 
way as to urge equality between men and women, especially in the realm of religious 
experience.
28
  Lanyer‟s exegesis of the fall is, significantly, given within the context of 
her exegesis on the Crucifixion.  As such, Lanyer‟s poem is not intended to be a poetic 
representation of the events in the Garden, but through both of these accounts and 
interpretations, Lanyer emphasizes and privileges the spiritual experiences and virtues of 
women, especially those who witness the Crucifixion, but also of women more 
generally.   
Key among the women in Lanyer‟s poem is the wife of Pontius Pilate.  It is 
Pilate‟s wife who recounts and comments upon the fall of Adam and Eve as she speaks 
to her husband about his role in the events leading up to the Crucifixion.  Lanyer herself 
                                                 
28
 Wendy Miller Roberts identifies Lanyer as a Gnostic, while Gary Kuchar aligns her with 
Lutheranism and even certain aspects of Catholicism (particularly her representation of Mary in the 
poem).  Kari Boyd McBride and John C. Ulreich write of the shared religious positions of Milton and 
Lanyer: “Like most of their English Protestant contemporaries, Aemilia Lanyer and John Milton share a 
commitment to the Bible as the ultimate ground of aesthetic—as well as spiritual and political—authority.  
What distinguishes them from many other Protestants is the way they lay claim to that heritage.  Both 
writers are crucially engaged in establishing their own authority: that is, they submit themselves, not to the 
letter of Scripture, but to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, often with interpretive results that do not 
obviously conform to the standard features of Protestant poetic” (332).  I would add their shared emphasis 
on reason in spiritual warfare also distinguishes them from the general tendency of Protestant poetics. 
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identifies this brief section of her poem as “Eve‟s Apology.”29  Pilate‟s wife narrates and 
interprets the events of the fall as she seeks to persuade Pilate to release Jesus so as to 
prevent the crucifixion, in effect aligning Eve‟s actions in the fall with the virtuous 
women witnessing the Crucifixion, and Adam‟s actions in the fall with the sinful and 
malicious men who seek to crucify the Son of God.   
“Eve‟s Apology” seeks in particular to excuse Eve‟s actions in the fall while 
placing more blame on Adam‟s weakness.  While Lanyer clearly identifies a role that 
reason plays in the temptation and fall, she seems to emphasize that role to a much 
greater extent in the temptation of Adam in order to suggest that Eve‟s sin is less serious 
than Adam‟s because Eve did not possess the same faculty of reason, or at least the same 
quality of reason, from the moment of her creation as Adam did.  Lanyer aims in this 
way to counter traditional theological interpretations of the fall that mainly condemned 
Eve for both her fall and the fall of Adam, seeking instead to exonerate Eve on two 
fronts.  First, Lanyer compares Adam‟s and Eve‟s respective actions that led to their 
respective falls.  And second, relative to the Crucifixion, Lanyer offers a poetic 
rendering of the virtuous actions of Eve‟s female progeny as witnesses of the crucifixion 
in comparison with the ignoble actions of the men involved in the Crucifixion. 
Lanyer‟s judgment is that the sins of the men involved in the Crucifixion are an 
indication of how far worse Adam‟s actions in the fall were than Eve‟s.  Lanyer does not 
proceed to claim complete superiority of women over men in light of Adam‟s primary 
culpability in the fall, even though it is implied that she could.  But Pilate‟s wife claims a 
                                                 
29
 “Eve‟s Apology” occupies only about sixty-five lines of the 1,840-line poem. 
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certain moral superiority for Eve over Adam, an exact inverse of the kind of moral 
superiority men have traditionally claimed over women following most traditional 
accounts of the fall.   
Yet Pilate‟s wife begins her apology for Eve‟s sin by assuming a traditional 
posture of submissiveness to her husband and to men in general: “Let not us women 
glory in Mens fall, / Who had power given to over-rule us all” (759-60).  She then 
proceeds, however, to qualify this submission.  She argues that the greatness of the sin 
that men are about to commit in the Crucifixion will render void the subjection that has 
been forced upon women because of Eve‟s role in the fall: “till now your indiscretion 
sets us free, / And makes our former fault much lesse appeare” (761-62).  Again Lanyer 
refrains from claiming that women should have total power over men.  But she offers a 
peculiar argument for women‟s equality with men at least, with a more than generous 
compromise.  Even assuming that Eve was the primary culprit in the fall, an assumption 
Lanyer does not maintain, the apparent fact that men were the primary culprits in the 
Crucifixion of Christ cancels out the alleged primary culpability of Eve.  Men and 
women should now be equals, Lanyer argues, with the lingering implication that women 
are yet morally superior.
30
  Moreover, while Lanyer‟s operating premise might seem to 
demand a harsh castigation of both Adam and the men primarily culpable in the 
Crucifixion, her repudiation of both is relatively gentle.  While Lanyer could have been 
sharper in her criticisms, she does not aspire to a full-scale feminist attack.  For the most 
part, Lanyer seems content to make at least two points: one, a counter to the operating 
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 This is in direct opposition to the long held tradition of seeing women as inherently fallen and 
the source of human sin. 
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premises of most accounts of the fall that make Eve the primary culprit; and two, the 
suggestion that woman are at least morally, if not intellectually, superior to men.    
Lanyer‟s proto-feminist moral theology seems to be, of course, historically 
conditioned.  Like Pilate‟s wife‟s initial position of submissiveness, Lanyer‟s treatment 
of the female intellect in the defense of Eve‟s actions seems to be derived almost entirely 
from her culture‟s traditional treatment of women.  It seems too much grounded upon 
commonplace ideas about women within the misogynistic culture of the seventeenth 
century.  That is, while Lanyer views women as morally superior to men, she also 
diverts attention from any prolonged consideration of the female intellect.  She seems to 
concede that women do not possess the same degree of intellect as men, so her emphasis 
on the role of reason in the fall seems pertinent primarily in regard only to Adam.  
Laying the greater blame for the fall upon Adam, Lanyer does so at the expense of an 
account of Eve‟s, and by extension all women‟s, intelligence and capacity to reason in 
order to emphasize instead women‟s moral virtue. 
Regarding the fall, then, Lanyer stresses the privileged place of Adam in the 
created world—that “he was Lord and King of all the earth, / Before poore Eve had 
either life or breath” (783-84).  Adam received the dictate not to eat the fruit straight 
from the mouth of God.  Eve therefore was at a disadvantage, for she only heard the law 
secondarily, from Adam.  Most importantly, then, Lanyer stresses the strength of mind 
Adam possessed which should have prevented his fall. 
In contrast to Adam‟s presumed strength, “Eve‟s Apology” is grounded in the 
notion that Eve fell because she was “simply good, and had no powre to see” what the 
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effects of eating the fruit would be (765).  Eve‟s sin is committed out of an 
“undiscerning Ignorance [which] perceav‟d / No guile, or craft that was by [Satan] 
intended” (769-70).  The implication is that Eve sins because she does not possess the 
capacity for reason that would enable her to recognize Satan‟s deceptions as such.  
Lanyer suggests that if Eve had been gifted with more of the original intellect, as it were, 
that Adam possessed, she might have been better able to reject the serpent‟s arguments.31   
Indeed, according to Lanyer, what Eve seeks in her sin is knowledge that is 
greater than that with which she was created.  For Lanyer, Eve justifiably believes what 
the serpent tells her—that they will “even as Gods, be wise” (776).  Thus, Lanyer tells 
the reader that “if Eve did erre, it was for knowledge sake” (797).  That “if” is quite 
suggestive in its implication that Eve‟s sin was really no sin at all, or that if her actions 
were yet sinful, her motive for that sin—to gain knowledge—was pure.32 
Eve loses her spiritual battle, but Lanyer does not blame Eve for her loss.  Lanyer 
places the blame entirely upon Adam, for she deems it was Adam‟s responsibility and 
duty to keep both himself and his wife from sin.  Whereas Eve possessed a rather limited 
                                                 
31
 In this way, Lanyer‟s Eve seems particularly marked as inherently fallen, as she does not seem 
to have been created “sufficient to stand.”  Despite the arguments that Milton‟s Eve must sin out of 
necessity because of her inherent weaknesses, I think this is much more the case for Lanyer‟s Eve.  Milton 
makes it clear that Eve‟s intellect is not one of her weaknesses; she possesses a full measure of reason with 
which to guide her will away from sin, whereas Lanyer‟s Eve does not.  This is one way in which Milton 
might be viewed as other than simply a misogynist. 
32
 Though I disagree with Wendy Miller Roberts‟s argument that “Eve‟s Apology” reveals 
Lanyer‟s Christian Gnosticism, I do agree with her statement that “in one stroke, Lanyer reverses the 
expected critique of women‟s superficiality and instead credits women with a preoccupation exclusively 
associated with men: knowledge” (16), which brings us again to questions of what she knows and how she 
is supposed to use that knowledge.  My problem with Roberts‟s argument lies in her insistence that Lanyer 
represents the knowledge that Eve seeks both for herself and for Adam as “inherently good and valuable” 
(17), but such a reading seems to superimpose what Eve expected of the knowledge onto Lanyer‟s own 
conceptions of that knowledge.  Eve‟s expectation that the fruit would make Adam‟s knowledge clearer is 
not necessarily what the fruit would actually do, but Roberts implies that the two are the same. 
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intellect, Adam possessed the wisdom necessary to withstand the temptation, as his 
strong wisdom was provided by God Himself quite immediately: “What Weaknesse 
offerd, Strength might have refusde” (779).  Adam‟s sin is greater because he has 
virtually no need to sin, while Eve‟s sin is at least minimally justified in her legitimate 
desire for a seemingly licit knowledge.  But if Lanyer‟s Eve is marked as particularly 
weak and ignorant, the point is that even if Eve sinned out of an inherent weakness, then 
Adam‟s inherent strength should have enabled him to withstand her temptation.  And, 
again, it was also Adam‟s responsibility, with that superior intellect, to keep Eve from 
her sin; if Eve did not already possess the means to withstand temptation, then Adam 
was that much more responsible for both his and Eve‟s sin. 
Lanyer goes even one step further to suggest a certain degenerate determination 
on Adam‟s part to eat the fruit.  She asks, “If he would eate it, who had powre to stay 
him?” so that Eve‟s temptation of Adam seems secondary to his own desire to eat the 
fruit (800).  She stresses that in his desire to eat the fruit, Adam “never sought her 
weaknesse to reprove, / With those sharpe words, which he of God did heare” (805-6).  
Instead, Lanyer suggests that Adam, and men more generally, boast of the knowledge 
that they gained “From Eves fair hand, as from a learned Booke” (808), such that the 
focus is drawn not to what Eve has done but to the benefit that men have drawn from 
Eve‟s actions: a claim of justifiable dominion over women because of the intellectual 
weakness of Eve.  The perverse irony, according to Lanyer, is that men condemn women 
for not being as intelligent as men, yet the justification for the maintenance of that claim 
of intellectual superiority was made manifest by an action that revealed male inferiority 
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in the exercise of morals.  Though Lanyer presents a less than flattering conception of 
Eve‟s intelligence in Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum, she exonerates Eve by placing greater 
blame on Adam‟s fall than on Eve‟s, even if Eve‟s fall seems as grave, or more so, as her 
fall renders her subject to Adam‟s rule. 
Most compelling in Lanyer‟s account, however, is her suggestion of the extended 
consequences (in a postlapsarian state) for broader human relations.  That is, such 
consequences are implied in her treatment of the first spiritual battle between Adam and 
Eve and Satan within the context of other, later spiritual conflicts, especially that of the 
Crucifixion.  This larger context of “Eve‟s Apology” is suggestive of the ways in which 
this first spiritual conflict gives rise to all later occasions of such battles and temptations.  
On a smaller scale, there is the battle which Pilate‟s wife is waging over the state of her 
husband‟s soul.  Pilate‟s wife is trying to prevent Pilate from committing a horrible sin 
by allowing the son of God to be crucified.  Yet therewith there is also an even greater 
battle being waged, one that has far-reaching implications for the people of God.  The 
entire story of the Crucifixion is a continuation and fulfillment of the first battle between 
God and Satan.  The redemption and possible salvation of the entire world is at stake, as 
the Crucifixion of Christ is revealed as necessary to remove the effects of the loss 
endured in the first spiritual war in the Garden.   
Ingeniously, Lanyer clarifies many complications involved in this universal 
spiritual warfare operating in the particular circumstance of Pilate‟s involvement in the 
Crucifixion by once again changing tradition.  As Lanyer challenges the traditional 
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reading of the fall that made Eve the primary culprit, Lanyer also refigures the role of 
Pilate‟s wife in the events leading up to the Crucifixion.   
Traditional treatments of the role of Pilate‟s wife have suggested that the dream 
of Pilate‟s wife is demonically-inspired.  Satan would be the source of the woman‟s 
dream that would recommend the halting of the Crucifixion.  Satan would want the 
Crucifixion halted because he realizes that Jesus is his promised foe and vanquisher, 
albeit a peculiar, dialectical vanquisher.  Jesus‟s death is the only event that would 
destroy Satan‟s power in the world.  According to this tradition, Satan therefore delivers 
a dream to Pilate‟s wife.  The satanic function of the dream would be to move Pilate‟s 
wife to dissuade Pilate from playing his part in the Crucifixion.  The satanic aim would 
therefore have all kinds of deleterious consequences: Christ would not be destroyed, and 
therefore Satan would not be vanquished; and the circumstance would harden Pilate‟s 
heart against both his wife and Jesus.  Pilate would resent his wife for interfering in his 
business; and Pilate would resent Jesus for causing a stir Pilate might be ineffective in 
solving.
33
   
In stark contrast to that traditional understanding of the role of the dream of 
Pilate‟s wife, Lanyer portrays the dream of Pilate‟s wife as divinely-inspired.  It is a 
dream delivered to her not out of hell but out of heaven.  Lanyer does not suggest that 
Pilate‟s wife‟s dream would be efficacious in preventing the Crucifixion.  Rather, 
Lanyer suggests that in a sense Pilate‟s wife is in a position of ignorance somewhat as 
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 The N------Town Plays, Ordinalia, and the York mystery plays from the previous century all 
represent Pilate‟s wife‟s dream in this way.  See Josephine Roberts.  Satanic dreams as a particular form of 
spiritual warfare have already been addressed in terms of Eve‟s dream in Paradise Lost and will be further 
analyzed in terms of Richard Norwood‟s Confessions and Jesus‟s dreams in Paradise Regained. 
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Eve was in a position of ignorance.  Pilate‟s wife was not privy to that which only 
Jesus‟s disciples could know: that the Crucifixion was necessary for the redemption and 
salvation of humankind.  As in the case of Eve, Pilate‟s wife was in a state of intellectual 
inferiority and was yet morally superior in her earnest attempt to prevent the Crucifixion.  
Moreover, the dream of Pilate‟s wife suggests that she was inherently virtuous.  
Not only was she worthy to receive a divine message, but her report of the dream reveals 
the proper care she has for her husband.  She rightly fears that Pilate‟s cooperation in the 
Crucifixion would surely damn his soul.  The virtue of Pilate‟s wife then extends to 
privilege the position of the women who witness the Crucifixion.  Pilate‟s wife lays the 
blame for Jesus‟s death firmly on the men involved and portrays the women who witness 
the Crucifixion as more fully aware, if only by superior moral intuition, of who is really 
being put to death. 
When Pilate refuses to heed his wife‟s dream and advice, Lanyer points out that 
he has failed to reason properly and understand what is at stake.  It is clear that Pilate is 
“content against all truth and right, / To seale this act, that may procure [his] ease / With 
blood, and wrong, with tryannie, and might” (842-44).  Pilate exhibits no care for what is 
true and right, as long as he does not have to face difficulties from the people over whom 
he rules.  Similarly, Lanyer argues that his refusal to listen to his wife reveals his “base 
dejection of this heavenly Light,” such that his will is directed by selfish desires rather 
than what is true and right as revealed by God (846). 
With regards to Pilate‟s part in the Crucifixion, Lanyer laments at what cost his 
choice has been made: 
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Oh that thou couldst unto such grace aspire, 
That thy polluted lips might never kill 
That Honour, which right Judgement ever graceth, 
To purchase shame, which all true worth defaceth. 
(853-56) 
Pilate‟s sins have driven him into even greater sin in his refusal to use his right judgment 
to speak out against what the multitude wishes to do to Jesus.  Though listening to his 
wife might have allowed him to aspire to the same grace which she has been given in her 
understanding of the events taking place, Pilate instead has defaced his own worth with 
the shameful choice he has made.   
Lanyer is harsh in her final judgment of Pilate, insisting that he is but a “painted 
wall” that appears good and virtuous but hides the sin and filth behind it.  Moreover, 
Lanyer insists that no matter what lies Pilate tells to himself to relieve him from his 
sense of guilt in sending Christ to be crucified, he will be held accountable for what he 
has done: 
Canst thou be innocent, that gainst all right, 
Wilt yield to what thy conscience doth withstand? 
Being a man of knowledge, powre, and might, 
To let the wicked carrie such a hand, 
Before thy face to blindfold Heav‟ns bright light, 
And thou to yield to what they did demand? 
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Washing thy hands, thy conscience cannot cleare, 
But to all worlds this staine must needs appeare. 
(929-36) 
Like Adam, then, Pilate possesses all the knowledge and power needed to choose 
rightly, and like Adam before him, Pilate willingly ignores the light of truth, ignores 
what his conscience tells him he should do at the crucial moment. 
In drawing such parallels between Adam‟s sin and Pilate‟s, and emphasizing the 
virtue and wisdom of Pilate‟s wife which stands in contrast to Eve‟s supposed lack of 
reason, Lanyer is suggestive of the extent of the consequences for failing to use reason 
when one is capable of doing so.  And by placing the account of Adam and Eve within 
this larger context of the Crucifixion, Lanyer implies that the women have learned from 
Eve‟s mistake and have internalized the need to use reason properly, while the men have 
failed to learn anything from Adam‟s mistake in his misuse of reason, as they continue 
to disregard what reason tells them. 
 
“Perswasive words, impregn’d / With Reason”:  The Temptation and the Fall in  
Paradise Lost 
While Lanyer places her treatment of the fall within the context of the 
Crucifixion, In Paradise Lost, Milton contextualizes his account of the temptation and 
fall with an extensive dialogue which he imagines leads to the separation of Adam and 
Eve.  That separation is the condition that enables Satan to tempt Eve when Eve is 
entirely alone, so it is worthwhile to consider Eve‟s state of mind as Milton represents it 
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when she leaves Adam and her reasons for doing so.  Eve is the one who wishes to work 
alone, separate from Adam, but her desire is itself not unreasonable.  She desires to work 
alone in the garden so that she might work more productively, apart from the distractions 
of conversation and other forms of company supplied by Adam. 
In his first response to her suggestion, Adam gives her a “mild answer,” though 
he does not like Eve‟s suggestion, because he enjoys working with Eve by his side 
(9.226).  Yet, he admits that Eve‟s request is not unreasonable, and indeed he praises 
Eve for her suggestion and desire to be alone in some measure—how better to fulfill the 
tasks assigned to them by their Creator?  Adam even mentions reason in his mild 
compromise.  He realizes that Eve is concerned about the shared smiles and sweet 
discourses that often interrupt their work, but he argues that such “smiles from Reason 
flow” and that God created them “not to irksom toile, but to delight / … and delight to 
Reason joyn‟d” (9.239, 242-43). 
Milton makes two points about reason here.  First, reason is the faculty that 
separates human from beast: reason is “To brute deni‟d” (9.240).  Second, rather 
remarkably, the function of reason in the prelapsarian state is linked intimately with the 
experiences of pleasure and delight.  It is through their use of reason that Adam and Eve 
most fully relate to one another.  They take greatest delight in one another‟s company in 
a way that is not merely bestial: they enjoy each other‟s company, sharing smiles and 
conversation, which Adam calls the “Food of the mind” (9.238).   
If Adam and Eve‟s innocent smiles and conversations are a sort of food that 
sustains their minds, then to some degree Eve‟s decision to work alone is a decision that 
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will remove her from the source of her mental sustenance.  To be absent from the 
company of the other will therefore effect to some degree a weakening of both their 
minds.  If Eve had remained with Adam to smile and converse as they worked together 
as usual, the implication is that Eve‟s reason and will would remain strong.  Yet, 
separated, Eve would be more easily deceived by Satan‟s lies about the tree of 
knowledge of good and evil.
34
 
Adam, notwithstanding his pure and simple desire to be in Eve‟s company, is 
also concerned about Eve‟s request to be alone.  Adam recalls the warning about an 
enemy who might lead them to pursue lesser goods, and he realizes their separation 
might provide an opportunity for the tempter to tempt one or the other alone.  Adam, 
knowing that their reason is heightened when he and Eve are together, also knows 
therefore that the enemy would have a more difficult time tempting the two together.  
Adam, despite acknowledging the reasonable nature of Eve‟s request to be alone, 
therefore tries to justify their need to stay together.  Adam reminds Eve of how subtle the 
enemy must be since he was able to seduce angels to his side.  Having the help of one 
another seems necessary in light of the power of the enemy.  And Adam proceeds to tell 
                                                 
34
 This is a rather hypothetical scenario, if also an interesting one for consideration.  Yet one 
should also consider whether shared smiles and conversations would likewise be “food for the mind” after 
the fall, or whether, like so much else, these are also tainted by the effects of the fall.  It is my inclination 
to read these lines as pertaining especially to the conversations between Adam and Eve in their innocent 
state; after the fall, their smiles and conversations are too much tainted by the sins which they have 
committed to be an entirely wholesome food for their minds and reason. 
In a variation on this idea, A. Kent Hieatt argues for an allegorical interpretation of the fall in 
which Adam and Eve are related as different levels of reason: “Woman is intellectually the equal of man 
in comprehending the truths of Christianity—but for symbolic reasons the role of the lower reason, or 
scientia, may be assigned to Eve, and that of the higher reason, or sapientia, to Adam” (221).  When they 
are separated, the consequences are dire: “At the Fall, the Serpent seduced Eve into such a faith in 
visibilia; and she then, by unspecified arguments (per discursum argumentationum in sensibilibus), in turn 
seduced faith—the fountain of reason, who should have managed her—into putting his trust in concrete 
things and into withdrawing his trust from invisibilia, or transcendent, properly governing truth” (223). 
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Eve precisely how she could be of help to him should they be faced with the enemy‟s 
temptation together:  
I from the influence of thy looks receave 
Access in every Vertue, in thy sight 
More wise, more watchful, stronger, if need were 
Of outward strength; while shame, thou looking on, 
Shame to be overcome or over-reacht 
Would utmost vigor raise, and rais‟d unite.   
(9.309-14) 
Adam‟s explanation echoes and reinforces what he said to Eve in the first part of their 
conversation.  Eve‟s presence and the virtue she both possesses and represents are a type 
of food for Adam‟s mind and reason.  He argues that he becomes more virtuous and 
even wiser by looking at her and being reminded of her virtue.  Adam also suggests that 
his mind and reason become firmer and more watchful on the assumption of Eve‟s 
presence for another reason.  If Adam were engaged in spiritual battle with her watching, 
he would fear failing because of the great shame he would feel through Eve‟s 
observation of his failure.  Conversely, however, the implication is that their minds 
would grow necessarily weaker if they were away from each other‟s company.  
Likewise, without the watchful gaze of the other, Adam implies the shame would not be 
immediately felt for what might be done. 
Adam has the highest regard for Eve and ties his very existence to her virtue and 
presence.  It is understandable that he wishes to hear that she has the same regard for 
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him.  He asks if his presence should not have the same effect on her the way hers has on 
him: “Why shouldst not thou like sense within thee feel / When I am present, and thy 
trial choose / With me, best witness of thy Vertue tri‟d” (9.315-17).  Yet, despite such 
exclamations of love, and despite such reassurances and arguments, Eve believes there is 
some doubt on Adam‟s part about her capacity to stand alone.  So, again, though still 
with “accent sweet” (9.321), Eve attempts to persuade Adam to let her work alone. 
Though Eve essentially reiterates what Milton writes elsewhere about the 
importance of a tested virtue—“what is Faith, Love, Vertue unassaid / Alone, without 
exterior help sustaind?” (9.335-36)—she follows that rhetorical question with the 
problematic claim that she and Adam are in no real jeopardy because God would not 
have made them in such a way that they would be unable to withstand spiritual tests 
either together or alone.  Eve seems convinced that neither she nor Adam is in any real 
danger despite evidence to the contrary, especially in the chilling effect of the temptation 
dream.  Eve also seems forgetful of the freedom God gave them, a freedom that allows 
for eventual failure should they fail to maintain a discipline of reason. 
Since Eve seems to have forgotten that God did not create her and Adam 
invulnerable to temptation, Adam reminds her of the danger of their state of being 
allowed to choose either good or evil: 
O Woman, best are all things as the will 
Of God ordain‟d them, his creating hand 
Nothing imperfet or deficient left 
Of all that he Created, much less Man, 
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Or aught that might his happie State secure, 
Secure from outward force; within himself 
The danger lies, yet lies within his power: 
Against his will he can receave no harme. 
(9.343-50) 
Adam reiterates the same summary claim God made to the Son in Book 3, that Adam 
and Eve were created “Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall” (3.99).   
Adam‟s response is a reminder of his and Eve‟s capacity to fall despite his 
knowledge that God had otherwise created them in a state of perfection.  Adam echoes 
Aquinas: Adam and Eve were created in a state of perfection; but not a state of 
perfection on a par with God‟s perfection, as Adam and Eve were potentially 
corruptible.
35
  But in their created state, Adam and Eve possessed a perfection God had 
ordained for them.  God has not left Adam and Eve lacking in anything that they could 
possibly need to remain in this state of perfection—namely the free will to choose and 
right reason to guide the will‟s choice. 
Adam then has to educate Eve as to the subtle danger to which they are subject.  
Despite their state of essential perfection, the source of the danger to which they are 
subject does not come solely from external sources or forces.  Rather, the basic and 
possibly lasting danger lies within the will itself, even as the power to resist that danger 
also lies within one‟s free will.  No matter what the enemy is able to do, he could never 
                                                 
35
 Aquinas writes of the “rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God,” 
which consisted in “his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: 
and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to 
God, the lower powers remained subject to reason” (ST 1.95.1). 
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force Adam and Eve to sin if their wills did not consent to sin.  And even though God 
has already announced to the Son that Adam and Eve will fall because they are deceived 
by Satan, such deception does not preempt their accountability and responsibility for the 
sins they commit via that deception.   
Once again, reason is central to the issue of the fall.  Satan‟s deception works 
because of the failure of reason to be vigilant:  
But God left free the Will, for what obeyes  
Reason, is free, and Reason he made right, 
But bid her well beware, and still erect, 
Least by some faire appeering good surpris‟d 
She dictate false, and misinforme the Will 
To do what God expresly hath forbid. 
(9.351-56) 
It is ultimately a failure of reason on Adam‟s and Eve‟s parts that allows their wills to 
direct them away from God, the highest good.
36
  Satan‟s arguments appear or sound 
good, as if they are reasonable, so when Eve fails to discern the falsity of those 
arguments, when her reason accepts Satan‟s arguments as valid, then the will is directed 
to disobey God‟s commandment. 
                                                 
36
 William Walker suggests that there is “something new and perhaps paradoxical in this account 
of the freedom to act, for now the unfallen will is not free tout court but is free only on the condition that it 
continually submits itself to the dictates—a word not usually associated with freedom—of reason and not 
to those other things within it that are identified earlier by Raphael: passion and appetite” (149).  Walker 
offers two possibilities regarding the relationship between freedom and obedience, arguing that the 
freedom of the will depends upon the faculty of reason, but he ignores the possibility that the will is still 
free even if it does not obey reason, even if it uses that freedom to sin in choosing, freely, lesser goods 
rather than higher ones.  Regardless, however, Walker likewise sees the fall as “not essentially a failure of 
the will but a failure of that faculty upon which the freedom of the will depends” (155). 
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Despite his misgivings, Adam gives Eve reluctant permission to do as she 
desires, and he does so in a way imitative of God giving humans the freedom to choose.  
That is, Adam relents with the same allowance of her free will that God grants to 
humankind, “for thy stay, not free, absents thee more” (9.372).  Adam realizes that 
forcing Eve to work with him, rather than alone, would be an instance of impeding her 
free will.
37
 
Despite these sound warnings and advice from Adam, and given the choice to 
leave or stay, Eve remains determined to work alone.  Though Eve still seems motivated 
to work alone so as to be more productive, her final statement to Adam also expresses a 
foolish hope to be tempted by their enemy in order to prove to Adam she can engage in 
spiritual warfare successfully on her own: 
With thy permission then, and thus forewarnd 
Chiefly by what thy own last reasoning words 
Touchd onely, that our trial, when least sought, 
May finde us both perhaps farr less prepar‟d, 
The willinger I goe, nor much expect 
A Foe so proud will first the weaker seek, 
So bent, the more shall shame him his repulse. 
(9.378-84) 
                                                 
37
 Adam‟s relationship with Eve here mirrors God‟s relationship to humans insofar as Eve is 
given the freedom to choose whether to stay obedient to God‟s commandment(s).  If Adam were to force 
her to stay, her obedience would not really be freely given.  However, what he hopes will happen when he 
gives Eve this freedom—that she will decide to stay with him—is not what she chooses to do. 
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Though she does not expect to encounter their enemy, Eve seems almost willing and 
eager to meet him now, for she feels she is prepared for such a battle.  It might seem that 
the foolishness of Eve‟s rebuke of Adam‟s wish to have her remain in his presence is a 
suggestion that Eve has already fallen, as might the foolishness of her hopes.  But Milton 
goes to considerable lengths to argue that Eve is not fallen for that reason.
38
  She is not 
fallen until she makes the choice to taste and eat the forbidden fruit.  That choice is her 
first sin.  Only the choice to disobey God‟s sole commandment can introduce sin into the 
created world.
39
   
Yet, the primary issue remains the issue of reason.  The key to understanding 
Eve‟s moves that place her in a vulnerable position is her rejection of reason.  Her first 
major misstep of reason that leads to the condition for her temptation is her rejection of 
Adam‟s “reasoning words” to stay with him (9.379).  While she accepts that Adam has 
given her “reasoning words” to persuade her to stay with him—as with Eve, Adam is not 
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 Building upon the scholarship which argues for a positive representation of Eve, Jeanie Grant 
Moore offers additional proof that Eve is inherently good by comparing her to the Lady in Comus: 
“supporting Milton‟s unfallen Eve as innately good is her likeness to one proven good, the Lady of 
Comus.  Verbal parallels, similar deceptions and arguments can be seen in the temptation scenes of the 
two women, and, although the nature of the temptations and the outcomes are very different, they can 
clearly be shown to begin from a similar point of innocence” (6).   
39
 Though this raises interesting questions about what being foolish or mistaken in her reason, or 
even naively wrong, means in a prelapsarian situation, the crucial difference lies in what constitutes sin 
before and after the fall.  Adam and Eve‟s perfection depends upon their obedience to God; as long as they 
remain obedient, they remain in that perfect state in terms of their relationship with God.  It is only when 
they are disobedient that such foolishness can become sinful, and only when their reason fails to direct 
their wills towards obedience, that they are actually fallen.  Al Cacicedo suggests that readers often make 
the mistake of “put[ting] Eve‟s prelapsarian behavior in a syllogistic relationship to postlapsarian truths. 
… The narrative voice in the poem invites such deductions.  Every time we are told that Eve is still 
innocent or not yet fallen, we are invited to contemplate the opposite of what were are [sic] told, 
particularly because the narrative voice is so slippery in its perspective that we cannot rely on it” (20-21).  
Kristin Pruitt McColgan emphasizes that “there is nothing inherently wrong in the action of separating, but 
that the means by which Eve defends this choice and by which Adam agrees to it will be, in the face of 
temptation, inadequate.  Reason should lead to faith rather than away from it” (“Reason, Faith, and „The 
Soul of All the Rest,‟” 198). 
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being unreasonable in his desires—Eve is yet more affected by her sense that he doubts 
the strength of her virtue if she decides to work alone where she might be tempted.  It is 
an initial failure of reason to direct her will rightly that will ultimately make her more 
vulnerable to Satan‟s deceptions when he tempts her in the form of the serpent, though 
she yet remains capable of overcoming his deception and temptation and remain in her 
unfallen state even when she leaves Adam‟s side.40 
Given Milton‟s emphasis on the role of reason in spiritual warfare, it is not 
surprising that a major element in Satan‟s subtlety—what makes him so powerfully 
deceptive and seductive—is his ability to use, or abuse, reason to tempt those unaware.  
Milton‟s Satan is not at all unreasonable, as Satan‟s arguments give at least the 
appearance of sound reason.  The difficulty for Adam and Eve therefore is that they must 
recognize and reject the faulty premises with which Satan begins his arguments. 
Eve is mostly impervious to the antics of Satan in serpent form when he is only 
moving around her, trying to get her attention.  It is when he begins to speak to her that 
Eve is truly amazed.  That is, Eve is not all that surprised by the serpent‟s movements 
even when they are suggestive of a certain amount of reason, for Eve had often thought 
the looks and actions of animals indicated “Much reason” (9.558).  But Eve is clearly 
impressed, and considers it miraculous, that the serpent should have the “Language of 
                                                 
40
 I read this scene, and this particular decision of Eve‟s, in the same way in which I view 
Adam‟s susceptibility to Eve‟s beauty.  Adam has already been shown to be somewhat too taken by Eve‟s 
beauty and person.  Adam was taken by Eve to such an extent that Raphael felt it necessary to warn Adam 
in previous books not to be overly swayed by Eve‟s charms.  That warning anticipates the reasons Adam 
will give for taking the fruit which Eve offers him after her own fall.  Such a weakness on his part neither 
says that he has to succumb to that weakness, nor suggests that such a weakness makes him inherently 
unable to withstand temptation.  Rather, Adam and Eve are both confronted with a failure of reason that 
makes them susceptible to temptation but not unable to remain in their state of innocence. 
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Man pronounc‟t / … and human sense exprest” (9.553-54).  She had never yet heard 
such language from the animals.  The serpent‟s ability to speak is so unexpected and 
beguiling that Eve demands that he tell her how he came to have this ability, an ability 
denied to all other animals.  Eve realizes something is not quite right in the serpent‟s 
ability to speak the language of humans.  Other animals indicate “Much reason” rather 
accidentally, but the serpent expresses reason directly and immediately.   
But Eve‟s own reason fails in this immediate, if bizarre, encounter with reason.  
Eve fails to question the true identity of the serpent, even though she has been warned 
that their enemy will use fraud and deception to bring about their fall.
41
  Eve only 
questions how the serpent came to be able to speak, while she otherwise superficially 
accepts his appearance as his real identity.  This is another misstep of Eve‟s reason on 
the way to the fall. 
Moreover, the serpent deceives Eve to her face.  He offers a fraudulent account 
of his ascension from brute to reasoning creature, and during that fraudulent account, 
Satan flatters Eve from time to time to distract her attention from the details of that 
fraudulent account.  The temptation of Eve includes a combination of flattery and 
reason, as the serpent convinces Eve that should she heed his words, her own mental 
abilities, already very impressive, will be increased that much more, very much as the 
serpent‟s own mental abilities had been so increased that he was transformed from a 
mere brute into a reasoning, speaking being.  Indeed, the serpent suggests that the 
transformation of Eve, upon her heeding his words, would be even greater yet.  He 
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 Eve is certain, for example, that her “firm Faith and Love / Can[not] by his fraud be shak‟n or 
seduc‟t” (9.286-87). 
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suggests she would be translated into a virtual goddess.  The serpent impresses Eve 
further by addressing her as “Empress” and telling her that it is “right thou shouldst be 
obeyed” as the ruler over all the animals (5.568, 570).  He insists that Eve would have 
such a transformation if she were to eat of the fruit of which the serpent has allegedly 
already eaten.   
It is important to note that in this discussion of Eve‟s transformation into a 
goddess, the serpent does not tell Eve which fruit he has supposedly eaten, and it is 
important to remember also that the serpent has not actually eaten any of it.  It is all a lie, 
of course, but the serpent nonetheless offers an extraordinarily descriptive account of the 
fruit‟s effects on him: 
Sated at length, ere long I might perceave 
Strange alteration in me, to degree 
Of Reason in my inward Powers, and Speech 
Wanted not long, though to this shape retain‟d. 
Thenceforth to Speculations high or deep 
I turnd my thoughts, and with capacious mind 
Considerd all things visible in Heav‟n, 
Or Earth, or Middle, all things fair and good. 
(9.598-605) 
The most alluring part of this argument is not merely that the serpent, upon eating the 
fruit, became able to speak and reason, but rather that with that transformation of his 
being, his mind was such that he was able to take in and hold all the secrets of the 
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universe.  The serpent suggests to Eve that he can now comprehend the entire universe 
and all its previously withheld secrets and mysteries—mysteries such as the movement 
of the stars and planets—the sort of knowledge that Adam sought from his conversations 
with Raphael but was denied to him. 
Satan then flatters Eve further.  He claims that after considering “all things fair 
and good” in the Heavens and on Earth, he finds her to be the fairest and best.  Again he 
intimates that she is in effect already a goddess worthy of “worship,” as he was 
compelled “to come / And gaze, and worship thee of right declar‟d / Sovran of 
Creatures, universal Dame” (9.610-12), and leaving her the suggestion that eating of the 
fruit would only assure that state that much more.  With these statements, Satan uses sin 
to generate sin.  In saying that he would worship Eve, he has essentially committed 
idolatry—he would worship Eve rather than God.  But Eve, not realizing that the enemy 
might generate sin by sin, remains “unwarie” (9.614), and she fails to recognize the 
serpent as her foe rather than a mere serpent.  Still, Eve is slightly suspicious of h is near 
idolatry.  The serpent‟s “overpraising” of both the tree and her person “leaves in doubt / 
The virtue of that Fruit” (9.615-16).  Rightly mistrusting his extravagant praise, Eve 
demands to be shown this remarkable tree. 
When taken to the tree, the only tree whose fruit was forbidden to Adam and Eve 
by God, Eve is still essentially sinless and innocent.  And at first Eve responds properly 
to the serpent, stating that bringing her to this tree will be of no benefit to her: 
But of this Tree we may not taste nor touch; 
God so commanded, and left that Command 
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Sole daughter of his voice; the rest, we live 
Law to our selves, our Reason is our Law. 
(9.61-54) 
Eve‟s observation of the tree reveals a remarkable understanding, in principle, of the 
situation.  For Milton, the fruit itself is inconsequential; the tree is what matters, is most 
significant.  And the tree is most significant because it is the focal point of God‟s only 
commandment at the time: not to eat the tree‟s fruit.  That sole commandment is the key.  
Eve views that commandment as the “sole daughter” of the voice of God.   
Eve‟s use of the words “daughter” and “voice” resonate in striking ways.  The 
Son of God is also understood as something related to the voice, that is, the Word, and 
the Word was to be revered especially as that vehicle through which the entire universe 
itself was created.  Now Eve describes the sole commandment of God as the daughter of 
his voice, that which is also intimately tied to the Word.  The sole commandment might 
be understood to be the daughter of the Son, a suggestion of a chain of obedience from 
God to the Son to humans.  Moreover, that which also links humans to the Son and to 
the Father is the use of reason.  Adam and Eve have been directed to live according to 
their reason.  In their prelapsarian state, humanity needed no other commandments from 
God but the sole commandment that implied that they use reason as the primary means 
by which to avoid temptation.  That sole commandment stands in contrast to the Ten 
Commandments Moses had to impose on God‟s chosen people among fallen humanity.42 
                                                 
42
 See William Walker‟s discussion of the relationship between reason and law.  He argues that 
“Milton‟s account of mankind‟s freedom as something that is not regulated but constituted by that reason 
that is its law is consistent with [the] rationalist explanation … against voluntarists such as Martin Luther, 
John Calvin, and Thomas Hobbes” (152). 
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Eve‟s initial response to the serpent upon seeing the forbidden tree should have 
been a reminder to herself that reason was the means by which she might maintain 
obedience to that sole commandment, or, more properly, the means by which she would 
prevent herself from being subject to temptations that would eventually overwhelm her 
capacity for discernment.  Her response also reveals exactly how much she understands 
the role her role is to play in doing what God has commanded. 
At this point in the temptation, therefore, Satan takes on the role of a great 
sophist and debater in order to manipulate Eve into accepting his false arguments.
43
  He 
displays a great “shew of Zeale and Love / To Man, and indignation as his wrong” 
(9.665-66), and then rapidly shifts to posture himself as a great Greek or Roman orator 
“to som great cause addresst” and who persuades not by what he actually says but by the 
great emotional display before he ever speaks (9.672). 
When Satan begins to speak again as orator and sophist, he seems to employ such 
a remarkable use of reason that Eve fails to discern his sophistry from the truth.  Satan 
urges Eve, as “Queen of this Universe,” to “not believe / Those rigid threats of Death” 
(9.684-85).  He argues, again by lying, that he has eaten of the fruit, when he has not, 
and not been touched by death.
44
  Satan also minimizes the transgression she would 
commit in eating the forbidden fruit.  He refers to it as a “petty Trespass” that will not 
                                                 
43
 The term “sophist” is used pejoratively to denote those sophists against whom Plato speaks in 
some of his dialogues; sophists are not interested in the truth of their premises or conclusions, but only in 
winning the argument.  The term, in my mind, fits Satan perfectly, as he knows his arguments are faulty 
and weak; he is not interested in truth, but only in winning this particular battle with Eve and more 
generally in winning the war he is waging against God. 
44
 Eve does not consider here that the tree was not forbidden to animals, but only to her and 
Adam, which again centers on the specific nature of the tree as the test of their obedience to God—a test 
not required of mere beasts.  So quickly, Eve has already forgotten the significance of this one 
commandment, which she remembered but moments before. 
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arouse God‟s anger.  Satan suggests that God in fact would rather praise Eve for her 
“dauntless vertue” and for her courage in daring to defy Him to make their human state 
happier with greater knowledge and wisdom (9.693-94). 
Eve fails to recognize the dangerous and heretical arguments Satan presents to 
her.  Satan attempts to persuade Eve that the knowledge of good and evil has been 
denied her by a merely jealous God: 
Of good, how just?  of evil, if what is evil 
Be real, why not known, since easier shunnd? 
God therefore cannot hurt ye, and be just; 
Not just, not God; not feard then, nor obeyd. 
(9.698-701) 
Satan proceeds to suggest cleverly that God is the problem: that God has left Adam and 
Eve deficient by not giving them the knowledge of evil, which knowledge would make 
their fight against evil easier, could Adam and Eve only possess it.  Satan also attempts 
to disqualify the punishment God proclaimed he would impose should Adam and Eve 
disobey.  Satan thereby calls God‟s justice into question.  Satan argues that if God is 
unjust for punishing his children, then He must not really be God.  Therefore, the need to 
obey God is minimized and even negated. 
Satan continues to drive home his argument against God, but throughout his 
oration, Eve never stops him to dispute the premises of the serpent‟s position.  Her 
reason continues to fail to discern the serpent‟s deceit as he asks why Adam and Eve 
would be given this commandment not to eat the fruit in the first place.  Not giving Eve 
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an opportunity to respond with the answer she knows to be true—and the knowledge of 
which she has already revealed to Satan—the serpent responds with an answer that again 
reflects on the role of reason while revealing Satan‟s perversion of that reason.  The 
serpent suggests that God wants his subjects to be ignorant: 
Why then was this forbid?  Why but to awe, 
Why but to keep ye low and ignorant, 
His worshippers; he knows that in the day 
Ye Eate thereof, your Eyes that seem so cleere, 
Yet are but dim, shall perfetly be then 
Op‟nd and cleerd, and ye shall be as Gods, 
Knowing both Good and Evil as they know. 
(9.703-709) 
The serpent leads Eve to believe that the sole commandment issued in the garden was 
imposed by God for God‟s entirely self-indulgent reasons: that God wished to keep 
Adam and Eve ignorant subjects, blind worshippers.  Yet, in truth, God wished Adam 
and Eve to use reason in the highest measure as the very means by which they would 
prevent being subject to the deceit of the enemy.  While Satan the sophist argues that 
Adam and Eve will find their eyes miraculously opened and cleared when they eat the 
fruit, Adam and Eve will discover, after their fall, that a consequence of their 
disobedience is that their eyes and minds are dimmer.  And while their recognition of the 
significance of the tree was a recognition that in it lay the intimate connection between 
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them and the Son, and therefore them and God, after the deception of Eve the pair find 
themselves further from God than they ever imagined possible. 
Satan ends his argument with one final interrogation by which to leave Eve 
hanging: 
wherein lies 
Th‟ offence, that Man should thus attain to know? 
What can your knowledge hurt him, or this Tree 
Impart against his will if all be his? 
Or is it envie, and can envie dwell 
In heav‟nly brest?  these, these and many more 
Causes import your need of this fair Fruit. 
(9.725-31) 
Again Satan would diminish the importance of God‟s sole commandment: surely, he 
argues, any knowledge gained from eating the forbidden fruit could not hurt God.  The 
serpent insinuates once again that God is a petty and jealous God who seeks to keep all 
of His creatures subjugated to His tyrannical will.  Satan, in the form of an animal, 
suggests that Adam and Eve would be barely better than animals were they to maintain 
their obedience to God.  Satan suggests it is necessary for Adam and Eve to escape their 
demeaning subjection by God if they really wish to think of themselves as free agents. 
Once again Milton stresses the failure of reason as the primary contributing 
factor in Eve‟s fall.  Eventually in her encounter with the serpent, Eve is unable or 
unwilling to withstand any longer the “[ring] of his perswasive words, impregn‟d / With 
  111 
 
Reason, to her seeming, and with Truth” (9.737-38).  Eve mistakes the sophistry of the 
serpent for truth, and bases her choice upon his lies.  It is really at this moment that Eve 
has fallen, for she has already made the choice to eat the fruit.  She is intent upon eating 
the fruit, and she is no longer reasoning against eating what was forbidden but instead is 
rationalizing the choice she has already made as a result of mistaking falsity for truth.  
Although she has not yet taken a bite of the fruit, she is now looking at it longingly, with 
an overwhelming desire to taste it.   
Now, although reason should still be her guide and should direct her will to 
submit to the will of God, Eve has begun to employ reason in ways similar to the ways 
of the enemy.  She offers rationalizing arguments to support what she is about to do.  
Such a use, an abuse really, of reason renders her fully culpable, for she is quite 
deliberate in her decision to eat what God has forbidden, even if she was led to that 
decision by Satan‟s deception.45 
In Eve‟s reasoning or rationalizing, we see the way in which Satan‟s deceptions 
lead to her fall.  Eve reiterates the punishment God said he would deliver were she and 
Adam to eat the fruit: “In the day we eate / Of this fair Fruit, our doom is, we shall die” 
(9.762-63).  But the false example of the Serpent makes her question God‟s warning: 
“How dies the Serpent?  hee hath eat‟n and lives, / And knows, and speaks, and reasons, 
and discerns, / Irrational till then” (9.764-66).46  Satan‟s deception leads Eve to a 
problematic analogy: she now views the fruit as “intellectual food” that will translate her 
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 Roy Flannagan notes that Eve‟s pause before eating the fruit “signifies the difference between a 
completely careless act and one endorsed by thought” (9.744n.223). 
46
 Again, she does not stop to consider that the commandment was directly only to Adam and her, 
not to other creatures. 
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human intellect to that of a goddess much as the serpent‟s intellect was supposedly 
translated from that of a mere beast to that of a rational animal (9.768).  Moreover, in 
Eve‟s mind the fruit as “intellectual food” now supplants her prior source of rational 
invigoration, Adam‟s company.  The serpent‟s deceit has made Eve see herself, and 
Adam, as lacking in a fundamental and necessary knowledge: thus Eve‟s “expectation 
high / Of knowledg” and her thoughts of God-head as she eats the fruit (9.789-90).  Eve 
expects divine knowledge to be hers instantaneously, with the first taste of what she 
perceives to be the most delectable fruit she could ever taste. 
But what occurs instantaneously is not the assumption of divine knowledge but 
the compounding of sin.  The dire consequences of Eve‟s fall follow fast from her first 
sin.  Other sins ensue at once: she eats “Greedily” as she “ingorg‟d without restraint,” 
displaying both greed and gluttony at once (9.791).  She is also “hight‟nd as with Wine” 
(9.793)—intoxicated by the knowledge which she now imagines is hers.  And she 
commits idolatry as she begins to worship the tree which has given her supposed divine 
knowledge and promises to praise the tree every morning upon waking, a time and habit 
she had previously reserved for Adam in their joint praise to God when they left their 
bower. 
Worst of all, Eve comes to denigrate the faculty of reason.  Prior to the fall, she 
and Adam, upon the advice of God Himself, took reason to be their primary guide.  After 
the fall, Eve glorifies experience, which is always problematic and no guarantor of the 
truth, as her primary guide: she deems experience the “Best guide; [for] not following 
thee, I had remained / In ignorance, thou op‟nst Wisdoms way, / And giv‟st access, 
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though secret she retire” (9.808-10).  Eve now considers experience a better guide than 
reason, and experience rather than reason earns the highest of her praises, second only to 
the praises she offers to the tree.  Such displacement of reason by experience is itself 
evidence of the now defective nature of Eve‟s reason and the perversion of her created 
nature. 
The extent to which Eve‟s first sin has now permeated her very being and 
diminished her ability to reason is clearly revealed further in more faulty rationality.  
Eve deliberates problematically whether to share the fruit with Adam.  Her deliberation 
discloses more evidence of her newfound greed.  Eve considers hoarding this new divine 
knowledge entirely for herself, to “keep the odds of Knowledge in my power / Without 
copartner” (9.820-21).  Suddenly Eve would very much like to be superior to Adam, or 
at least equal, as she now, suddenly, views herself as having been inferior beforehand.
47
  
Eve does not consider in detail in what manner she might have been subject in some way 
to Adam; but worse, she is entirely incorrect in her conflation of inferiority and a lack of 
freedom: “for inferior who is free?” (9.825).  The correct theological response is that all 
of God‟s creatures are inferior to Him.  Yet that does not render them any less free to 
obey or disobey God‟s commandments. 
Despite the allure of superiority over Adam, Eve determines that she will share 
the fruit with Adam so that he may also partake of its supposed benefits.  Her 
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 Of course, she acknowledges that the realization of her entire argument here would depend 
upon a premise which must be rejected by the reader—that God, their “great Forbidder” (9.815), somehow 
missed seeing her eating the fruit so she would only reap the benefit of the fruit and miss the punishment 
for eating it. 
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justification for this generosity, however, is really rooted in envy, yet another sin now 
present in the postlapsarian world: 
For what if God have seen, 
And Death ensue?  then I shall be no more,  
And Adam wedded to another Eve, 
Shall live with her enjoying, I extinct. 
(9.826-29) 
Eve then begins to weigh the possibility that God was serious about his punishment for 
her sin, considering that it would be worse to be punished while Adam continues to live 
happily with another wife.  Furthermore, while Eve claims to love Adam dearly—to 
such an extent that “with him all deaths / [she] could endure, without him live no life” 
(9.832-33)—her motives remain questionable, as she does not appear to be really 
concerned with Adam‟s well-being, but only with her own selfish desires. 
Resolved to share the fruit with Adam, and thereby have him share her fate, Eve 
turns from the tree to seek out her mate.  She does not walk far when Adam meets her 
near the tree.  Adam had become worried about Eve‟s long absence, and indeed seems to 
have intuited that something was gravely amiss with her.  As forthrightly as she is able at 
this point, Eve begins to tell him what has transpired.  She believes her story is 
“wonderful to heare,” full of things at which to wonder (9.862).  She claims that Adam 
will be amazed and that the story will be of great benefit to him. 
First and foremost she tells him they were mistaken about the dangerous nature 
of the tree—that it confers divinity rather than evil upon them.  To show him the truth of 
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what she has said (but also to delay the real point, that she herself has tasted the 
forbidden fruit), she first relates to Adam the extraordinary example of the serpent who 
has eaten the fruit and who is yet “Not dead, as we are threatn‟d, but thenceforth / 
Endu‟d with human voice and human sense, / Reasoning to admiration” (9.870-72).   
Eve highlights the serpent‟s transformation from mere beast to reasoning 
creature.  Yet Eve remains oblivious to some of the crucial implications of her 
explanation of this transformation.  She implicitly acknowledges, in an almost 
parenthetical addition, that she has been deceived by the serpent but does not wish to 
admit it.  That is, when she states “as we are threatn‟d,” she acknowledges the very 
limited range of God‟s promised punishment: that only she and Adam were actually 
threatened with the punishment of death for eating from the tree, not any others in the 
created order.   
This point, while seemingly minor, stresses Milton‟s understanding that the 
power of the tree is not inherent in the fruit itself but in God‟s commandment not to eat 
from it.  Yet Eve attempts to sidestep this issue entirely by suggesting to Adam that she 
does not know whether the serpent was “not restraind as wee, or not obeying” (9.868).  
We know, of course, that neither the serpent, nor even Satan in the form of the serpent, 
ever actually ate from the tree.  But even if he had, Eve‟s manipulations here would 
further suggest that while she is very much aware that God did not forbid the serpent to 
eat the fruit, only her and Adam, it is to her advantage to persuade Adam to eat the fruit 
as well.  That is, her words can suggest that the serpent had also disobeyed and yet 
escaped punishment, and indeed benefited marvelously from his disobedience.  Like 
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Satan‟s, Eve‟s reasoning has become convoluted sophistry with which she would 
manipulate others, and her sin in abusing reason would spawn even more sin. 
After presenting the serpent‟s taste and ascension in glorious terms, particularly 
his newfound ability to reason so persuasively that he was able to prevail upon her to eat 
too, Eve finally admits to Adam circuitously that she has tasted the fruit.  And in this 
admission, she reveals that it was her willing choice to eat the fruit: she is persuaded, not 
forced, to act.  Even if that persuasion is generated by fraud and deception, she still made 
a conscious choice to eat what was forbidden.   
Once she “confesses,” as it were, she is, however, very quick to relate what she 
perceives to be the immediate benefits of her disobedience.  Thus she tells Adam that 
like the serpent, she has 
also found 
Th‟ effects to correspond, opener mine Eyes, 
Dimm erst, dilated Spirits, ampler Heart, 
And growing up to Godhead. 
(9.874-77) 
Through Eve‟s report on the effects the fruit has on her vision, Milton uses the eyes to 
represent the mental faculties at large.  Eve believes that her mind, in her postlapsarian 
state, is more open than before, keener and more receptive to reason and wisdom.  
Believing that her mind, like her eyes, was “dimm” before, she now perceives it to be 
enlightened with a new wisdom and power to such an extent that she thinks she is in the 
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process of ascending even to godhead.  In Eve‟s mind, the report of these benefits would 
be the basis by which she should be able to persuade Adam to eat also.   
Eve now, with dubious motivation, intends to persuade Adam to share her fate 
with her.  Eve suggests to Adam that she really sought this newfound power and wisdom 
primarily for his benefit.  The reader already knows just how false this part of Eve‟s 
argument is, for we know how she seriously considered hoarding the fruit so she could 
be Adam‟s equal, if not his superior.  It was really only jealousy of a non-existent future 
Eve that moved Eve to share the fruit with Adam.  Now obviously lying, Eve tells Adam 
that having obtained godhead for his sake, she would yet despise that newfound power 
were she not to share it with him, “For bliss, as thou hast part, to me is bliss, / Tedious, 
unshar‟d with thee, and odious soon” (9.879-80).  She concludes her lie with an appeal 
to equality: 
Thou therefore also taste, that equal Lot 
May joyne us, equal Joy, as equal Love; 
Least thou not tasting, different degree 
Disjoyne us, and I then too late renounce 
Deitie for thee, when Fate will not permit. 
(9.881-85) 
This appeal to equal lot, joy, and love is perverse given her desire not for equality but 
superiority.  And the perversion is compounded in her claim that she would be willing to 
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renounce her godhead for Adam if she were permitted to do so, but she cannot.
48
  Again, 
Eve is much less interested in returning to her former state, since she erroneously views 
that state as deficient, than in saying whatever it takes to avoid enduring her fate alone.  
Eve‟s love for Adam is fundamentally defaced by her fall into sin as she is no longer 
primarily concerned with his well-being, but with her own, and she deludes both Adam 
and herself in her posturing that suggests that Adam‟s welfare remains her primary 
concern.   
Adam‟s fall is sad indeed, but not because he is persuaded by Eve‟s false 
arguments.  While Eve fails to recognize Satan‟s lies and deceptions, thereby losing her 
first spiritual battle because she is persuaded by an enemy whose sophistry she does not 
anticipate, Adam‟s subsequent loss is significant because he is not at all deceived by 
Eve‟s lies and glossing half-truths.  He recognizes instantly what she has done and the 
implications of her actions.  What is most striking about Adam‟s fall, therefore, is its 
very deliberate nature.  He does not fall deceived and unaware as Eve did.  Rather, 
Adam falls with complete awareness of who the tempter is, what is being offered, and 
the consequences of accepting that offer.
49
  While Eve does not recognize Satan in the 
form of the serpent, and while she remembers what she has been told will be the 
consequences if she eats the fruit, she is yet deceived into thinking that such 
consequences will not actually come to pass.  Adam, on the other hand, knows that Eve 
                                                 
48
 The irony is deepened in the reader‟s realization that it would be impossible for Eve to 
renounce her deity since she has no deity to renounce.  She is still operating here under the false pretenses 
with which Satan persuaded her to eat in the first place. 
49
 This is not to minimize the consciousness with which Eve falls.  She also makes a conscious 
and deliberate choice, but she is deceived insofar as she believes the lies which Satan tells her and insofar 
as she does not recognize the tempter, Satan, in the form of the serpent. 
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is now functioning as a temptress.  He knows what she is offering; he knows what her 
punishment will be, and he knows what his punishment will be if he follows her.   
Very aware of the situation, Adam yet makes the conscious and deliberate choice 
to share God‟s capital punishment with Eve.  In a way, Adam‟s fall is the worse, since 
he knows what he should do, or more exactly what he should not do.  Yet Adam makes 
the choice to eat despite what reason dictates to him.  He makes the choice based not on 
his reason but primarily on his physical desires for Eve.  Eve‟s reason failed to recognize 
falsity.  But while Adam quickly and correctly discerns the truth, he willfully goes 
against what his reason says he should do.  Instead, Adam allows his passions rather than 
reason to direct his will, and his passions lead him away from God. 
Adam‟s reaction to the realization that Eve has fallen is one of the most poignant 
moments in the epic.  The garland that Adam has woven for Eve falls from his hand, the 
roses faded and wilted.  He stands, initially, speechless and pale, until his silence is 
broken inwardly, at least at first.  Adam talks to himself, and still carrying a prelapsarian 
impulse, he continues to exalt Eve even at this moment: “O fairest of Creation, last and 
best / Of all Gods works, Creature in whom excell‟d / Whatever can to sight or thought 
be formd” (9.896-98).  Adam mourns Eve‟s loss of innocence, but he focuses only 
momentarily on the fact that “some cursed fraud / Of Enemie hath beguil‟d thee, yet 
unknown” (9.904-5).  Instead, most of his attention is on his conviction that this enemy 
“mee with thee hath ruind, for with thee / Certain my resolution is to Die” (9.906-7).  
Adam talks, if only to himself, as though his capacity for deliberate choice has been 
taken away in this moment—that he has no choice but to fall with Eve—but his 
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willingness to accept that conviction without question constitutes a pivotal moment in 
his fall. 
Adam‟s spiritual battle thus offers an example of a different kind of spiritual 
warfare, one in which the battle is almost entirely internal.  Adam‟s temptation does not 
derive mainly from a disguised enemy who lays traps for his credulity.  Adam‟s 
temptation comes almost entirely from within his own mind.  While Eve functions as a 
temptress of sorts, she does not persuade him of the goodness of the forbidden fruit in 
the way Satan persuaded her.  Rather, Adam recognizes the fruit for what it is, 
recognizes Eve‟s arguments for what they are, yet he still chooses to sin because he 
allows the wrong faculties to direct his actions.   
Adam is not battling Eve the way Eve was, unknowingly, battling Satan. Rather, 
Adam is battling his over-dependence on Eve‟s charms.  While recognizing that he is 
about to choose death over life, he does not question whether what he is doing is right or 
wrong.  Instead, he is concerned only with what life would be like without Eve: “How 
can I live without thee, how forgoe / Thy sweet Converse and Love so dearly joyn‟d, / 
To live again in these wilde Woods forlorn?” (9.908-10).   
Adam‟s apparent unwillingness to live without Eve‟s conversation and love, and 
his resolve to join her in her punishment because he cannot imagine life without her 
(even if God were to create another Eve—her worse fear), recalls his impassioned 
account to Raphael in the previous book.  There Adam tells the angel about the creation 
of Eve and his first reaction to her: 
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transported I behold, 
Transported touch; here passion first I felt, 
Commotion strange, in all enjoyments else  
Superiour and unmov‟d, here onely weake 
Against the charm of Beauties powerful glance. 
(8.529-33) 
Within the context of this conversation, Adam‟s repeated use of the word “transported” 
suggests that he was moved from his thinking and reasoning faculties to his emotional 
and passionate faculties when he first beheld Eve.  Adam himself recognizes that in 
gazing upon Eve for the first time, passion was awakened within him and seemed to 
work against the superior faculty of reason.  Though his mind and reason remain strong 
elsewhere, there, looking at Eve, beholding her charm and beauty, Adam sensed about 
himself that he was potentially weak, as he admits to Raphael that when he looks at Eve, 
she appears to be so perfect that “what she wills to do or say, / Seems wisest, 
vertuousest, discreetest, best” (8.549-50), to such an extent that  
All higher knowledge in her presence falls  
Degraded, Wisdom in discourse with her  
Looses discount‟nanc‟t, and like folly shewes; 
Authority and Reason on her waite. 
(8.551-54) 
Adam was still innocent there, even if his admiration of Eve bordered on idolatry.  Yet, 
while that admiration was not actually a sin then, we can see how Milton establishes 
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Adam‟s passion for Eve as a weakness that constitutes the center of Adam‟s spiritual 
warfare.  And Adam eventually falls when his borderline idolatry relative to Eve 
effectively crosses a line.    
And yet, Milton is just as insistent that this weakness in Adam is not impossible 
for him to overcome.  Milton‟s soteriological argument is that Adam‟s passion for Eve 
does not lead Adam ineluctably to his fall.  Milton maintains throughout his epic and 
elsewhere that Adam and Eve were created sufficient to withstand this and any 
temptation, and thereby had the capacity to remain in a prelapsarian state such that they 
would not need salvation by way of another agency.   
In Paradise Lost, Milton makes this point rather explicitly by having Raphael 
frown at Adam at that point in the conversation when Adam was exalting the beauty of 
Eve.  Raphael issued a stern warning to Adam that Adam was to recall perpetually.  
Raphael tries to make Adam aware that his passion for Eve will be a central problem in 
his peculiar spiritual war, and that Adam should heed this fact well when the time comes 
for Adam‟s most acute temptation: 
Accuse not Nature, she hath don her part; 
Do thou but thine, and be not diffident 
Of Wisdom, she deserts thee not, if thou 
Dismiss not her, when most thou needst her nigh, 
By attributing overmuch to things 
Less excellent, as thou thy self perceav‟st. 
(8.561-66) 
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With much foreshadowing, Raphael informs Adam that Eve‟s beauty will offer no 
excuse if and when Adam falls.  Adam will not be able to blame Nature or God for 
making Eve so beautiful and charming.  Regardless of Eve‟s charms, Adam has a 
responsibility to rely on reason to act properly.  He must look to wisdom for guidance 
rather than only to Eve‟s physical graces, even if the poem allows that Eve‟s presence is 
part of that which constitutes Adam‟s use of reason.  While Eve may be an excellent 
example of beauty, charm, and virtue, she and her attributes are still lesser goods, in St. 
Augustine‟s terms, that can be lost against one‟s will relative to eternal goods which 
cannot be lost against one‟s will.  And that which is most important for Adam to 
conclude is that even if Eve‟s presence is what constitutes in part the activation of 
Adam‟s faculty of reason, the other element in that activation of reason is Adam‟s proper 
reciprocal action that would serve to spark reason in Eve in turn.  Both of them are still 
required to heed the voice of reason within themselves rather than resort only to their 
passions. 
Furthermore, Raphael reminds Adam that what he admires, that by which he is 
“transported,” is only mere appearance—she is “fair no doubt, and worthy well / Thy 
cherishing, thy honouring, and thy love, / Not thy subjection” (8.568-70).  While it is 
right that Adam should love and honor his wife, Raphael is properly worried that Adam 
will eventually subjugate himself to the allure of Eve‟s appearance.  Adam could easily 
become infatuated with Eve‟s appearance and thereby distract himself from the use and 
appreciation of the higher goods of his own mind.  Were that to occur, Adam would fall 
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into a state of error such that he would come to worship Eve, the creature, more than 
God the Creator. 
In attempting to prevent Adam from falling into such a state, Raphael concludes 
his warning with a clear delineation of the significant differences between love and 
passion.  Raphael gently chides Adam for being consumed by passion rather than guided 
by love:  
In loving thou dost well, in passion not, 
Wherein true Love consists not; love refines 
The thoughts, and heart enlarges, hath his seat 
In Reason, and is judicious, is the scale 
By which to heav‟nly Love thou maist ascend, 
Not sunk in carnal pleasure, for which cause 
Among the Beasts no Mate for thee was found. 
(8.588-94) 
Raphael‟s warning to Adam brings the reader once again to the issue of reason.  
Raphael‟s warning to Adam is not merely negative.  Rather, it identifies remarkable 
ways in which love is directly related to the use of reason.  Love is inseparable from the 
use of reason, and there is a reciprocity between love and reason.  Love serves to refine 
thoughts even as love grows out of the proper use of reason.  Raphael suggests that love, 
as it was intended by God for human employment, therefore aids in the act of judgment.   
Also, in a claim that echoes Plato‟s Symposium and the Neo-Platonic theories of 
love by Marsilio Ficino, Raphael claims the reason-oriented love Adam has for Eve can 
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function like a ladder by which Adam will reach higher and higher realizations of the 
love of God.
50
  This elevating love is the kind of love God intended for humans alone 
and is the reason God did not seek a mate for Adam among the already created beasts 
but created a new mate for him.  This elevating love is not possible for mere brutes, for 
which there can be only physical pleasure.  Rather, this rational, elevating love is a 
function of the divine communion of souls through which reciprocity Adam and Eve 
might ever better worship their Maker. 
In the realization of those foreshadowing moments with Raphael, Adam 
expresses the deficiency in his total regard for the spiritual relationship he should have 
and maintain with Eve.  In his fall, Adam instead focuses on their physical relationship 
as his reason for following Eve‟s suggestion to eat the fruit with her: 
no no, I feel 
The Link of Nature draw me: Flesh of Flesh, 
Bone of my Bone thou art, and from thy State 
Mine never shall be parted, bliss or woe. 
(9.913-16) 
Adam is drawn to his sin by the connection he feels between his flesh and Eve‟s, not the 
connection between his reason and hers.  Adam assumes, erroneously, that the creation 
of Eve out of his own body ties him to her such that he is unable to live his life apart 
from her.  Adam is therefore all too willing to share in Eve‟s sin. 
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 See Ch. 18 of Ficino‟s Commentary on Plato’s Symposium on Love: “How the soul is raised 
from the beauty of the body to the beauty of God” (141). 
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Adam‟s final words to Eve before eating the fruit express this sentiment, as he 
reveals his inner thoughts: 
However I with thee have fixt my Lot, 
Certain to undergoe like doom, if Death 
Consort with thee, Death is to mee as Life; 
So forcible within my heart I feel 
The Bond of Nature draw me to my owne, 
My own in thee, for what thou art is mine; 
Our State cannot be severd, we are one, 
One Flesh; to loose thee were to loose my self. 
(9.952-59) 
And when Adam does finally take the offered fruit from Eve to taste it for himself, 
Milton‟s narrator makes Adam‟s motives exceptionally clear: “he scrupl‟d not to eat / 
Against his better knowledge, not deceav‟d, / But fondly overcome with Femal charm” 
(9.997-99).  Raphael‟s precise warning was to no avail.   
Having resolved in his own mind to join Eve in sin, Adam is calm when he 
finally speaks to Eve.  But as Adam‟s conversations with Eve ensue, Adam‟s convoluted 
thoughts reveal again one of the key theses of Milton‟s Paradise Lost: that human reason 
has become deeply defective as a consequence of the fall and the failure of reason there.   
The first indication that Adam is fallen is that his postlapsarian argumentation 
reveals itself to be as flawed as Eve‟s.  Adam offers some delusional hope that he and 
Eve might escape the punishment God promised.  Like Eve, Adam also begins to aspire 
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to something like godhead, expecting an ascent that will be proportional to the serpent‟s 
ascent to language and reason.  But more crucially, Adam‟s impiety is manifested by 
him essentially calling God an incompetent liar.  Adam begins to gainsay God and even 
begins to suggest what God should, or what God is able, to do: 
Nor can I think that God, Creator wise, 
Though threatning, will in earnest so destroy 
Us his prime Creatures, dignifi‟d so high, 
Set over all his Works, … 
   so God shall uncreate, 
Be frustrate, do, undo, and labour loose, 
Not well conceav‟d of God, who though his Power 
Creation could replete, yet would be loath 
Us to abolish, least the Adversary 
Triumph and say; Fickle their State whom God 
Most Favors, who can please him long? 
(9.938-49) 
Eve, of course, is thrilled at the choice Adam has made.  But her assessment of 
the choice betrays yet another abuse of reason.  It allows for equivocation on the terms 
“exceeding love.”  Eve sees Adam‟s decision to follow her as a “glorious trial of 
exceeding Love” (9.961).  And in some sense of the terms, that is true.  But the real truth 
operative in the terms, given Adam‟s position, is that Adam‟s “exceeding love” for Eve 
is such because it includes a motivation driven by sexual passion more than reason.  If 
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Adam were acting from truly “exceeding love” he would choose to love God, the 
Creator, more than Eve, the creature.  Neither Adam nor Eve seems to understand, nor 
wishes to understand, the nature of the spiritual warfare in which they are engaged, or 
the consequences they will face because they have lost the spiritual battles.  They both 
speak as if they welcome death, but they actually have no notion of what it means to die.  
They are intoxicated by that which they know to be an inferior faculty, the Fancy; they 
are intoxicated by their imaginations.  They imagine effects the fruit is supposed to 
bring, and their delusion distracts them from weighing rationally what their fall has cost 
them.  
Milton leaves no doubt as to what he considers the consequences of Adam and 
Eve‟s fall.  Reason is especially defective in the fallen Adam and Eve as the weaknesses 
which made them vulnerable to sin blossom into full-blown sins.  Their “Carnal desire 
enflaming, hee on Eve / began to cast lascivious Eyes, she him / As wantonly repaid; in 
Lust they burne” (9.1013-15).  In fallen souls, the passions almost entirely dominate the 
will, and to that extent the capacity for right reason is mightily diminished.  The use of 
right reason might have prevented the fall.  But it will be ever more difficult for the 
postlapsarian human to heed right reason, even as it will be ever more necessary to do 
so.  For Milton, virtually all spiritual warfare returns to the issue of reason. 
Both Lanyer and Milton suggest in their treatments of the fall that Adam and 
Eve‟s failure of reason contributed significantly to that fall, as it rendered them both 
more vulnerable to Satan‟s wiles and deceptions.  Both poets also point to the effects 
that this failure on the part of the first parents will have for all humans—in their ability 
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to overcome temptations, in their relationships with each other, and in their relationships 
with God.  While Calvinist theologians would emphasize the total depravity of reason 
and human nature that would result from this initial failure, the coming chapters will 
examine texts that turn on their head the arguments about human reason after the fall put 
forth by radical reformers who stress the utter depravity of fallen humans.
51
  For if Adam 
and Eve fell despite the agility of their mental faculties, other texts will show that 
already fallen humans, with all the limitations placed upon their mental faculties, can yet 
exhibit a triumph of reason over evil, when aided by the work of grace. 
 
                                                 
51
 Lorraine Boettner explains this Calvinist position in Reformed Doctrine of Predestination: “Is 
not man now, as his progenitor Adam, fleeing from the presence of God, not wanting communion with 
Him, and with enmity in his heart for his Creator? … We live in a lost world, a world which if left to itself 
would fester in its corruption from eternity to eternity—a world reeking with iniquity and blasphemy” 
(74).  Boettner also provides an excellent summary of the Calvinist position regarding the extent and 
effects of original sin on humankind (61-68). 
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CHAPTER IV 
AFTER THE FALL: REASON INFORMED BY GRACE 
 
Calvinists generally believe that only grace can bring the sinner back into 
communion with the Creator, for it is only through the restraining influences of God‟s 
irresistible grace that humans are again incited to love, truth, and goodness, and grace is 
the only means by which humans can do any good whatsoever.  But for Milton and 
others, grace is also the means by which reason once again can function as right reason, 
so that the human will itself can direct the soul to right action in tests of virtue, as is 
necessary to restore the relationship between God and humans. 
As a necessary part of the testing of virtue, temptations can take many and varied 
forms in the fallen world, and only a few will be examined here.  First, we will continue 
the discussion of demonic dreams begun in the previous chapter.  There the focus was on 
the dynamics involved in Eve‟s prelapsarian dream, though the debates surrounding 
Pilate‟s wife‟s dream regarding the suffering of Christ also point to particular ways the 
dynamics of spiritual warfare change because of the events of the fall of Adam and Eve.  
While Adam and Eve could draw comfort in the thought that Eve committed no sin in 
her dream because her reason was not awake to guide her will and she did not will to 
commit the sin, such a resolution does not seem as completely relevant or even possible 
after the fall because of the lasting effects of original sin.
1
  Furthermore, while Lanyer 
portrays Pilate‟s wife‟s dream as a divinely-inspired dream, the traditional belief that her 
                                                 
1
 Evidence of this distinction was already discussed in the previous chapter in the comparison of 
Adam‟s treatment of Eve‟s dream with Augustine‟s remarks on his own dreams in his Confessions. 
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dream was satanically-inspired calls our attention again to demonic dreams as a form of 
spiritual warfare and raises important questions about the role of reason and will in all 
such warfare after the fall.  Thus, the problem of reason and will in postlapsarian dreams 
as implied in Augustine‟s Confessions and the controversy surrounding Pilate‟s wife‟s 
dream are further reabsorbed in the greater epistemological question regarding the nature 
of reason itself as a result of the fall. 
Temptation can take many and varied forms in the fallen world, and we will 
examine only a few here.  First, we will continue the discussion of demonic dreams 
begun in the previous chapter.  There the focus was on the dynamics involved in Eve‟s 
prelapsarian dream.  Here we will briefly consider Milton‟s poetic accounts of Adam 
and Eve‟s postlapsarian dreams and then look more fully at the demonic dreams in 
Richard Norwood‟s spiritual autobiography, a compelling prose testimonial of spiritual 
warfare which addresses the defects of reason.   
Then we will examine further Milton‟s explorations of the work of reason in 
spiritual warfare after the fall in both his early and his late work, as represented by 
Comus and Samson Agonistes.  Milton portrays two different kinds of spiritual warfare 
in these two texts, rather similar to the two kinds of temptation (Eve‟s and then Adam‟s) 
encountered in Paradise Lost.  That is, in Comus, the spiritual warfare is external—the 
Lady is tempted and tested by the external force of Comus.  In Samson Agonistes, 
however, the spiritual conflict is an internal one; Samson struggles with his own demons 
through each encounter with the various people in his life.  These three texts represent 
the reliance on reason in different ways and to different degrees, but they all suggest that 
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reason after the fall must necessarily be informed by grace if it is to work properly in the 
temptations of spiritual warfare, even as spiritual warfare is necessary to restore the 
relationship between the Creator and the sinner. 
 
“Wrestl[ing] with the Devil by Night”: Norwood’s Demonic Dreams 
In Paradise Lost, Milton reveals his concern not only with Eve‟s prelapsarian 
dream but also with the intersection of evil and dreams after the fall.  In Paradise Lost, 
as previously noted, immediately after the fall, Adam and Eve fall into a kind of frenzy 
of sin of various forms, sometimes subtle, as with the seven deadly sins, sometimes more 
obvious as in the case of sexual lust.  The sleep that had formerly provided them rest and 
comfort from their daily toil now oppresses them after their exhaustion from their lustful 
play.  This is now a “grosser sleep / Bred of unkindly fumes, with conscious dreams / 
Encumbered” (9.1049-51).  It is also when they awaken from these dreams that Adam 
and Eve become aware of what they have lost, as they realize “thir Eyes how op‟nd, and 
thir minds / How dark‟nd; innocence, that as a veile / Had shadowed them from knowing 
ill, was gone” (9.1053-55).  This new, uncomforting sleep is marked by “conscious 
dreams”—dreams that disturb the parties waking from them.  These are the first truly 
evil dreams, dreams that arise out of the sins committed by Adam and Eve, and there is 
no real rest for the fallen to escape their sins and their effects.
2
   
                                                 
2
 It might be useful to clarify what is meant here by “Satanic” or “demonic dreams.”  The two 
terms are essentially interchangeable in meaning, but I generally use that term which is most appropriate 
in context in terms of their origin from Satan or from demons.  In the case of Eve‟s dream, there is little 
ambiguity in the designation of her dream as satanic, since her dream clearly originates in the character of 
Satan, present at her ear in Paradise Lost.  It is less obvious in Augustine‟s case that his dreams originate 
from the specific person of Satan, leading me to designate them as “demonic” rather than “satanic,” but it 
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We have seen the richness of the implications of Milton‟s literary invention of 
Eve‟s dream, and the richness of the ruminations of Adam and Eve on the nature of that 
dream.  Yet the non-fictional literature about demonic dreams, their content and their 
effect, and the role of reason in this kind of spiritual warfare, is almost as rich as 
Milton‟s poetic creations. 
Two of the most compelling works of non-fiction regarding spiritual warfare 
share the same title:  Augustine‟s Confessions and Richard Norwood‟s Confessions.3  
Both men reveal the concerns facing fallen humans in the problem of satanic and 
tempting dreams.  Both Norwood and Augustine suggest that their disturbing dreams are 
signs or manifestations of their actual sins, despite their will not to have such dreams and 
commit such sins.  Moreover, both men imply that they, unlike the unfallen Eve in 
Paradise Lost, cannot entirely escape the responsibility they continue to feel for the 
occurrence of disturbing dreams.
4
 
                                                                                                                                                
would still not be inappropriate to call his dreams of temptation and sin “satanic” in the sense that Satan 
remains the primary figure of man‟s tempter, so that any dream which tempts man must in some sense 
originate from Satan, even if it is one‟s own memory that serves as the means for that temptation.  Both 
terms are used to imply that spiritual force with which humans must contend and which seeks to pull them 
away from God.  I would also include waking visions in the discussion of satanic dreams because, as 
Augustine notes, sleep is only one of several possible times when reason and the senses are not 
dominant—other instances include when people are “disturbed from their inward structure, as in the case 
of madmen, or distracted in some other mode, as in that of diviners and prophets” (Augustine, On the 
Trinity, 11.4, p. 148). 
3
 Norwood began writing his Confessions in 1639, at the age of 49, and he emphasizes that he 
began writing them out of a need to remember: “I endeavored to call to mind the whole course of my life 
past, and how the Lord dealt with me.  At which time I perceived that some things began to grow out of 
memory, which I thought I should scarce ever have forgotten; and considering that as age cam eon, 
forgetfulness would increase upon me, I determined then to set down in writing” (3). 
4
 Frank Paul Bowman identifies a certain tension in the dual motives for writing spiritual 
autobiography in the period: these Christian believers write because they want to show the work of divine 
grace in them, but also so that other believers may pray for them as terrible sinners.  Bowman thus 
suggests that there is a basic paradox at work in these dual motives: “the greater the sin, the greater the 
grace” (38).  This is borne out in Norwood‟s journal as well, in his epigraph: “Jesus Christ came into the 
world to save sinners, of whom I am chief” (4). 
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In Paradise Lost, we recall that Adam and Eve never identify Satan as the source 
of Eve‟s disturbing dream.  In his Confessions, Norwood has no doubt regarding the 
source of his disturbing dreams.  The source is Satan who, for Norwood, is certainly no 
fictional character, even if he is otherwise invisible.  Norwood relates to his reader 
numerous times and without equivocation that Satan is present in his life.  Norwood 
clearly sees himself in an unceasing spiritual war with Satan, who is a constant threat, 
tempting Norwood and trying to lead him to evil and away from God, especially through 
his dreams.
5
   
Yet it is equally clear from Norwood‟s Confessions that Norwood does not 
believe it is Satan alone who is at work in tempting him.  Rather, Norwood confesses 
that he, Norwood himself, essentially aids Satan by carelessly and irrationally placing 
himself in circumstances, great and small, that make him more susceptible to Satan‟s 
evil work.  He reflects in particular on his decision to go to Rome, and the necessity of 
his conversion in order to do so, which he later views as trials of a war waged only on 
the spiritual level: “But miserable and foolish man, I understood not the many dangers of 
soul and body whereinto I cast myself, and how every step I went, as it was further from 
my native country so it led me and alienated my heart farther from God” (22).  Looking 
back on that particular episode in his life, Norwood believes that “Satan was leading 
away in triumph his poor vanquished vassal, never likely to have been recovered again 
out of his hands had not the Lord, who hath the hearts of all men in his hands, by his 
                                                 
5
 In one of the very few articles written about Norwood‟s Confessions, Charles Whitney explores 
Norwood‟s recorded struggles with despair and guilt, as well as his apparent nightly battles with demonic 
terrors and dreams, but he reads them within the context of Marlowe‟s Doctor Faustus. 
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almighty power and gracious providence brought me back again” (22).  Norwood reveals 
here some of the particular implications of his Calvinist beliefs.  Though he would resist 
the more extreme forms of Puritanism (Craven xxxi), it is also clear that Norwood does 
not share Milton‟s belief in the primacy of the human will.  Here, indeed, we sense that 
Norwood is almost passive in his susceptibility to Satan as well as to God‟s grace.  
Norwood seems to accept the Calvinist doctrine of irresistible grace—that being a 
reprobate or a regenerate is not a case of free will, in that each person chooses to accept 
or deny God‟s grace given to all, but rather that God chooses to whom He will give his 
grace freely, and that person is able only to accept, never to reject, that grace.  Yet even 
Norwood allows for some action of his will and reason, as evident in the previous 
quotation—he willingly chooses, without understanding the spiritual consequences of 
his choice, to go to Rome.  His reason has failed to direct him properly, and Satan leads 
him triumphantly away from God and truth and the good. 
If Satan can be that effective in tempting and deluding a person awake, the 
danger Satan would pose in dreams is even greater.  And, of course, so constant is the 
war with Satan that it should not be surprising that Satan would employ sleep as a means 
by which to wage his part in the spiritual war.  That is why arguably the most striking 
element in Norwood‟s Confessions, at least for our purposes here, is his accounts of 
“that nightly disease which we call the mare” (26).  The Oxford English Dictionary 
offers the following definitions for “mare” as Norwood appears to use it: “A spirit 
  136 
 
believed to produce a feeling of suffocation in a sleeping person or animal; a feeling of 
suffocation experienced during sleep; an oppressive or terrifying dream.”6   
Norwood‟s most fascinating accounts of his nightly afflictions, or the “mare,” 
come in two rather detailed narratives of dreams—one that came before his “true” 
conversion and one that came after.  Norwood is first struck by this “disease” in his 
journey to Italy, and he blames himself in part for being subject to the mare because it is 
he who allowed himself to be subject to the “dangers” to both body and soul when he set 
off on the arduous trip to Rome.  Norwood relates the ill effects of the mare upon him at 
this time in his life: 
I was scarce any night free from it, and seldom it left me without 
nocturnal pollutions; besides, whilst it was upon me I had horrible dreams 
and visions.  Oft-times I verily thought that I descended into Hell and 
there felt the pains of the damned, with many hideous things.  Usually in 
my dreams methought I saw my father always grievously angry with me.  
…  And sometimes I seemed to see a thing on my breast or belly like a 
hare or cat, etc.; whereupon I have sometimes taken a naked knife in my 
hand when I went to sleep, thinking therewith to strike at it, and it was 
God‟s mercy that I had not by this means slain myself.  But after I had 
observed the danger whereinto the wily fiend was like to draw me, I left 
of that.  (26-27) 
                                                 
6
 Oxford English Dictionary Online, “mare” (2nd entry).  Recorded in the history of this particular 
use of the word “mare” is T. Cooper‟s use in 1565 in his Thesaurus; under the word “Ephialtes” is listed 
“the disease called the mare,” a phrase directly echoed in Norwood‟s Confessions. 
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Of perhaps minimal interest here is Norwood‟s mention of the “nocturnal pollutions,” or 
wet dreams, which plague him with this disease.  Norwood seems to consider his wet 
dreams a mere symptom of his sins rather than an actual sin on his part.
7
  Yet, at the very 
least those nocturnal emissions are reminders of the depth of his capacity for evil even 
after very consciously eschewing evil.   
For Norwood, the most significant part of suffering from disturbing dreams is 
more complex than the mere issue of the nature or function of nocturnal emissions.  
Perhaps that is why Norwood, as compared with Augustine, presents basically only a 
passing reference to nocturnal pollutions.
8
  Instead, other aspects of Norwood‟s dreams 
and visions are much more telling and important for Norwood, dreams of both 
temptation and damnation, some of which he describes in great detail.   
One of Norwood‟s dreams is so real to him that it spurs him to believe he is 
already damned and suffering in Hell.  And therewith he dreams of his father‟s anger 
with him.  It is clear from other passages in the Confessions that Norwood believes he 
had committed grave sins against his parents, and thereby against God as well, perhaps 
the primary of which was that of abandoning his apprenticeship without their blessing: 
                                                 
7
 Norwood says in the same paragraph as that quoted above that he “was altogether freed from 
those nocturnal pollutions” after his conversion at the age of twenty-six, though he continued to suffer 
from the “mare” even to the time of writing his Confessions (27).  Perhaps it is for that reason that 
Norwood is not as obsessed with his wet dreams to the considerable extent that he is with his “master sin” 
of masturbation (70). 
8
 Augustine confesses that he also suffered such “nocturnal pollutions,” which at one point are the 
principal subject of Book 10, Chapter 30, from which I have already quoted extensively in the previous 
chapter.  For his part, Augustine views his wet dreams as the very sign of the sin of his dreams—they are 
an indication of the “clinging mire of concupiscence” that lingers after he has given his life to Christ and 
renounced the sins of his early life.  Those wet dreams are actual exercises in evil by the individual 
himself, according to Augustine.  They are “base corrupting deeds, brought on through corporeal images 
even to bodily pollution” in his sleep, without his consent. (10.30).  For his part, Norwood is not as critical 
as Augustine regarding nocturnal emissions. 
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“having forsaken the calling wherein my parents had placed me, and betaken myself to 
another course of life without and against their liking and without any due calling or 
encouragement from God or men, I met with many troubles” (16).9  It seems that 
Norwood believes he might have violated the commandment of honoring his father and 
mother when he decided to go his own way rather than the way his parents preferred, 
and this willful choice—without either parental or divine blessing—led him to further 
spiritual trials. 
But Norwood‟s Confessions show how he has to deal with more bizarre images 
that play a role in his spiritual warfare, temptations presented in the form of visions of 
animals sitting on his chest.  His first instinct is to kill such animals without regard to the 
danger to his own person.
10
  This he regards as a direct temptation of Satan, “the wily 
fiend” who draws Norwood into such dangers as would jeopardize his soul; that is, here, 
he would be drawn into suicide. 
Although Norwood has not experienced his conversion at this point in his 
narrative, it is clear that he believes, reflecting upon these experiences and his 
conversion years later, that God‟s grace is working in his life even at this early point, 
and more significantly, even when he still believed he was to be damned.
11
  Looking 
back especially at the bizarre dreams that seemed to spur him to suicide, even suicide in 
his sleep, Norwood believes that it was only by “God‟s mercy that I had not by this 
                                                 
9
 Stachniewski notes that “acceptance of parental choice of calling was regarded, especially by 
puritans, as an absolute filial imperative” (257n.129). 
10
 Consider again the OED definition of “mare” as a spirit that induces a feeling of suffocation in 
the sleeping person. 
11
 This suggests belief in the doctrine of predestination—that God had already chosen Norwood 
as one of the regenerate, even if the time was not proper to Norwood to know that, so that God‟s grace is 
already at work in Norwood‟s life, also unbeknownst to him then, but known now at the time of writing. 
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means slain myself” (26).  Although he is tempted and misled by Satan, Norwood truly 
believes that it is only by God—and God‟s grace—that he is prevented from falling into 
sin entirely.  And, again, Norwood blames himself in part for the seeming constancy of 
Satan‟s attacks, waking and sleeping.  Norwood concludes that God allows him to be 
tormented by Satan so regularly because of the bad choices he, Norwood, has made in 
his life, bad choices that make him ever more susceptible to Satan‟s attacks.   
The principal choice which Norwood associates with his affliction of satanic 
dreams and satanic visions is his decision to go to Rome.  In order to go to Rome, he had 
to “pretend” to convert to Catholicism.12  Thus, Norwood can reflect, after his “true” 
conversion, that is, to the Puritan faith, as opposed to his earlier “false” conversion to 
Catholicism, that he “was often checked inwardly for dissembling myself to be of that 
religion which I denied in my heart; to avoid which check of conscience I was willing 
for that time of my travel to have been persuaded of the truth of that religion” (23).13  
Since his conscience smote him for lying in his conversion to Catholicism, Norwood 
suggests that he makes a conscious choice to become Catholic, thus persuading 
                                                 
12
 The reader cannot help but think that Norwood was at this point sincere in his conversion to 
Catholicism, which makes it crucial to remember that it is only from his perspective of reflection after his 
conversion in the “true faith” of a puritan that he writes, “I very desperately dissembled seeming to be 
convinced and to embrace that religion, confessed to a priest, and received their sacrament” (23). 
Another such choice, though not linked, in Norwood‟s narrative, to his early dreams and visions 
is his conscious choice to delay his true conversion, as when he writes, “I seemed willing at sundry times 
in my own apprehension to be delivered from those corruptions, yet to some of them my wretched heart 
clave very close.  I thought upon a renouncing of all worldly pleasures, and that after conversion an 
austere and a single life would be fittest if not necessary.  …  But because of that austerity and renouncing 
of all pleasure which I proposed to myself, I often thought: It is not best to make too much haste, lest I 
should return again to my sinful delights” (59-60). 
13
 I use quotation marks around “true” and “false” here not to suggest that the respective faiths are 
themselves true or false, but to indicate how Norwood himself perceives his two conversions. 
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himself—at least momentarily—of the truth of Catholicism so as not to go obviously 
against his conscience. 
From this internal conflict between his reason, will, and conscience, Norwood 
then concludes that so many of his disturbing dreams were the result of this pseudo-
conversion to Catholicism.  Looking back in the writing of his Confessions, Norwood 
claims he was never sincere in his conversion to Catholicism and that his conversion was 
only undertaken for the expediency of traveling to Rome.  Hence, in reflection, Norwood 
believes he deserved the many tormenting dreams from which he suffered: Norwood 
deserved to be tormented regularly by Satan at that time because for some time he had 
allowed himself to be deceived by his belief in Catholicism.  And, even when Norwood 
realized the false nature of Catholicism, he still finds himself guilty in the entire episode 
for convincing himself so fully that he truly did believe that his conversion was sincere 
in order to repudiate his own conscience that would have told him he was living a lie—
all to make his trip to Rome more convenient.   
As Norwood later observes—and I would again emphasize that he reflects on this 
years after the fact—“when I departed out of Italy to go for England this disease began 
to abate, and afterwards more when I came into England” (27).  Norwood believes that 
once he made the turn away from Rome, and thus away from false religion, God relieved 
him of his suffering, if only for a time.  Norwood tells us that even though the disturbing 
dreams abated after the resolution of the complications of his pseudo-conversion, he 
continued to experience mares up to three or four times a year.  It was after his true 
conversion experience, that is, his full embrace of the Puritan faith, facilitated in large 
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part by Augustine, that Norwood found himself in some ways even more susceptible to 
Satan than before.
14
  Wesley Frank Craven observes that “So warming had been the 
initial experience of his conversion that Norwood seemingly overtaxed both body and 
spirit in an attempt to keep the fire alive.  … [F]ighting off heretical notions by day, he 
wrestled with the devil by night” (xxxi-xxxii).   
Norwood himself gives a rather particular account of these elements of spiritual 
warfare.  Norwood acknowledges that he had spent so much time fasting and praying 
and reading that he had become weak both physically and mentally, making him “more 
liable to the buffetings of Satan” as he entered into spiritual combat (91).  As in 
moments in Augustine‟s Confessions and other confessional literature, Norwood 
suggests that Satan sometimes seems to fight the hardest the closer one is to true piety.  
It is very important for Norwood, and for those studying him, to note the paradox that in 
his very conscious engagement in spiritual warfare Norwood comes to the belief that his 
spiritual state, at least for a time, is worsened rather than strengthened.  That is, the more 
Norwood seemed to engage in spiritual combat consciously, he likewise found “more 
prevalency of corrupt thoughts and affections and less ability against them or for holy 
duties” (92).  Rather than finding strength in his faith in God, Norwood begins to despair 
of his salvation as “the wily fiend would secretly persuade me all was but in jest, and to 
make me afraid” that he was not truly delivered by God from Satan‟s assaults (93). 
                                                 
14
 Norwood writes that he “resolved that in points of religion to be believed or practiced, which I 
did not sufficiently understand by the Holy Sciptures, I would be regulated by Augustine, though I had 
read little or nothing of his writings at that time … because not only in sermons but almost in all authors 
which I had read, whether divine or human, there was honourable mention of him, and he seemed to be 
generally most approved of for piety and learning” (61).  Augustine‟s Confessions are included among the 
works of Augustine which Norwood mentions (61).  
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Accompanying this spiritual combat is a return of the visions of Satan with which 
Norwood had battled years earlier before his conversion—“a very sensible annoyance of 
Satan, sometimes waking, sometimes sleeping, which in short time also grew to be 
almost continual” (93).  Norwood spends considerably more time describing his satanic 
dreams and visions after his conversion than he spent narrating his earlier afflictions, 
which speaks to the greater significance of this later spiritual combat.
15
  Although the 
earlier dreams are significant from a reflective point of view—Norwood is able to see 
how his dreams fit into the sinful pattern his life had taken in his youth, despite the work 
of God‟s grace throughout his life—his post-conversion battles with Satan are more 
spiritually significant for Norwood.  Now, Norwood has been regenerated by God‟s 
grace and the Holy Spirit.  But these new assaults by Satan tempt him to despair, to 
believe that God could withdraw the grace already bestowed upon him.
16
  It is at this 
time that he finds that his “wonted apprehensions of the joyful presence of God‟s Holy 
Spirit were turned into an apprehension of the presence of Satan in soul and body, 
stirring up horrible blasphemies in my mind and sundry annoyances in my body” (93).   
It is here that the function of reason is most pronounced in Norwood‟s accounts 
of spiritual warfare.  In moments when he thinks he is most on guard, Norwood‟s reason 
fails him, leading him to accept falsehoods about God.  This is the kind of state Milton 
                                                 
15
 Whereas Norwood spends approximately four pages in the earlier account of his dreams before 
his conversion, he spends closer to fifteen pages on the later account of his satanic visions after his 
conversion. 
16
 Consider Norwood‟s hesitation to share his “greatest grievances and fears, supposing that if I 
should lay open all I should be rejected of Christians as a reprobate, a man forsaken of God and given over 
unto Satan” (101). 
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would claim is the case with the faculty of reason in fallen man.
17
  These satanic attacks 
which began as attacks on his physical body, as Norwood lies in his bed at night, 
progress to attacks on his mind.  Satan or the demons are 
sometimes pressing, sometimes creeping to and fro, sometimes ready to 
take away my breath, sometimes lifting up the bed, sometimes the pillow, 
sometimes pulling the clothes or striking on the bed or on the pillow; 
sometimes as it were flashing in my head and all my body, sometimes 
working a strange and stirring fear and amazedness, whether I would or 
not, though I was firmly resolved against them; and often an expectation 
of some apparition.  (93) 
Here we see more similarities with Augustine‟s many accounts of Satanic attacks.  
Though Norwood is “firmly resolved against” the demons who fill his mind with “a 
strange and stirring fear and amazedness,” his firm resolve yet fails him much as 
Augustine‟s resolution sometimes fails him in his sleep.  This calamity in the faculty of 
reason leads Norwood to unfounded fears and, more significantly, to greater sins: 
blasphemy and, eventually, despair.   
Norwood‟s experiences of error and especially despair recall a passage from On 
the Trinity in which Augustine writes of “untrue recollections, such as we commonly 
experience in sleep, when we fancy we remember, as though we had done or seen it, 
what we never did or saw at all; and that the minds of these persons, even though awake, 
                                                 
17
 Compare C. A. Patrides‟ point concerning the success of the temptation scene in Paradise Lost: 
“Since the fruit was prohibited to man as a test of fidelity, it is not surprising that Satan‟s capital aim was 
to undermine man‟s faith in God by inducing him to question the terms of that prohibition.  As Lancelot 
Andrewes observed of Satan‟s scheming, „It is our faith that he aimes at.  …  For having ouerthrowne that, 
disobedience soone will follow‟” (105). 
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were affected in this way at the suggestion of malignant and deceptive spirits, whose 
care it is to confirm or to sow some false belief” (12.15).18  Augustine thus believes that 
demons are able to lead men to false conceptions of the soul, such as those Norwood 
experiences directly.   
The erroneous opinions to which Satan leads Norwood are primarily, or most 
significantly, the blasphemies in his mind and his lack of faith in God‟s grace—his 
temptation “to doubt whether I were a man indeed embued with a reasonable soul, or 
whether I were not rather a devil incarnate in the likeness of man, and a very enemy to 
God, and therefore did seem to wish that I had never been or that I might fly somewhere 
from God” (95).  Norwood himself is able to recognize that his faculty of reason seems 
lost at various points in his combat—he cannot find his reason to rely on it to combat 
Satan‟s temptations—such that he begins to doubt whether he has or ever had such a 
faculty.  But Norwood then is tempted further to make the wildly illogical leap from 
doubting that he is a creature of reason to believing that he himself must then be an 
actual devil and an enemy of God. 
For Norwood, his inability to use his reason eventually results in a decisive lack 
of faith and despair, until he finally “began to perceive my foolishness and how I had 
been deluded by Satan when I was drawn to lay down the shield of faith which would 
have sheltered me from the fiery darts of the devil unto which I had laid myself so open 
and had gotten so many deep wounds both in soul and body” (94).  Yet, even as 
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 Though Augustine is discussing the problems he finds with the Platonic theory of “learning as 
recollection,” he clearly takes those false recollections to be included in the general category of “such as 
we commonly experience during sleep, [etc.]” so that Norwood‟s visions and the “suggestion of the 
malignant and deceptive spirits” to which he is susceptible can also be subsumed in the larger implications 
of Augustine‟s argument in this passage. 
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Norwood acknowledges his own attempts and failures, by acts of reason, to return to his 
former faith that seems to have left him, he also believes that Satan recognizes his 
intentions and “therefore did assault me more furiously than before” (95).  Thus once 
again, as before his conversion, Norwood describes being 
troubled with the disease called the “mare” (wherein a man seems to be 
neither quite awake nor quite asleep) and in that fit I was most suddenly 
and vehemently assaulted with a number of blasphemous and horrible 
thoughts and temptations or persuasions, as that God was not just and 
faithful in his word, that he was hard and unmerciful, etc.  And that he 
had now certainly given me over to Satan and that I was now become a 
companion of the devil and his angels, and that I did hate God and rage 
against Him as the damned spirits do.  And surely my heart seemed to be 
in a manner so disposed for a moment.  But then it pleased the Lord to 
bring it to my remembrance and knowledge that all this was but a 
temptation, and that things were not so indeed as they seemed to be, but 
was only a delusion of Satan and provocation to blasphemy.  (95-96) 
The real turning point for Norwood in his spiritual warfare is an essentially two-edged 
awareness: the recognition that he “was too much afraid of Satan, [and] too distrustful of 
the constant mercy of God” (97).   
In effect, in the final analysis, Norwood returns to the position Milton maintained 
in Paradise Lost: that proper piety is inextricably linked with the use of right reason.  
Norwood is right all along for blaming himself for making himself vulnerable to Satan‟s 
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attacks by making bad choices.  But Norwood also comes to realize that the passion with 
which he was waging spiritual war was, in a sense, too passionate and not rational 
enough.  Norwood concludes it was, indeed, his responsibility to act “with a good heart 
and in earnest, or from a good judgment, and not to perform spiritual duties as I was led 
by passions and affections but to guide myself by knowledge and judgment and 
discretion and truth” (97).  With those many mares, Norwood again was the problem, 
along with Satan, because Norwood had been following his passions—especially in his 
fear and despair—rather than reason and his knowledge of the truth, so that Satan was 
effectively able to draw Norwood away from God.  While Norwood “was exceedingly 
oppressed and deprived in the powers and faculties of my mind and soul, and all things 
seemed to my sight, hearing, and other senses very deadly, and as the shadow of death,” 
he was still susceptible to the temptations of blasphemy.  But when he lets his mind once 
again rule his passions, Norwood is able to recall “Scriptures contrary to these 
temptations” (99).  Thus, again, we find in Norwood‟s writings, as we already found in 
Milton‟s and Augustine‟s, the notion that the ability for humans to overcome the 
temptations offered in satanic dreams and visions is considerably lessened because the 
faculty of reason is no longer fully in control while the person is asleep, allowing instead 
the fancy or the passions to rule the soul and to guide the will.  And for Norwood, his 
dreams are so powerful that he seems to experience the same loss of reason even when 
he is awake and being tempted by Satan.
19
 
                                                 
19
 Frank Paul Bowman finds it is common in spiritual autobiographies that the “authors are not 
reasonable people in the strict sense; they have doubts about the efficacy of the reason to lead them to a 
true or the good.  Indeed, through possession or madness they may for a time abandon reason entirely” 
(34). 
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Yet in an inversion of his earlier loss of reason and faith because of his demonic 
dreams, Norwood‟s ability to recall Scriptures in the battle with Satan allows him to find 
his faith again, which in turn allows his reason once again to rule his passions and to 
direct his will toward God.  Finally, Norwood can even say that “this temptation, the 
thought whereof hath been always some abhorring to me and dampening of spirit, seems 
upon due consideration to have been most expedient and profitable and a further pledge 
of God‟s free grace and mercy to me in Christ” (110). 
Norwood and Augustine both end their Confessions with a prayer to be delivered 
from their afflictions with Satan.  Augustine initially speaks particularly about his 
dreams, asking, “Is not your hand, O God all-powerful, powerful to heal all diseases of 
my soul, and, by your more abundant grace, to quench even the lustful movements of my 
sleep” (10.30).  But he goes on to acknowledge that these dreams reveal a greater 
weakness on his part, which can only be healed by God:  “But what I still may be in this 
type of evil I have now said to my good Lord, „rejoicing with trembling‟ for what you 
have given to me, lamenting in that in which I remain incomplete, hoping that you will 
make perfect in me your mercies even unto the fullness of peace, which my inward and 
outward members will have with you, when „death is swallowed up in victory‟” (10.30). 
Norwood similarly gives thanks for God‟s deliverances from the evil that has 
pursued him, and he further asks that the Lord keep these deliverances in his memory—
”Make me mindful of that great deliverance out of Egypt from those cruel taskmasters 
who would soon have made me wholly unfit for earth, much more unfit for heaven, 
spoiling me daily of whatsoever good thou hadst given me, and hurrying me forwards 
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unto everlasting destruction” (110).20  But he then continues his prayer with the 
knowledge that he is still vulnerable to temptation, so he asks that God “Fit me unto the 
trials and temptations whereunto thus hast reserved me.  Strengthen me to stand in the 
evil day.  Thou hast engaged thy faithfulness.  Leave me not to be tempted above what I 
am able, but give a comfortable issue with the temptation that I may be able to bear it” 
(110).  And, finally, he asks, “That I may know him and the virtue of his resurrection 
and the fellowship of his afflictions, and be made conformable unto his death if by any 
means I might attain unto the resurrection of the dead” (110).  This, of course, is the 
ultimate aim of spiritual warfare—to be made a fit companion among God‟s people. 
 
“Surpriz’d by unjust force, but not enthralled”: The Lady’s Encounter with Comus 
Demonic dreams are one type of spiritual warfare, but dreams are certainly not 
the only arena in which humans face spiritual tests and temptations.  Moreover, while 
dreams are a particularly problematic form of spiritual warfare precisely because reason 
is less active during sleep, other forms of spiritual tests and temptations allow and even 
demand a more active response and vigilance on the part of reason.  Milton‟s Comus 
imagines and represents a spiritual conflict between a human being, the Lady, and a 
tempter who is physically present, Comus.  Though the masque has a seemingly pagan 
setting and cast, with virtually no explicit references to the Christian God or Christian 
theology, Milton‟s emphasis on the Lady‟s virtue and her use of reason to withstand 
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 The need to remember the work of reason—what has been learned in previous battles—is a 
further aspect of spiritual warfare that will be addresses in the next chapter. 
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Comus‟s temptation resonate with the Christian arguments found in many of his major 
works and the other texts in this study.
21
 
The spiritual battle between the Lady and Comus is the central conflict of this 
poem.  The Lady is virtuous, as the reader knows almost immediately from the 
Attendant Spirit when he informs the audience that he has been sent down to guard one 
“favour‟d of high Jove” (78).22  Though the Lady is traveling with her two brothers 
through the woods towards their home, she suddenly finds herself alone in the darkness 
when they leave her to find some sort of refreshment for her.  She has heard the rowdy 
noises of Comus‟s merriment with his followers, and though she understands the sort of 
crowd who would be making such riotous noises, she also realizes that she has little 
choice but to seek out whatever kind of help she can find.  More importantly, though she 
is fearful of the kinds of danger in which she may very well find herself, she is also quite 
secure in her sense that “These thoughts may startle well, but not astound / The vertuous 
mind, that ever walks attended / By a strong siding champion Conscience” (210-12).  
She suggests that thoughts of evil may very well startle the faithful person, but such 
thoughts cannot take over the virtuous mind that is led by conscience.  With faith and 
hope, her reason tells her that God will help guard her virtue, her honor, and her life in 
this dire time of need. 
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 Elisabeth Frost points out that “as in Areopagitica, the first part of Comus asserts that „our faith 
and knowledge thrives [sic] by exercise,‟ and, furthermore, that without knowledge of evil, without trial 
and the possibility of failure, there can be no true virtue.  Comus, like Milton‟s later political tract, is based 
on the power of reason to conquer evil, the necessity of trial in affirming virtue, and the reliance on will as 
a means of understanding the nature of temptation” (88). 
22
 It is, of course, a commonplace notion that Jove can be understood as referring to the Christian 
God so that the pagan setting features a Christian subtext without being explicitly Christian. 
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Comus himself is aware of the Lady‟s virtue before he ever sees her, as he breaks 
off the Bacchanalian dancing when he “feel[s] the different pace, / Of som chast footing 
neer about” (145-46).  Yet when Comus first presents himself to the Lady, he does so in 
disguise.  It is his way to greet unwary travelers  
   under fair pretence of friendly ends, 
And well plac‟t words of glozing courtesie 
Baited with reasons not unplausible 
Wind me into the easie-hearted man, 
And hugg him into snares. 
(160-64) 
Like Satan in Paradise Lost, Comus is a master of sophistry.  He is able to make the 
most sinful of arguments sound reasonable to bring the unsuspecting person into his 
waiting trap.
23
  Yet there is another, darker purpose which Comus has in mind for the 
Lady.  Comus is immediately taken with the Lady when he hears her singing, and he 
desires to have her not only in his entourage, but also as his queen. 
Despite his intentions for the Lady, Comus initially presents himself to her as a 
“gentle Shepherd” (271) and offers to take her to a cottage where she can rest safely 
until her missing brothers can be found.  She accepts his help without reservation: “I 
take thy word, / And trust thy honest offer‟d courtesie” (271-72).  The Lady does not see 
through the disguise of Comus to realize what he really is and what he intends, but it is 
important that she really has no reason at this moment to mistrust what this seemingly 
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 Elisabeth Frost argues that “Comus represents the dangers of reason, its transmutation into the 
logic and false philosophy of the fallen” (91). 
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good and gentle shepherd has told her, no reason to doubt that he speaks the truth to 
her.
24
  That said, however, she still understands the precariousness of her situation, 
which gives her little choice in whether to proceed with this presumed shepherd, and 
asks that God‟s providence watch over her and “square [her] triall / To [her] 
proportion‟d strength” (329-30). 
After Comus and the Lady exit, the reader is introduced to the two brothers.  The 
younger brother is rightly concerned about his sister‟s safety and welfare, but the older 
brother, while also concerned, has found a certain comfort in the knowledge of his 
sister‟s chastity, which he feels will keep her from harm.  Even when he discovers 
through the Attendant Spirit (also in disguise as a gentle shepherd, but this time as one 
who is familiar to the boys) that she has been found by Comus and is therefore in greater 
danger than he had wanted to think possible, he insists that “Vertue may be assail‟d, but 
never hurt, / Surpriz‟d by unjust force, but not enthrall‟d” (589-90).  In a sentiment 
which echoes that which we already discovered in Paradise Lost—that evil can enter the 
mind of God or man and leave no stain behind—the older brother insists that their 
sister‟s virtue, even if attacked and surprised by the evil in the wood, will not be 
enthralled by the persuasive powers of that evil. 
Indeed, the reader sees very soon after that the elder brother was entirely correct 
in his trust in his sister‟s virtue.  The next time we see the Lady with Comus, it becomes 
quickly apparent that she has already seen through his disguises and knows Comus for 
                                                 
24
 Daniel Colvin argues that before the actual seduction of the Lady, Comus “blur[s] her sense of 
sight, her natural means for distinguishing between good and evil, between appearance and reality.  The 
„false presentments‟ will then subvert her understanding, a faculty which retained a vestigial capacity even 
after man‟s fall.  … The attack, then, is to be made not directly on the Lady‟s virtue, but on the powers of 
reason and will by way of the appetites inherent in her particular nature” (11). 
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who and what he truly is.  Moreover, she refuses to submit to the powers of which he 
boasts. 
Comus has taken the Lady not to an humble cottage but to a grand palace, and he 
has placed her in an “inchanted Chair” before tables laden with “all manner of 
deliciousness” (s.d. 153).  Though he offers the Lady a drink, she wisely sets it aside and 
attempts to rise out of her chair.  Comus detains her, threatening to use his magic wand 
to bind her to the chair in which she sits, which he does indeed do.
25
  But this does not 
particularly worry the Lady as she undertakes what she now knows is a spiritual battle 
with Comus.  Though he boasts of his power over her, she insists, “Thou canst not touch 
the freedom of my minde / With all thy charms, although this corporeal rinde / Thou 
haste immanacl‟d, while Heav‟n sees good” (663-65).  The Lady‟s words again resonate 
with the belief that her mind and will are of utmost importance here; it does not matter 
what Comus does to her body, as long as her mind refuses to believe his lies and her will 
does not consent to do what he suggests.
26
  More importantly, God knows what is in her 
mind and will, so He sees the good she wants to do but is prevented from doing because 
of the evil of others. 
                                                 
25
 Debora Shuger relates the entrapment of the Lady to Augustine‟s treatment of his wet dreams 
in his Confessions, where  he laments his “inability to achieve the perfect continence God demands” (3), 
and in City of God, where he compares wet dreams to rape, insisting that both are free of guilt for what 
happens to and with their bodies.  The Lady is as free from guilt from her entrapment as Eve, Augustine, 
and Norwood are from the sins in their dreams.  But as with Norwood and Augustine, the implications for 
the Lady are different than they are for Eve, because they live in an already fallen world. 
26
 Shuger sees these lines as Milton‟s affirmation of a Catholic distinction between sinful consent 
and unwilling arousals: “the fact that the Lady preserves her moral freedom and purity despite being 
trapped on a „venom‟d seat‟ (916) counters the dark and Protestant understanding of human sinfulness” 
(7).  Kathryn Schwarz, in looking at the ways in which Milton attributes the virtue of chastity to the 
feminine will, suggests that the reader “may feel a certain skepticism, suspecting a more intimate mind-
body connection than [the Lady] admits.  But she is proved right, sustained in her conviction by the 
masque‟s events” (273). 
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Throughout Comus, both in the dialogue between the two brothers and in the 
encounter between the Lady and Comus, Milton explores a particular idea of chastity 
and virtue that is linked with the free exercise of the mind and will.  The elder brother is 
absolutely certain that his dear sister‟s chastity—her virtue not only of body, but more 
importantly of mind—will be her “hidden strength” that will not allow her to be 
overcome by Comus‟s evil (415).27 
At this point in the masque, Comus and the Lady engage in a debate as he 
attempts to persuade her that what he desires is not really as evil as she perceives it to 
be.
28
  He urges her to see the pleasures available to her and offers her reasons that she 
should accept them.  Comus charges that the Lady “invert[s] the cov‟nants of her trust, / 
And harshly deal[s] like an ill borrower / With that which [she] receiv‟d on other terms” 
(682-84), suggesting that she is somewhat cruel to herself in denying herself these 
                                                 
27
 Paula Loscocco addresses the Lady‟s chastity and compares it to Samson‟s heroic chastity.  
James Obertino argues that chastity is “important as a virtue in its own right, as well as a pervasive 
metonymy for charity, which binds Creator and creature, grace and nature together” (21).  Such a reading 
of virtue, Obertino suggests, aligns Milton more closely with the Catholic theology of Aquinas than with 
the Reformation theologies of either Luther or Calvin.  Debora Shuger also conceives of the Lady‟s 
chastity in terms of masculine virtue/chastity: “For a man, sex (that is, heterosexual intercourse) requires 
consent, and therefore his virtue can protect his virginity.  However, while a man cannot be raped, his 
chastity can be threatened, and hence tested, by sexual temptation.  Thus, in both Renaissance and modern 
usage, when a woman says she has been ravished, she means that she has been sexually assaulted; if a man 
makes the same claim, he means that he has been sexually aroused.  Both sorts of ravishing involve 
coercion, but whereas women must fall back on pepper spray (or a couple of sword-bearing brothers) to 
ward off unwanted assaults, their own virtue suffices to protect men from all dangers except the „birdlime 
of concupiscence‟” (5). 
Elisabeth Frost maintains that the Lady “bears out the Elder‟s prediction: armed with reason, and 
the inner light of chastity, the Lady remains steadfast against Comus‟s tangle of false reasoning, 
demonstrating the victory of innocence in the face of bold seduction.  … [O]nly because the Lady remains 
pure in body and spirit, and carries her strength within herself, can she resist the seductive power of false 
reasoning” (93-94). 
28
 Frost suggests that “throughout this first part of the poem, reason is at odds with the forces 
striving to depose it—perverse sophistry and sensuality.  Reason governs the structure of the action, which 
centers on argument, dialogue, and debate” (90). 
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pleasures and violates the covenant which she implicitly has with Nature who has 
bestowed this beauty upon her. 
Comus then moves to appeal to the Lady‟s understandable thirst and hunger after 
traveling for the day and becoming lost at night.  Comus thus questions why she should 
deny herself “Refreshment after toil, ease after pain, / That have been tir‟d all day 
without repast,” particularly since all humans require such sustenance (687-88).  Comus 
suggests that such need is a mark of a general frailty among human beings, rather than a 
sign of any individual weakness on her part.  He concludes the first of his arguments 
with the urging that she drink what he has offered because it “will restore all soon” 
(690)—her strength will be restored so that she could presumably continue her journey. 
The Lady, however, is not deceived by Comus‟s rhetoric.29  She delivers a 
blistering tirade against the falsehoods he has told:  “„Twill not false traitor, / „Twill not 
restore the truth and honesty / That thou hast banish‟t from thy tongue with lies” (690-
92).  She points out that he lied when he told her he was taking her to a safe and humble 
cottage, but even more importantly she recognizes that the beast-like creatures 
surrounding him must also have been enchanted by Comus‟s evil offer of refreshment.  
She thus continues her accusation against Comus: 
Hence with thy brew‟d inchantments, foul deceiver, 
Hast thou betrai‟d my credulous innocence 
With visor‟d falshood, and base forgery, 
                                                 
29
 Jean Graham, analyzing the Lady‟s silence and deafness in the masque, argues that “the Lady 
possesses the ability to understand and judge the virtue of words, and the will to shield her mind from 
unvirtuous words as soon as she recognizes them, just as Eve escapes pollution from Satan‟s dream, 
according to Adam” (6). 
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And wouldst thou seek again to trap me here 
With lickerish baits fit to ensnare a brute? 
(696-700) 
The Lady again offers her innocence in her defense in coming even thus far with Comus.  
She admits that she initially believed the lies that Comus told her—she was trusting of 
his lies in her innocence, but there was also no sign that he was less than he seemed 
when they met.
30
  Furthermore, in comparing the enticements Comus has offered her to 
baits fit to snare brutes, she implicitly suggests that her reason—that which separates her 
and all humans from mere beasts—puts her above his appeal to merely physical desires.  
Her suggestion also shows a recognition that in appealing to his victims‟ purely physical 
desires, and having them succumb to his physical offerings, Comus renders them mere 
brutes—no longer capable of reason or rational thought.31 
The Lady reiterates again in this portion of her argument that she “would not 
taste [his] treasonous offer” (702).  In seeing Comus‟s offer as a form of treason, we are 
led to ask for whom this offer is treason—for Comus or for the Lady.  In what way, or 
against whom, is this offer a form of treason?  There are various ways to answer this 
question, each of which resonate with the implications I would read into this passage. 
First, the Lady could be understood as saying that Comus himself is committing 
treason in making this offer—treason against God or the Heavens in attempting to lure 
unsuspecting humans into his sins.  She also understands Comus as committing treason 
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 Recall, however, that she also acknowledges that her choices were very limited when she 
decided to go with him, so that at that moment, he seemed no worse than the lesser of two evils, as it were. 
31
 Daniel Colvin suggests that “in the process of being transformed by Comus, each subject loses 
that which, according to Milton, connects him with his creator and defines him as human: the faculties of 
understanding and will” (9). 
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against her—he has already betrayed her in telling her he would help her while intending 
to seduce her. 
The most significant reading of this passage, however, implies that the Lady also 
understands that the offer Comus makes to her would lead her to a significant betrayal of 
herself—of her virtue, her mind, and her soul.  Were she to accept the drink and 
promises offered by Comus, the Lady would be committing treason against herself, and 
also against her God.
32
 
The Lady concludes her argument against Comus‟s enticement to drink his 
potion with an adamant statement that appeals to reason and wisdom: she would find no 
pleasures in his drink because “that which is not good, is not delicious / To a wel-
govern‟d and wise appetite” (704-5).  The Lady‟s claim here emphasizes the 
subordination of appetite to mind.  While the drink Comus offers might indeed be 
pleasurable to the appetite, which by nature has hunger and thirst for refreshment, the 
appetite would not yearn for such sensuous satisfaction if reason and wisdom governed 
it.  She suggests, therefore, that the mind moved by wisdom and right reason, as hers is, 
would find no pleasure in Comus‟s drink, not because it does not taste good (it may), but 
because it is being offered for sinful purposes. 
Comus immediately dismisses the Lady‟s arguments as the “foolishness of men,” 
and instead points her again to the persuasion of Nature who provides all this wonderful 
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 The Lady then suggests that it is not necessarily the potion itself that is evil, but that it is 
rendered evil by the one who offers it.  In a way, the potion offered by Comus is symbolically significant 
in ways that echo the symbolic significance of the fruit in Eden.  That is, neither the fruit nor the potion is 
inherently evil, but they are rendered so when they are used in manners directly against the 
commandments of God.  In drinking the potion that is against God‟s will for human beings, the Lady 
would be committing treason in the same way that Adam and Eve did when they ate what was forbidden. 
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bounty which is intended to be enjoyed.  Yet he has already made this argument, and it 
failed to persuade the Lady.  So Comus then moves to persuade her by conflating his 
notion of Nature with the Lady‟s belief in God: 
if all the world 
Should in a pet of temperance feed on Pulse, 
Drink the clear stream, and nothing wear but Freize, 
Th‟ all-giver would be unthank‟t, would be unprais‟d, 
Not half his riches known, and yet despis‟d, 
And we should serve him as a grudging master 
As a penurious niggard of his wealth, 
And live like Natures bastards, not her sons. 
(720-27) 
The “all-giver” does not appear to be nature, in part because of the different pronouns 
Comus uses for each: the all-giver is male, nature is female.  Yet Comus moves easily 
between talking about the all-giver and nature such that they are essentially the same.  
Comus is a rank naturalist, a kind of perverse pantheist, and a virtual animist.  Comus‟s 
naturalism has no proper place for reason, and is even antithetical to reason.  We see this 
especially in the clever pun in the last line of Comus‟s argument on the whole in this 
context.  In Comus‟s rank naturalistic world-view, humans almost have a duty to incline 
to excess sensuality so as to relieve Nature of her abundance, to keep nature from being 
“strangl‟d with her waste fertility” (729).  Comus almost seems to expect that the Lady, 
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who is feminine like nature, cannot employ reason that would discern that there is 
something beyond the merely natural and sensual. 
Comus then concludes his argument with his most brazen appeal to the Lady.  He 
offers her this sinful advice: 
List Lady be not coy, and be not cosen‟d  
With that same vaunted name Virginity, 
Beauty is natures coyn, must not be hoorded, 
But must be currant, and the good thereof 
Consists in mutual and partak‟n bliss 
Unsavoury in th‟ injoyment of it self 
If you let slip time, like a neglected rose 
It withers on the stalk with languish‟t head. 
Beauty is natures brag and must be shown 
In courts, at feasts, and high solemnities 
… 
There was another meaning in these gifts, 
Think what, and be adviz‟d, you are but young yet. 
(737-55) 
Comus implies here that the Lady has been fooled into thinking that virginity is 
something to be prized and praised and instead argues that in keeping her virginity and 
chastity, the beautiful Lady is cheating both nature, who gave the Lady her beauty in 
order to see it spent in the indulgence of natural pleasures, and herself, for she could 
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experience the bliss of those same pleasures.  In Comus‟s argument, the fact that nature 
has seen fit to bestow such beauty on the Lady is the very reason that the Lady should 
now indulge in the natural and sensual goods offered by and in the person of Comus. 
Again, the Lady is not fooled by Comus, and she responds even more 
vehemently than before: 
I had not thought to have unlockt my lips 
In this unhallow‟d air, but that this Jugler 
Would think, to charm my judgement, as mine eyes 
Obtruding false rules pranckt in reasons garb. 
I hate when vice can bolt her arguments 
And vertue has no tongue to check her pride. 
(756-61) 
The Lady will not let Comus deceive her.  She even attacks his view of nature.  
Countering Comus‟s crude naturalism, the Lady claims that there is, somewhat as in 
Stoicism, an inherent and functionally rational virtue in nature; that nature makes the 
greatest provision for those who live according to the laws of temperance.  The Lady 
argues that the  
 
giver would be better thank‟t, 
His praise due paid, for swinish gluttony 
Ne‟re looks to Heav‟n amidst his gorgeous feast, 
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But with besotted base ingratitude 
Cramms, and blasphemes his feeder. 
(775-79) 
The Lady then asks Comus rhetorically, “Shall I go on?” (779), and she does indeed 
continue her speech on the value and power of chastity, the sublimity and mystery of 
which she acknowledges Comus will never be able to understand. 
Comus knows the Lady speaks only truths, as he reveals to the audience that he 
“fear[s] / Her words set off by som superior power,” and he reacts physically to her 
words in the same way he reacts when he feels the power and wrath of Jove (800-1).  
Despite this, however, Comus is still determined to “dissemble, / And try her yet more 
strongly” (805-6).   
He barely begins his persuasions anew, however, when the Lady‟s brothers rush 
into the palace, take the glass from his hand, and break it against the floor.  
Unfortunately, the brothers failed to follow the Attendant Spirit‟s precise instructions to 
take Comus‟s magic wand.  Comus therefore manages to escape, and the brothers are 
unable to “free the Lady that sits here / In stony fetters fixt, and motionless” (818-19). 
Despite the Lady‟s impressive use of reason in the face of Comus‟s temptation, 
Milton suggests that the Lady‟s ability to withstand Comus nonetheless does not come 
entirely from her own mind.  The Lady yet needs some external aid added to her own 
virtue to be entirely free from the sinful fetters with which Comus attempts to bind her.  
The Attendant Spirit thus calls on Sabrina, a “Virgin pure,” who was transformed into a 
river goddess so as to avoid her potential rapist (826).  The Attendant Spirit believes 
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Sabrina will be willing and able to help the Lady, “For maid‟nhood she loves, and will 
be swift / To aid a Virgin, such as was her self / In hard besetting need” (855-57).  
Sabrina is indeed willing and able to release the Lady from Comus‟s spell, and she does 
so by sprinkling a sort of holy water from Sabrina‟s fountain onto the Lady‟s chest and 
rubbing the water three times on her finger tip and on her lip.  This scene between 
Sabrina and the Lady suggests the act of Christian baptism, particularly with the use of 
water and the repetition of the number three.   
Upon this cleansing rite at the hand of Sabrina, the “spell hath lost his hold” on 
the Lady (919).  Furthering the analogy with Christianity, at least Miltonian Christianity, 
I argue that Comus is able to bind the Lady to his chair, despite her otherwise perfect use 
of reason to resist temptation, as a sign that the Lady, and all of humanity, is yet subject 
to the frailty of reason that is the most deleterious effect of original sin.  The Lady‟s 
right reason guides her to the truths about Comus such that she is able to see through his 
false arguments and maintain her virtue.  But he can still bind her body because her soul 
is still marked, in the context of the pagan masque, by something like the sins of Adam 
and Eve.  The Lady employs right reason throughout, better than Adam and Eve did, but, 
in the terms of Thomas Aquinas, she was still potentially corruptible, a state poetically 
symbolized in her being stuck in Comus‟s spell.  Sabrina, then, becomes a figure of 
God‟s grace as she cleanses the Lady in such a way that Comus has lost entirely his 
power over her.  Milton himself makes this connection between Sabrina and God‟s grace 
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explicit when the Attendant Spirit urges the Lady to leave Comus‟s lair “while Heaven 
lends us grace” (938).33 
Milton‟s argument concerning spiritual warfare in Comus is essentially the same 
as that Paradise Lost: right reason is foundational in spiritual temptation.  The subtle 
difference in presentation between Comus and Paradise Lost is that in the latter Adam 
and Eve fall by the failure to employ right reason, and the effects of that fall, the 
dementing of humanity, are on rather full display.  In Comus, the Lady, unlike Adam and 
Eve, employs right reason from beginning to end.  Yet, she still needs a kind of baptism 
as a reminder that she is still potentially if not actually fallen at any moment.  Comus 
operates as more of a cautionary tale than Paradise Lost.  The Lady succeeds with 
reason, yet she is still subject to the enemy, and needs some form of prevenient grace to 
sustain her virtue.
34
 
At the end of Comus, Milton offers a sort of summary statement concerning the 
worthwhile endeavor of spiritual warfare.
35
  The Attendant Spirit tells the parents of the 
children: 
 
                                                 
33
 Sacvan Bercovitch cites A. S. P. Woodhouse‟s outline of the action of the masque as a 
“movement from „nature‟ to „grace alone,‟ with an intermediate „area where nature and grace are met‟ as 
„adjoining and are interpenetrating orders‟” (357).  Nancy Weitz Miller suggests that the Lady‟s “steadfast 
refusal to yield to coercion, though physically bound to Comus‟s chair, merits divine aid.  … [E]ven a hint 
of lust in her would tarnish her chastity, prevent divine intervention, and leave her entirely (bodily and 
spiritually) in Comus‟s power” (162-63). 
34
 Daniel Colvin takes the lesson of Comus to be that “Only when a person recognizes his own 
nature can he exercise his faculties in a proper way.  Significant action is indeed possible in a fallen world, 
but only with the proper knowledge of the self and the world and a concentrated exercise of the proper 
faculties” (16). 
35
 James Obertino points out that the Attendant Spirit tells Lord and Lady Egerton that “all that 
has transpired has helped to perfect their children,” but Obertino also acknowledge that Milton knows that 
the trials are not finished, for “nature will continue to mix the ingredients of trial with blessedness” (37). 
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Heav‟n hath timely tri‟d their youth, 
Their faith, their patience, and their truth. 
And sent them here through hard assays 
With a crown of deathless Praise, 
To triumph in victorious dance 
O‟re sensual folly, and Intemperance. 
(970-75) 
The Lady beats Comus‟s sensual folly and intemperance with right reason; but her 
momentary imprisonment and her liberating baptism reminds her that the next time she 
would be “timely tri‟d” she would still need God‟s grace to guide her right reason.36  
Even in the last moments of the masque, Milton seeks to affirm for his audience that 
Heaven‟s grace would always help to sustain the work of reason and virtue in the face of 
such powerful temptations as Comus presented.
37
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Catherine Thomas suggests that the Lady will be better prepared for the next battle because 
“the test of her virtue [here] may be less that she deny all feelings and maintain unblemished notions of 
virginity and more that she learn to temper the passions she feels and those others feel toward her” (448).  
Responding to critics who suggest that the Lady‟s chastity has faltered, leading to her being bound to the 
chair, Debora Shuger points out that the praise offered by the Attendant Spirit for the Lady‟s triumph 
makes it difficult to read the Lady‟s entrapment as evidence of sin on her part: “The masque insists upon 
the Lady‟s virtue, without ever disclosing why she falls victim to the glutinous gums” (2). 
37
 Arguing that Milton offers positive views of both Eve in Paradise Lost and the Lady in Comus, 
Jeanie Grant Moore yet suggests that their differences—“the failure of Eve in her unfallen state and the 
success of the Lady in a fallen world—are accounted for “in the paradox that only through the fall could 
Eve attain that which would have saved her: the knowledge of good and evil” (2).  What Moore seems to 
ignore is just how Milton understands that knowledge of good and evil—“good lost, evil gained” rather 
than a particular kind of knowledge that could have prevented the fall had Eve had it.  Milton‟s point is 
precisely that Eve was always sufficient to withstand the temptation of Satan. 
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“The tumors of a troubl’d mind”: Samson’s Battles Within 
The Lady‟s spiritual battle with Comus offers an example of a rather obvious 
kind of spiritual warfare in which people must encounter a tempter who offers them 
something external to themselves.  The Lady‟s mind was already strong when she met 
Comus, and she simply (though it is never really simple) had to maintain that strength of 
mind in order to see through the lies that Comus used in his attempt to persuade her to 
his side with the worldly and sensual delights offered.  In Samson Agonistes, however, 
we find a kind of spiritual warfare that is deeply internalized so that the presence of 
others (who may or may not be functioning as tempters) is secondary to the battle being 
waged in one‟s own mind.  For Samson, each of his visitors tempts him in a way that is 
contrary to what he feels he must do, but those temptations are less important than his 
battle against his despair which informs his encounters with his visitors.  Insofar as 
Samson is (and has always seen himself as) an active rather than a contemplative man, 
his particular form of spiritual warfare is also rendered rather paradoxical.  That is, this 
man of action finds his spiritual warfare centered mainly on his despair resulting from 
his failure to act properly in order to overcome temptation.  He is forced to reflect upon 
his relations with those around him, but especially upon his relationship with God, as he 
realizes that the external deeds by which he expected to fulfill God‟s purpose for his life 
and his people were insignificant in light of the sins he committed against God. 
Part of the power of Samson‟s spiritual battles is that he is fully, recognizably 
human in being marked by all the flaws of fallen humanity, unlike the Lady, for we 
never see her failing in her spiritual battles.  Even more than the Lady who also 
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necessarily lives in the fallen world, Samson represents the struggles of fallen humanity 
in powerful ways, especially as he first recognizes his own weaknesses, and succumbs to 
those weaknesses, before he comes to the greater knowledge he needs in order to 
overcome those weaknesses.
38
  In addressing Samson‟s weaknesses and humanity, 
critics of Samson Agonistes seem to be divided between the “traditional” view of 
Samson as redeemed through his repentance and the “revisionist” view of Samson as 
problematic because of his violence.
39
  I offer an alternative to the extremes in this 
traditional/revisionist dichotomy by focusing on Samson as fully human—a human who 
sins and fails in the initial trials with which he is presented, but one who is also capable 
of redemption through God‟s grace in cooperation with human reason, as indeed is the 
case with all persons.  
                                                 
38
 Camille Slights writes that “in Samson Agonistes Milton shows us the fallen world where 
doubting men struggle among the bewilderingly deceptive forms taken by good and evil where virtue is 
possible only when doubt is overcome” (395).  Franklin R. Baruch argues that “the play has been centrally 
concerned, not with Samson, but rather with the way in which the Old Testament hero‟s story could be 
made to figure forth the nature of spiritual strength and insight, and of the kind of activity needed to 
achieve these objectives”(319).  Baruch further suggests that Samson serves to show both a godliness that 
has been difficult to achieve (in the virtue of Samson) and the limiting nature of those who stop only at the 
admiration of such persons rather than seeking such virtue for themselves (in the distorted vision of the 
Chorus), such that the images at the conclusion of the poem “serve simultaneously to suggest Samson‟s 
victory and the Chorus‟ very limited and significantly distorted sense of what his mission has meant for 
them” (320). 
39
 See Alan Rudrum‟s history of scholarship on Samson Agonistes.  He identifies the traditional 
view (epitomized in the work of Mary Ann Radzinowicz and Joan S. Bennett) as seeing Samson as a hero 
who “through a process of repentance and renewal of spirit charted through the poem‟s major episodes, 
becomes enabled for the role to which he had been dedicated by angelic promise,” and the revisionist view 
(epitomized in the work of Joseph Wittreich and John Carey) of Samson as a false hero who commits 
“morally disgusting” acts and whose actions should be contrasted with those of the Son in Paradise 
Regained (465).  I realize that I cannot entirely escape this dichotomy, and I also recognize that my view 
tends toward the traditionalist, for I cannot see Samson‟s final actions (which are the focus for revisionist 
critics) as “morally disgusting” either in the historical biblical telling or in Milton‟s version.  That said, I 
appreciate Rudrum pointing out that the revisionist view, in basing its understanding of Samson on the 
premise that Samson cannot be a hero because he did bad and sinful things, “ignores the Christian view of 
God‟s forgiveness of sins; it also fails to take human experience into account” (475).  He also highlights 
Joan S. Bennett‟s attack (in Reviving Liberty) on “the shallow liberal assumptions that have fueled the 
revisionist thesis from the beginning” (479). 
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Thus, despite the focus in Samson Agonistes on the internal spiritual battle of the 
blind Samson on the day of his death and his defeat of the Philistines, Milton‟s closet 
drama yet implicitly deals with other kinds of spiritual battles as well.  Otherwise, and 
not accidentally, Milton often refers to an earlier spiritual battle which Samson lost, a 
defeat that has haunted Samson in crucial ways—his failure to resist the temptation by 
Dalila to reveal the secret of his strength.  The defeated Samson is distressed by the 
knowledge that he made a series of bad choices regarding his marriage to Dalila, choices 
which essentially rendered Samson a man incapable of action and brought him to this 
state of despair and to his final spiritual battle.   
First, Samson reflects upon his very decision to marry Dalila.  Samson had been 
married before, and in that case, Samson “knew / From intimate impulse” that God 
directed him to marry his first wife (222-23), despite the fact that she was the “daughter 
of an Infidel” (221).  Though God directed Samson to marry his first wife, upon 
reflection Samson concedes that there was no similar divine impulse directing Samson to 
marry Dalila.  Samson admits regarding his marriage to Dalila that he “thought it lawful 
from [his] former act” (231), assuming that what God had sanctioned the first time must 
also be allowed the second.
40
  Samson assumed that he knew the will of God, and, not 
heeding reason properly, he proceeded according to a problematic inference.   
                                                 
40
 Michael Bryson argues that “in choosing to present Samson‟s story in dramatic form, Milton 
focuses our attention on the subjective and potentially unreliable nature of his Samson‟s [as opposed to the 
Biblical Samson‟s] claim to divine impulsion.  What Judges establishes as truth, Milton‟s Samson 
Agonistes opens to doubt and skepticism” (27).  Yet I would ask what purpose Milton would have in 
calling into question the truth of Samson‟s claim.  Milton‟s ongoing work of “justifying the ways of God 
to man” would hardly be served by calling into question the truth of Holy Scriptures. 
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Samson must also reflect upon his choice to tell Dalila the secret of his strength, 
which is reminiscent of the choices Adam and Eve made in Paradise Lost.  In 
succumbing to the temptations offered by Dalila, Samson mirrors the fall of Adam and 
Eve in Eden in several important ways, including the terms of obedience and the effects 
of the fall. 
Samson‟s hair has a symbolic function similar to that of the fruit  in the Bible and 
in Paradise Lost where matters of ultimate consequence are intertwined with the most 
insignificant objects, fruit and hair.  Harapha mocks Samson and Samson‟s God for 
having his strength placed in his hair, suggesting even that Samson is a freakish 
pretender since his strength “from Heaven / … was giv‟n [him] in [his] hair, / Where 
strength can least abide” (1134-36).  Samson, in a superficial response, tells Harapha 
that his strength, like Harapha‟s, is diffused throughout his body, its muscles, its sinews.  
Yet, Samson really knows what Harapha does not, that Samson‟s strength is not his own 
and is a fragile gift from God that, though fragile, was intended to be used to defeat the 
enemies of God‟s chosen people, and, despite its fragility, would nonetheless be 
efficacious for Samson‟s cause and call.  The hair itself, of course, is not the source of 
Samson‟s strength, except as it is “the pledge of [his] unviolated vow” to God (1144)—
the visible sign of the covenant between God and Samson.  Samson‟s strength will 
remain only if he keeps his hair uncut—i.e., only if he keeps his covenant with God.  As 
the fruit in Paradise Lost was a sign of Adam and Eve‟s obedience, Samson‟s unshorn 
hair is significant only as a sign of Samson‟s obedience to God.  As long as the hair 
remains uncut as a sign of Samson‟s obedience, then his strength remains, but when 
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Samson reveals the secret of his covenant with God, he also breaks that covenant.
41
  The 
consequences of that break are dire for Samson, as his hair is cut by his enemies, thereby 
robbing him of his God-given strength, and he is blinded to ensure that he will pose no 
further harm to the Philistines, the enemy of God‟s chosen people whom Samson was 
summoned to defeat. 
Samson‟s blindness that results from his fall is a also comparable to the effects of 
the fall on Adam and Eve and all humankind.  His blindness functions as a metaphor for 
the mental and spiritual blindness, or the diminution of rational faculties, which all 
humans must endure as an effect of the sins of Adam and Eve, as well as their own sins.  
While Adam and Eve, and by extension all fallen humanity, enter into a spiritual and 
intellectual darkness, Samson enters a physical darkness when the Philistines blind him 
in their revenge.  Such a metaphorical view of Samson was common in the seventeenth 
century, as evidenced by the analogy John Brayne poses in his treatise, The Rules of 
Dispute: “Order being observed … truth will have preserved to it its strength and 
freedom, which by the subtilty and sophistry of mens deceitful ways and wit, is weakned 
and captivated: and men contending for truth denyed this, are disarmed; and the people, 
as Samson, have their eyes put out, and made grinde in the Mills of error and ignorance” 
(7).   
                                                 
41
 William Kerrigan conceives of Samson‟s hair as a symbol of the “internal marriage” of 
strength and wisdom which Samson should have, and Kerrigan therefore relates Samson‟s hair, and the 
necessity that he leave it uncut, to a woman‟s preservation of her chastity, such that his “internal marriage 
represents in this sense spiritual virginity—strength intact, guarded by wisdom” (230).  The loss of his hair 
is therefore also comparable to a woman‟s loss of her virignity. Paula Loscocco also conceives of Samson 
as a hero of chastity, focusing on Samson‟s “role as God‟s recuperated spouse” (192), and arguing that 
“Samson‟s chastity is, in its end, a bride‟s virtue that is first rendered male to purify its heroism from 
effeminate carnality but is then set in female spousal relation to the husbandly Lamb” (197). 
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Though Samson‟s blindness can be understood in terms of the fallen human 
condition, the punishments which Samson endures for his sins, especially his blindness, 
also come to have particular symbolic significance for Samson himself.  He realizes that 
his physical blindness is insignificant compared to the metaphorical blindness he 
experienced in his relationship with Dalila.
42
  He bemoans the loss of his sight 
eloquently at the opening of the poem, considering this blindness “a living death, / And 
buried … / My self my Sepulcher, a moving Grave” (100-2), but Samson comes to 
recognize in the course of the poem that “that blindness [was] worse then this 
[blindness], / That saw not how degeneratly I serv‟d” (418-19).  Being physically 
blinded, however, is the necessary condition for Samson to overcome the blindness that 
overcame him, and all of humanity, when he and they, following Adam and Eve, sinned 
against God in the first place.  Moreover, the spiritual warfare in the case of Samson is 
that much more acute as it is so manifestly and profoundly internal in light of Samson‟s 
blindness. 
So, Samson‟s all-important spiritual battle lies centrally in his struggle with his 
own despair.  Next to pride, despair is just about the worst of sins, because it means one 
                                                 
42
 Michael Bryson similarly suggests that “Samson does not merely suffer his blindness, he is his 
blindness—so thoroughly and completely does Samson inhabit the darkness that blindness has cast him 
into, that he, like Nicholas of Cusa‟s „every creature,‟ quite literally „is darkness‟” (29).  Caroline 
McAlister argues that “Milton employs images of sentience—particularly seeing and hearing—as an 
analogue for internal, spiritual perception” (59).  McAlister further considers Samson‟s failed perceptions 
as related to his spiritual imprisonment: “The opening scene makes the point that to indulge the external 
senses at the expense of the internal faculties of sentience is to imprison oneself in the flesh. … While 
prison, airless and drab, is in part one cause for his lack of sentience, lack of sentience is also in itself a 
kind of prison. … Likewise, vision, the faculty of perception most frequently associated metaphorically 
with the imagination, is also a means of escaping one‟s immediate, physical boundaries. … Samson‟s true 
imprisonment is thus internal and metaphorical as well as literal—a loss of sentience that prevents him 
from contact with the spiritual realm.  Samson‟s impaired external vision becomes a metaphor for the 
partiality and vulnerability of all forms of human perception as contrasted with the completeness, the 
absoluteness of divine illumination” (62). 
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has lost all hope and has given up on God‟s work in one‟s life.43  In his state of despair, 
Samson encounters various people from his past on this day which he has been given to 
rest.  Each visitor pities  Samson somewhat and even offers possible ways out of his 
torture and toil.  Thus the genius of Milton: each visitor offers Samson temptations of 
sorts, temptations that represent and reveal parts of the arguments the fallen Samson has 
had with himself, and are now all the more intense in his blindness.  These visitors come 
to see Samson on a day of his bodily rest, yet their presence and virtual temptations 
serve only to stimulate Samson‟s mind into the most complex of internal, mental 
turmoil.  I would go so far as to suggest that these faceless voices that tempt Samson 
serve to internalize Samson‟s own self-communication in spiritual warfare and that 
Samson really is to be regarded as functioning as his own tempter throughout the poem.  
As a result, even the Satan-figure in the dramatic poem is no less than Samson himself.
44
 
For the longest time, Samson‟s mind is not entirely capable of the reasoning 
needed to free himself from the despair in which he finds himself, such that his real 
battle throughout the dramatic poem is with himself and in his mind—he has brought 
himself to unreasonable despair, and he will have to reason and will himself out of that 
sorry state by the end of the poem, with the aid of grace.  As Samson struggles within his 
mind to reconcile himself to the knowledge that his sins have brought him to the low 
point in which he finds himself, he eventually comes to a peace of mind about his 
                                                 
43
 Pride is the root of all sins, but despair is the belief that God has abandoned a person. 
44
 Nancy Rosenfeld suggests that “in Samson we also see … what Milton‟s Satan had become: a 
man limited by his human vision, yet retaining certain superhuman abilities as the leader and prophet: the 
ironic human counterpart of Satan, the false heavenly deliverer” (187).  Though she admits that Samson is 
often considered a precursor to Christ as a “great Deliverer,” Rosenfeld yet suggests that Samson‟s very 
humanity and his cycle of sin, repentance, and more sin reflect a Satanic pattern rather than a divine one, 
though unlike Satan, Samson is able to be redeemed and reconciled with God. 
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relationship with God when he begins to employ right reason and understand that he can 
be forgiven even for what amounts to a betrayal of God‟s promise to him and his 
covenant with God. 
Samson‟s current condition is such that he is being allowed some bodily rest 
from his servile toil on this day of feasting as the Philistines honor their god, Dagon, 
whom they believe to have defeated the God of the Israelites.  Samson‟s body is 
ostensibly at rest, but his mind is in utter turmoil, full of “restless thoughts, that like a 
deadly swarm / Of Hornets arm‟d, no sooner found alone, / But rush upon [him] 
thronging” (19-21).  Focused on the disparity between “what once [he] was, and what 
am now” (22), Samson‟s mind allows him no real rest as he questions why God foretold 
the great feats Samson would accomplish.  Yet, the formerly great and strong Samson 
questions his sorry condition:  
Betray‟d, Captiv‟d, and both my Eyes put out,  
Made of my Enemies the scorn and gaze;  
To grind in Brazen Fetters under task  
With this Heav‟n-gifted strength? 
(33-36) 
In his spiritual warfare, Samson has to remind himself that he should “not rashly call in 
doubt / Divine Prediction” when all that had been promised by God might have been 
accomplished if Samson had not “default[ed]” on his part of the bargain (43-45). 
Yet even in this small admission of responsibility, Samson‟s words would 
suggest that he believes God did not make him entirely sufficient to maintain his 
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strength because of a certain “impotence of mind” on his part (52).  Echoing the 
language in Paradise Lost concerning ideas of will, mind, and reason in spiritual battles, 
Samson questions his own strengths and weaknesses: 
what is strength without a double share  
Of wisdom, vast, unwieldy, burdensom,  
Proudly secure, yet liable to fall 
By weakest suttleties, not made to rule, 
But to subserve where wisdom bears command 
(53-57).   
Samson‟s declaration that he is “proudly secure, yet liable to fall” echoes the similar 
claim about Adam and Eve in Paradise Lost that they were created “Sufficient to have 
stood, though free to fall” (3.99).  Through the similar phrases, Milton compels the 
reader to recall the line and idea from Paradise Lost, if only to note the difference in the 
circumstance relative to Samson.  Instead of emphasizing, as with Adam and Eve, the 
freedom of Samson‟s will in his choice to fall, Milton reveals Samson‟s own perception 
of himself as always “liable to fall” (55).  Moreover, Samson emerges as a figure even 
more problematic than Adam and Eve.  Samson dissociates his liability to fall from his 
postlapsarian status as he proceeds through the course of events with the idea that God 
did not endow him with the ability, especially the wisdom, to withstand the temptation 
that would take his strength away from him.  In attempting to blame God for his own 
weakness (which is what Adam and Eve did eventually as well), Samson fails to 
understand that his own pride played a major part in his downfall—he was not only 
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falsely secure in his strength with which God endowed him at his conception and held in 
his hair, but he was also excessively proud of the strength of will he imagined he had but 
discovered that he did not.
45
 
Similarly, Samson‟s statement that his strength should have served his wisdom 
and followed wisdom‟s command echoes the idea that pervades Paradise Lost that the 
will should follow reason‟s command.  Samson does not consider is that he had 
sufficient wisdom to guide his strength and his will to God‟s purpose and to reject the 
temptation offered by Dalila, because it is easier to blame God than to take complete 
responsibility for his blindness and enslavement at the hands of his enemies. 
In this state of mind, Samson first hears the approach of the Chorus, but he is 
uncertain whether those who are coming are his friends coming to pity him or his 
enemies coming to mock him, so he becomes quiet.  The Chorus is indeed comprised of 
Samson‟s friends from his Jewish tribe, but they are likewise hesitant to approach 
Samson in his sorry condition.  They initially view him from afar, not wanting to disturb 
what little peace Samson may have on this day of rest, but they also recognize that 
Samson is not at peace—they understand that his state of mind is reflected in his very 
appearance before them:  
See how he lies at random, carelesly diffus‟d,  
With languish‟t head unpropt,  
 
                                                 
45
 Samson‟s false sense of his own strength of will also echoes Eve‟s decision to leave Adam‟s 
side in Paradise Lost, insofar as she does not expect that she will ever willingly disobey God‟s 
commandment not to eat the fruit; she, too, was proud in the conception of herself as being able to 
withstand any temptation before her. 
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As one past hope, abandon‟d,  
And by himself given over. 
(118-21) 
Samson‟s very posture and clothing reveal the despair in which he finds himself, and his 
friends cannot comprehend the difference between the warrior Samson and the captive 
Samson.  These friends ask themselves if it is possible that “this be hee, / That Heroic, 
that Renown‟d, / Irresitible Samson” (124-26).  They comment to themselves upon the 
changes in Samson until Samson begins to speak again, and then they finally announce 
themselves his friends and neighbors.  Their hopes for their visit are that  
Counsel or Consolation we may bring,  
Salve to thy Sores, apt words have power to swage  
The tumors of a troubl‟d mind,  
And are as Balm to fester‟d wounds. 
(183-86) 
Samson‟s troubled mind and festered wounds are precisely what need to be healed in the 
course of the dramatic poem, and the Chorus will indeed help him, but Samson will have 
to do the redemptive mental work for himself. 
Samson is somewhat comforted by the presence of his Chorus of friends, yet he 
is perturbed further when he realizes how few of his friends have come to see him in his 
demeaning state.  Even his blindness offers him some small comfort at this point as it 
means that he cannot see their scorn, and perhaps even a sense self-righteousness that 
Samson has deserved what has befallen him.  The only defense he can offer of himself is 
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that while they could see his immense strength, they could not see that his wisdom was 
“nothing more then mean” (207).  The Chorus of friends seeks to reassure him that even 
“wisest Men / Have err‟d, and by bad Women been deceiv‟d” (210-11), so Samson‟s 
poor judgment would be understandable even for men renowned for their wisdom.   
Yet the Chorus continues by questioning Samson‟s reasons for marrying Dalila 
in the first place.  Though they are more focused on his reasons for marrying her and his 
failure to free the Israelites from the Philistines, Samson seeks to defend that failure by 
placing some of the blame on Israel‟s governors who “not at all consider‟d / Deliverance 
offerd” by Samson‟s great and heroic deeds (245-46).  Instead of following Samson‟s 
numerous victories over the Philistines with complete defeat of their enemies, the people 
of Israel, Samson suggests, 
had grown corrupt, 
And by thir vices brought to servitude, 
Then to love Bondage more then Liberty, 
Bondage with ease then strenuous liberty. 
(268-71) 
He suggests a certain unwillingness on the part of the Israelites to do the arduous work 
that gaining their freedom will require, for it is sometimes easier to remain in easy 
bondage than work for freedom.  Though Samson may only intend to speak of the 
Israelites, the subject at issue is really Samson himself.  His vices—listening and 
succumbing to his wife‟s temptation—have brought him to servitude, and there is a 
certain complacency in his bondage because of the despair in which he finds himself.  
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Samson‟s physical strength eventually returns, but he cannot find easily the strength of 
will to gain his freedom from the Philistines, nor does he believe that it will be at all 
possible for him to deliver his people as promised by God, unless “Gods propos‟d 
deliverance” makes it possible (292).  Even making such an allowance, it does not seem 
that Samson has much hope that such a deliverance will be possible with him as God‟s 
instrument. 
Samson‟s point about God‟s providence, however, turns the conversation to the 
topic of God‟s justice.46  Samson‟s friends lament that there are so many people who  
doubt his ways not just, 
As to his own edicts, found contradicting, 
Then give the rains to wandring thought, 
Regardless of his glories diminution; 
Till by thir own perplexities involv‟d 
They ravel more, still less resolv‟d, 
But never find self-satisfying solution. 
(300-6) 
Though the Chorus seems to be talking in generalizations about people who doubt God‟s 
justice, they are again unwittingly referring to Samson‟s own state of mind, his doubts 
about God‟s justice, and his despair over his condition. Samson is one who has given 
himself over to wandering thoughts, becoming ever more entangled by the snares 
provided by his own uncertainties. 
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 In another echo of Paradise Lost, the Chorus reminds Samson that “Just are the ways of God, / 
And justifiable to Men” (293-94). 
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The Chorus also speaks directly to Samson‟s own experiences by pointing out 
that God‟s justice and providence must have been at work in his two marriages to 
Philistian women, if God desired that Samson, a chaste Nazarite, marry an unclean 
women.
47
  The Chorus then urges Samson to suppress the vain reasonings by which he 
has brought himself to despair: “ Down Reason then, at least vain reasonings down, / 
Though Reason here aver / That moral verdit quits her of unclean” (322-24).  The 
Chorus is speaking very particularly about the blame which belongs to Dalila rather than 
to Samson in her betrayal of her husband, but their words also speak to Samson‟s state of 
mind.  He needs to shut down his “vain reasonings” which have focused on the illicit 
aim to call God‟s justice into question.  Instead, the implications of the Chorus‟ 
statement are that Samson needs to redirect his use of reason toward God, His purpose, 
and his own place and role in God‟s plan for his life and his people. 
Samson does not respond to the Chorus‟ points about God‟s justice and 
Samson‟s role in God‟s plan, for they are interrupted by the arrival of Manoa, Samson‟s 
father.  Yet, Samson internalizes their points, and employs right reason to draw the 
analogy between the status of the Israelites overall and his own situation.  Then, in most 
of the remainder of the poem, he is able to use right reason as a means to emerge from 
his despair.  As a result, Samson becomes resolute in his conclusion that God has been 
just all along.   
Samson‟s emergence from despair with the help of right reason occurs especially 
when Samson begins to speak to Manoa, his father, as Manoa‟s arrival poses yet another 
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 The Chorus is seemingly gentle in their handling of Samson at this point, as they avoid the 
suggestion that Samson did not have God‟s permission to marry Dalila.  
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trial for Samson.  Manoa also doubts that God‟s justice is at work in his son‟s life.  
Manoa believes that because Samson was so manifestly chosen by God for exceptional 
work, God “should not so o‟rewhelm [him], and as a thrall / Subject him to so foul 
indignities” (370-71).  But a more contrite Samson is beginning to employ right reason 
and confidently reminds his father that he should  
Appoint not heavenly disposition, Father, 
Nothing of all these evils hath befall‟n me 
But justly; I my self have brought them on, 
Sole Author I, sole cause. 
(373-76) 
Taking full responsibility for his own fallen condition, Samson now confesses he knew 
what Dalila sought and what it would cost him were he to succumb to her temptation.  
He knew “How openly, and what impudence / She purpos‟d to betray [him]” (398-99), 
and he understood that giving into her wishes would make him “Traytor to [him] self” 
(401).  Samson recognizes that succumbing to Dalila‟s temptation essentially rendered 
him her servant, effecting his betrayal not only of himself and his people, but also a 
betrayal of his sacred duty to them and to God.  In giving into Dalila‟s “blandisht parlies, 
feminine assaults,” Samson failed to heed or uphold his reason which might have 
allowed him to remain strong against her false claims and arguments (403).  Samson 
therefore sees a great justice at work insofar as his formerly “servil mind / [Is] Rewarded 
well with servil punishment” (412-13).  Though he now finds himself a slave to the 
Philistines, he realizes that his enslavement to Dalila‟s beauty and arguments was the 
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prior, worse, and more consequential enslavement.  Yet, now while his body is enslaved, 
his mind, formerly enslaved by Dalila‟s sway, is becoming free again. 
But there is another effect of Samson‟s sin: on this very day the Philistines are 
honoring their pagan god, Dagon, in celebration of their victory over Samson.  Manoa 
presses his blind and enslaved son to realize that  
Dagon will be magnified, and God, 
Besides whom is no God, compar‟d with Idols, 
Disglorifi‟d, blasphem‟d, and had in scorn 
By th‟ Idolatrous rout amidst thir wine; 
Which to have come to pass by means of thee, 
Samson, of all thy sufferings think the heaviest, 
Of all reproach the most with shame that ever 
Could have befall‟n thee and thy Fathers house. 
(440-47) 
Manoa‟s words here provide Samson occasion to heed the corrective counsel Samson 
just heard from the Chorus.  The Chorus recommended Samson “down” his “vain 
reasonings,” and now that we hear the words of Samson‟s father, we can see whence 
Samson might have inherited his “vain reasonings.”  Such reasonings are “vain” in at 
least two senses.  First, Samson‟s previous reasonings, and now Manoa‟s reasonings, are 
vain in the sense of being unproductive.  They go nowhere; they do not improve the 
circumstance.  And they are also vain as in vainglorious.  Manoa‟s words in particular to 
Samson regarding the shame brought upon “thy father‟s house” reveal Manoa‟s rather 
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remarkable vanity.  Manoa thinks the ultimate suffering in this circumstance is not really 
the diminution of his and Samson‟s God, the suffering of the Israelites, or even 
Samson‟s blindness, but the dishonor that will befall Manoa in particular for being 
Samson‟s father.  Manoa is too preoccupied with his own private domain, his “house.”  
Manoa‟s vain words give us a greater glimpse into Samson‟s own “vain 
reasonings,” his deliberations that go nowhere and his vanity.  Yet, in this very 
confrontation with the “vain reasonings” of his own father, Samson continues his right-
reasoning emergence from despair.  Where he previously believed that he was entirely 
without hope and had been abandoned by his God, he now speaks again of hope: “This 
only hope relieves me, that the strife / With me hath end; all the contest is now / „Twixt 
God and Dagon” (460-61).  Samson has no doubt that their God will prove victorious 
over Dagon, despite Samson‟s own defeat.  And Samson reassures his father that Dagon 
will soon receive “Such a discomfit, as shall quite despoil him / Of all these boasted 
Trophies won on me, / And with confusion blank his Worshippers” (469-71). 
Manoa is comforted by Samson‟s words, taking them as a divine prophecy that 
God will neither “long defer / To vindicate the glory of his name / Against all 
competition” (474-76), nor will He “long / Endure it, doubtful whether God be Lord, / 
Or Dagon” (476-78).  But despite that reassurance offered by his son, Manoa again turns 
his attention to the condition of his son, telling Samson that he seeks to ransom him from 
the Philistines. 
But Samson insists that it is just for him to remain a slave to the Philistines.  He 
asks Manoa to “let him here, / As I deserve, pay on my punishment; / And expiate, if 
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possible, my crime” (488-90).  He believes that his punishment must be harsh to make 
up for the extent of his crime—”shameful garrulity” (491)—which would have been a 
bad enough crime if he had betrayed only a friend with his excessive talkativeness, but 
he had betrayed God Himself by revealing his and God‟s secret.  He reminds his father: 
I Gods counsel have not kept, his holy secret 
Presumptously have publish‟d, impiously, 
Weakly at least, and shamefully. 
(497-99) 
Samson feels he must remain in bondage to pay for his sins, but Manoa persists, further 
urging his son to work towards his own preservation.  Even while urging Samson to “Be 
penitent and for thy fault contrite” (502), Manoa also urges his son to “act not in [his] 
own affliction” (503).  Manoa thinks Samson can repent for his sins without suffering 
punishment for them, but Samson, the right-reasoning Samson, knows better.  His 
punishment is just and necessary and must be endured.
48
   
Yet even at this moment of acceptance of his state, Samson has not completely 
left his despair.  Manoa attempts to convince Samson that God is as happy with the 
sinner who “imploring mercy sues for life” as He is with the sinner “who self-rigorous 
chooses death as due” (512-13).  Manoa even goes so far as to suggest that Samson is 
being harder on himself than God would be.  But Samson replies that while he earnestly 
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 Philip Dust points out that Milton‟s representation of Samson‟s penitence for his sins follows 
Aquinas‟s treatment of penitence as a virtue: “Aquinas defines penitence as „to grieve over something one 
has done previously.‟  As such it is an act of the will and … it is „the habit of choosing according to right 
reason‟” (15).  Dust therefore argues that Samson‟s habit of consciously maintaining a state of penitence 
toward God, whom he has wronged through his various sins, but especially in telling his secret to Dalila, 
allows him to “achieve[] true freedom through God‟s grace” (15). 
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desires God‟s pardon for his sins, he sees no point in asking for life because his life 
would have no purpose, no end to which he would aim.  Samson has no desire to return 
to the Israelites and live “blind, disheartn‟d, sham‟d, dishonour‟d, quell‟d” (563), and his 
despair causes him to believe that God would have no use for such a life where he could 
serve neither his nation nor his God but only “sit idle on the houshold hearth, / A 
burdensome drone; to visitants a gaze, / Or pitied object” (566-68).  While Samson is 
sure he could live a long easy life in such a state, he is also sure that he does not want to 
live “To a contemptible old age obscure” (572).  Instead, it is infinitely more appealing 
to him to work as a slave for the Philistines “Till vermin or the draff of servil food / 
Consume me, and oft-invocated death / Hast‟n the welcom end of all my pains” (574-
76).  Samson would prefer death under the Philistines to an easy life with his father 
among the Israelites.  Samson is ready for death, or so he thinks, and despite a few more 
right-reasoned judgments, he yet reverts to despair.  Again, Samson, inclined to fall, is 
falling yet again even as, for the most part, he is emerging into the light of right reason. 
In a hasty attempt to bring Samson out of this despair, Manoa offers the hope that 
God might give Samson back his vision.  Manoa is not entirely wrong in thinking that 
the same God that has worked other miracles in Samson‟s life (like the fountain that 
sprung from dry ground after Samson‟s prayer for water to drink) could also work a 
miracle to make Samson see again—such would be within the powers of God.  But 
Manoa foolishly seems to place all his hope in such a miracle.  He is right in thinking 
that because Samson‟s strength returned with his hair God‟s strength does not continue 
“in thee for naught, / Nor shall his wondrous gifts be frustrate thus” (588-89).  Manoa 
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hopes for a miracle of returned sight because Manoa still harbors hope that Samson 
might one day return to the battlefield and defeat the Philistines, and, of course, return 
honor the house of Manoa.  Yet, here Manoa reveals his own blindness, his spiritual 
blindness.  Manoa cannot imagine that Samson could use his strength to defeat the 
Philistines without his sight. 
Samson cannot imagine it, either.  Indeed, he is so convinced of his uselessness 
that he admits to Manoa: 
So much I feel my genial spirits droop, 
My hopes all flat, nature within me seems 
In all her functions weary of her self; 
My race of glory run, and race of shame, 
And I shall shortly be with them that rest. 
(594-98) 
Again, the only hope that Samson can bring himself to have, even now, is that death will 
soon come to him—all other hopes have fallen flat, their possibilities ringing hollow. 
Manoa understands that Samson is suffering from “anguish of the mind and 
humours black” (600), but he still insists, despite Samson‟s protests, that he will attempt 
to ransom Samson from the Philistines.  While he goes about that business, he therefore 
asks that the Chorus offer some “healing words” to his troubled son (605).  In response 
to that request, Samson confirms for the Chorus the extent to which his mind remains 
troubled: 
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Thoughts my Tormenters arm‟d with deadly stings 
Mangle my apprehensive tenderest parts, 
Exasperate, exulcerate, and raise 
Dire inflammation … 
Sleep hath forsook and giv‟n me o‟re 
To deaths benumming Opium as my only cure. 
Thence faintings, swounings of despair, 
And sense of Heav‟ns desertion. 
(623-32) 
Samson recalls here the image in the opening of the poem: his thoughts torment and 
sting him like a swarm of hornets.  But he also emphasizes in this speech that the 
torment in his mind, the battle being waged there against his hopelessness and despair 
and his desire for death, is much worse than the struggles endured by his body, both in 
the past and in the present.  His body can find rest, but his mind has no reprieve, not 
even in sleep.  Death, therefore, seems to offer him the only possible reprieve.  But with 
that “thence,” Samson seems to realize that the assumption that death may be his only 
reprieve is what actually drives him to the despair and to the sense that God has deserted 
him.  If he could come to peace with his situation in life, with his responsibility for that 
situation, such that his mind and thoughts could end their torment, he would not still feel 
that he has been abandoned by God.  Samson thinks he needs peace of mind in order to 
emerge from his despair.  Yet, here is where Samson‟s last lapse away from right reason 
will converge with his sad insight that death may be his only reprieve.  At this point he 
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does not realize it, but, in a sense, he is right: he will find his final cause, in Aristotle‟s 
terms, in his death, but it will be a death that will also be his victory over his enemy as 
God promised.  For all of Samson‟s right reasoning as the poem proceeds to its end, he 
still, until the very end, cannot completely escape despair and the wrong reasoning, 
which confuses cause with effect, and yet he needs peace of mind in order to be free of 
despair.   
Yet that recognition alone is not sufficient to bring him out of despair, and he 
concludes this speech with yet another clear statement of his hopelessness and despair: 
Nor am I in the list of them that hope; 
Hopeless are all my evils, all remediless; 
This one prayer yet remains, might I be heard, 
No long petition, speedy death, 
The close of all my miseries, and the balm. 
(647-51) 
Samson is clearly still deeply immersed in his despair.  He has returned to his sense of 
his own hopelessness, that there is no hope for his life, other than death. 
In that frame of mind, Samson encounters his next visitor—his wife, Dalila.  He 
does not want to be near his wife, but he is helpless to prevent either her appearance or 
her conversation.  Samson‟s encounter with Dalila is crucial, as he must deal with her 
temptation all over again.  This will be a defining moment for Samson, as he must refute 
Dalila‟s logic to prevent becoming enslaved to her again. 
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Though Dalila initially claims to have repented for her actions which brought 
about Samson‟s enslavement and blindness, Samson understands that her presence and 
her words will be another temptation for him to withstand.  There is a strong 
misogynistic attitude in Samson‟s words as he makes generalizations about women, but 
he is talking specifically about false women—not all women.  More importantly, what 
he believes about Dalila‟s motives, and the motives of women like her, is that she 
intends “to try / her husband, how far urg‟d his patience bears, / His vertue or weakness 
which way to assail” (754-56).  Samson intuits he will once again be tested, and he 
prepares himself for this crucial mental battle.
49
 
Dalila attempts to appease Samson, even as she offers a variety of defenses of her 
past actions: her weakness as a woman, her jealousy of his love, that she was looking out 
for his safety (which was promised to her by those who sought to know Samson‟s 
weakness).  Dalila mostly lies to Samson, but there is one truth she speaks that Samson 
cannot dispute, nor does he have any desire dispute it.  She reminds him that “what I did 
thou shewdst me first the way” (781).  They both revealed a secret that should have been 
kept secret—Samson revealed his secret to Dalila; Dalila revealed it to the Philistines.  
Despite her appearance of repentance, and despite the truth that she speaks about 
following Samson‟s example of revealing secrets, Samson sees her present disclaimer as 
an extension of her previous and continued cruelty: 
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 Samson seems much less susceptible to Dalila‟s physical presence than he was before.  Though 
he may have given in partly because of her beauty the first time he fell, now he cannot see her beauty, and 
he instead has to see through her arguments as she attempts to persuade him to come live with her again. 
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How cunningly the sorceress displays 
Her own transgressions, to upbraid me mine? 
That malice not repentance brought thee hither, 
By this appears. 
(819-22) 
To Samson, Dalila‟s attempt to exonerate herself because of his example only makes her 
more culpable.  He accepts her “bitter reproach” as true, even if a harsh taste of reality 
(823), but mostly because he realizes that “I to my self was false e‟er thou to me” (824).  
Therefore, he unexpectedly accepts her premise that their crimes were equivalent, and he 
will give her “Such pardon … as I give my folly” (825).  His offering of pardon and 
forgiveness is ironic, of course, because what Dalila miscalculated was the extent to 
which Samson has already damned himself because of his weakness in giving into her 
demands. 
Dalila also misjudges the extent to which Samson will heed her false arguments.  
Samson does not entirely ignore the defenses Dalila offers for her actions, but he reasons 
through them, rejecting all of them as false, but especially her claim to have acted out of 
love for him.  He reasons that she could have no hope of his love when she “tookst the 
way / To raise in [him] inexpiable hate, / Knowing, as needs [he] must, by [her] 
betray‟d” (838-40). 
Dalila then tries a different mode of attack: she tries to make Samson pity her.  
She asks him to “Hear what assaults [she] had, what snares besides, / What sieges girt 
me round, e‟re [she] consented” (845-46).  She suggests that she was also tempted and 
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threatened by the Philistines if she did not fulfill her “bonds of civil Duty / And of 
Religion” (853-54).  If Samson had a duty to his people and his God, she claims the 
same for herself in acting the way she did.  Yet Samson claims to have anticipated that 
Dalila would end precisely with these arguments—”In feign‟d Religion, smooth 
hypocrisie” (872).  He counters her claim with the argument that it was her duty as his 
wife to leave her family and country and enter under his own protection rather than 
theirs, so that her loyalty should have been with her husband rather than the Philistines. 
Dalila then makes one more attempt to earn her husband‟s unqualified 
forgiveness by claiming outright that she seeks his forgiveness and wants to take care of 
him with “redoubl‟d love and care” (923), so that “what by me thou hast lost thou least 
shalt miss” (927).  She wants to persuade Samson that her comfort in his old age and 
blindness will give him Samson such relief that he will not miss either his vision or his 
strength.  Samson is not swayed.  He knows that if Dalila could treat him as she did 
when he was “in my flower of youth and strength, when all men / Lov‟d, honour‟d, 
fear‟d me” (938-39), she will potentially treat him worse when he is “blind, and thereby / 
Deceivable, in most things as a child / Helpless, thence easily contemn‟d, and scorn‟d” 
(941-43).  He cannot even begin to imagine the ways in which she would betray and 
humiliate him.  He realizes, now in full, a truth he willingly ignored earlier in the 
poem—he is in a greater position of freedom, and sees more clearly, now than he was 
before in his marriage to her.  “This Gaol [he] count[s] the house of Liberty” compared 
to the truer enslavement he would endure if he were to return to her house (949). 
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Dalila realizes she has lost to Samson‟s reason in his recognition of what she is, 
but she makes one final effort—to touch his hand.  Samson recoils from the possibility 
of her touch, which perhaps he intuits would likely be more successful than her other 
approaches, instead offering her the forgiveness she supposedly has sought from him.  
Yet even in that forgiveness, Samson‟s words ring with bitterness and accusation as he 
tells her to “Bewail thy falshood, and the pious works / It hath brought forth to make 
thee memorable / Among illustrious wives” (955-57).  But such a dismissal from 
Samson only enrages Dalila to the point that the façade she has upheld throughout her 
meeting with Samson finally falls away.  If he places the “brand / Of infamy upon [her] 
name” (967-68), then she can exalt in the knowledge that she  
    shall be nam‟d among the famousest 
Of women, sung at solemn festivals, 
Living and dead recorded, who to save 
Her countrey from a fierce destroyer, chose 
Above the faith of wedlock-bands. 
(982-86) 
Dalila willingly embraces Samson‟s judgment because infamy among his people will 
mean fame among her own, and this, perhaps, is what she sought all along. 
Dalila thus leaves Samson, but both he and the Chorus are now fully aware of 
Dalila‟s true nature—”a manifest Serpent by her sting / Discover‟d in the end, till now 
conceal‟d” (997-98).  Here is an explicit connection between Dalila and Satan, as both 
are figured as serpents.  Insofar as Dalila was Samson‟s original tempter in the 
  190 
 
“backstory” of the poem, she also functions to some extent as Samson‟s tempter here.  
But Dalila as temptress is important for the way in which it lends to Samson‟s struggles 
with himself.  In arguing with Dalila, Samson is really having to come to terms with his 
own weakness which allowed him to succumb to her the first time.  Recognizing those 
weaknesses, Samson is able to struggle with them more consciously rather than giving 
into them.  Thus Samson dismisses not only the person of Dalila, but even discussion of 
her.
50
  He tells the Chorus: 
So let her go, God sent her to debase me, 
And aggravate my folly who committed  
To such a viper his most sacred trust 
Of secresie, my safety, and  my life. 
(999-1002) 
Though Samson seems to believe that the encounter with Dalila has left him debased and 
his folly even more exposed, in truth, he emerges from this encounter victorious over her 
temptations.  For if he were truly foolish, he would have given into what she offered.  
But in remaining strong of will now, he is more prepared for his next encounter with 
Harapha, which will be “another kind of tempest” for Samson to endure (1063). 
Harapha comes in part to taunt Samson, though he is not willing to test Samson‟s 
strength in combat as Samson proposes.  Instead, his primary task is to suggest that 
Samson‟s God is weak and ineffectual compared to Dagon.  Harapha makes precisely 
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 Susan B. Iwanisziw stresses the idea that Samson both reestablishes himself as the patriarch in 
his marriage and regains the spiritual authority of his Nazarite vow in this, his final rejection of Dalila and 
her temptations: “In this closet drama, then, Samson consciously separates himself from the pleasures of 
Dalila‟s body in pursuit of his spiritual salvation, the fulfillment of his Nazarite vow” (118). 
  191 
 
the kind of arguments about Samson‟s presumed relationship with God that the cynical 
Samson has so often made: that he is without hope of being redeemed.  Harapha tells 
Samson to 
Presume not on thy God, what e‟re he be, 
Thee he regards not, owns not, hath cut off 
Quite from his people, and delivered up 
Into thy Enemies hand, permitted them 
To put out both thine eyes, and fetter‟d send thee 
Into the common Prison, there to grind  
Among the Slaves and Asses thy comrades, 
As good for nothing else, no better service. 
(1156-63) 
Harapha critically expresses about Samson‟s case the same despair Samson himself has 
spoken.  Samson has felt that he has been abandoned by God, rightly, and that he is good 
for nothing beyond the slavish toils he now performs.  But in hearing these words 
spoken by Harapha, Samson finally finds hope in his situation—hope that he is not 
completely lost and that God can still work through him.
51
  He can therefore speak to 
Harapha with confidence: 
These evils I deserve and more, 
Acknowledge them from God inflicted on me 
Justly, yet despair not of his final pardon 
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 Albert Fields argues that “it is by means of Harapha … that [Samson‟s] self-realization is 
ultimately effected, for Harapha represents the darker self which has come to rule Samson” (399). 
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Whose ear is ever open; and his eye 
Gracious to re-admit the suppliant. 
(1169-73) 
Throughout his conversation with Harapha, Samson grows more confident, both that 
God has not left him and that, even though blind, he could defeat the giant Harapha.
52
  
He is not given the opportunity to prove the latter, however, because Harapha cowardly 
leaves Samson, claiming an unevenness of battle that would give him no glory in 
defeating the blind Samson. 
After all these visitors on this day of rest in which his mind wrestles with his 
thoughts and his despair, Samson has one final test.  When the Philistine officer comes 
to take him to perform feats of strength at the feast in honor of Dagon, Samson initially 
refuses to perform for his captors.  He first cites the Hebrew Law which “forbids at thir 
Religious Rites / My presence” (1320-21).  This answer does not please the officer, so he 
questions Samson again, emphasizing the care Samson should have for himself because 
of the likely retribution when he refuses the command.  But Samson grows ever more 
certain of himself at this point, responding to the officer: 
My self?  my conscience and internal peace. 
Can they think me so broken, so debas‟d 
With corporal servitude, that my mind ever 
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 Philip Dust suggests that the temptation which Harapha presents is “one more temptation to act 
out of self-interest … [b]ut for Samson to do combat with Harapha solely on the basis of his strength 
would also be a betrayal of his habit of penitence, since that strength comes from the power of God” (18)  
Dust argues that Samson‟s justification in the theater and before God depended on his own cooperation in 
his habit of penitence and in his affirmation that God alone is the source of his strength (19). 
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Will condescend to such absurd commands? 
… I will not come. 
(1334-42) 
Samson‟s actions and choices are clearly being guided by his conscience, and acting 
according to his conscience gives him a certain amount of peace that he has been 
missing since his captivity.  Up until this point, Samson has complacently done what has 
been asked of him by the Philistines, but he has reached a point where the stakes are too 
high to do whatever they ask without question.  In realizing that he is not as truly broken 
and debased as he himself seemed to think at the beginning of the poem, Samson‟s mind 
is able to come out of the depths of despair.  His reason refutes the absurdity of the 
command which he has been given, and he is able to take a stand against it. 
Even when the Chorus is worried because Samson refused the Philistines‟ order, 
Samson clarifies his reasons further for refusing: 
Shall I abuse this Consecrated gift 
Of strength, again returning with my hair 
After my great transgression, so require 
Favour renew‟d, and add a greater sin 
By prostituting holy things to Idols; 
A Nazarite in place abominable 
Vaunting my strength in honour to thir Dagon? 
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Besides how vile, contemptible, ridiculous, 
What act more execrably unclean, prophane? 
(1354-62) 
In Samson‟s mind, according to his conscience, performing such feats in honor of Dagon 
would be a greater sin against his God than that which he has already committed.  
Samson refuses to commit such a vile and profane act against God.
53
  When the Chorus 
questions him, then, as to why he uses his strength to work for the Philistines, Samson 
defends himself by claiming that such work is lawful and honest work, done to gain 
food, and because he is under their power.  Being called to the feast for Dagon, however, 
is not at all comparable; there would be nothing honest in such a performance of strength 
because it would be done for idolatrous rather than honest purposes.  Samson thus 
emphasizes again that his free will determines what actions he will take, and how he will 
be held accountable for those actions, even when the actions are commanded:
54
  
Commands are no constraints.  If I obey them, 
I do it freely; venturing to displease 
God for the fear of Man, and Man prefer, 
                                                 
53
 Yet John C. Ulreich, Jr. suggests that “Samson‟s own unconscious idolatry” when he 
degenerately served Dalila is more deplorable than any possible actions he could take in the feast to 
Dagon, such that “[t]he process of Samson‟s regeneration is essentially a struggle to free himself from the 
vain idols of his own imagination.  And it is this iconoclastic impulse that gives meaning to Samson‟s final 
act of violence….  Samson‟s symbolic destruction of Dagon represents his final liberation from idolatry” 
(29). 
54
 The Chorus echoes an idea which Milton also presents in other writings, especially in Comus: 
“Where the heart joins not, outward acts defile not” (1368).  Milton shows in Comus that the Lady, though 
her body is enthralled by Comus‟s spell, remains virtuous because her mind never consented.  But he also 
seems to imply that at least an attempt to abstain from the “outward acts” is required to be truly innocent.  
With regard to Samson, he may ultimately be forced to perform for the Philistines, but he at least attempts 
to forestall such a performance on his part.  In resisting in this way, his heart clearly does not join in his 
performance. 
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Set God behind: which in his jealousie 
Shall never, unrepented, find forgiveness. 
(1372-76) 
Samson has already shown his preference for a woman over God‟s commands, but he 
has repented and found forgiveness.  He cannot bring himself to choose worldly goods 
once again at the expense of his relationship with God. 
Despite such willful certainty and his refusal to do what the Philistines have 
commanded, Samson changes his mind about performing for the Philistian feast.  When 
the officer returns to insist that Samson return to the feast with him, Samson is ready to 
give in to the command.  He offers reassurances to the Chorus: 
Be of good courage, I begin to feel 
Some rousing motions in me which dispose 
To something extraordinary my thoughts. 
… 
Nothing to do, be sure, that may dishonour 
Our Law, or stain my vow of Nazarite. 
If there be aught of presage in my mind, 
This day will be remarkable in my life 
By some great act, or of my days the last. 
(1381-89) 
Samson, through the work of his mind and reason, came to the decision not to attend the 
feast because it would amount to another betrayal of his God.  But now, he has another 
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influence upon his mind which will supersede what his reason told him to do.  Knowing 
that Samson has had “divine impulses” in the past which led him to act in ways contrary 
to the laws and customs of his people (namely, in his first marriage to the woman of 
Timna, but noticeably lacking with his marriage to Dalila), it is not unreasonable to see 
that Samson has received some sense of God‟s will in what he is to do, even if it runs 
counter to the laws and reasons he has already offered in his refusal.
55
  Yet even in 
willingly attending the feast, Samson assures his friends in the Chorus that he will “in 
nothing to comply / Scandalous or forbidden in our Law.”   
Samson does not know at this point what God intends, but he feels God‟s grace 
guiding him to the feast to fulfill some purpose for God.
56
  He therefore seeks to reassure 
them one final time before leaving with the officer: 
Happ‟n what may, of me expect to hear 
Nothing dishonourable, impure, unworthy 
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 Feisal Mohamed suggests that “for Samson‟s final act to be justified, it cannot be causally 
related to the fleshly, rational concerns of his three major dialogues; it must instead take its impulse from 
the immediate divine illumination residing entirely outside the events with which we are presented” (334).  
In contrast, Daniel T. Lochman argues that “analysis of Samson‟s peripety (that is, his determination to 
accompany the officer to the temple) indicates that reason plays a major, if not absolute, role in his 
exercise of judgment; however, the unique force of his reason is negative, iconoclastic, deconstructive in 
that it breaks down prior conclusions rooted in unwarranted assumption, legal absolutes, and destructive 
ratiocination” (275).  Lochman further argues that Samson uses not merely reason in the logical sense but 
“right reason”: reason which “involves a willing acceptance of things as they are; … a rational admission 
that obeying and loving God with fear are the „best‟ modes of acting; … [and which] ought to culminate in 
opening oneself to Providence and in performing God‟s will in „Deeds‟ „answerable‟ to one‟s knowledge” 
(278).  I would further argue that those events, and the work of right reason with which Samson engaged 
throughout those events, were crucial insofar as they enable him to be open to such divine illumination as 
he receives in his final moments.  Indeed, that illumination itself contributes more fully to his right reason 
that allows him to see what God intended him to do.  If he had still been immersed in his despair rather 
than working himself out of those depths, then Samson would not have been likely to see that divine 
purpose. While Lochman suggests that “Samson‟s use of reason to restrain reason permits him to enact 
God‟s justice” (285), the point I would stress is that Samson uses right reason to restrain the use of pure 
reason in order to act according to God‟s will for his life. 
56
 Caroline McAlister argues that Samson Agonistes is a play “about the mysterious 
communication of grace … [and] about the formation of a new community” (58). 
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Our God, our Law, my Nation, or my self, 
The last of me or no I cannot warrant. 
(1423-26) 
Though Samson speaks as he if intuits that he will likely die in performing God‟s will, it 
is crucial to note the difference between his expectation of possible death here and the 
longing which he had for death in the earlier parts in the poem.  No longer is he actively 
seeking his death as the only possible reprieve from his misery, but he is now calm in the 
assurance that God can still find use for him, even as a blind slave to his enemies.
57
 
Sometime after Samson leaves with the officer, the Chorus reports several noises 
to the reader: first, the shouts of applause from the audience as Samson is brought before 
them; next, a “hideous noise” or “universal groan / As if the whole inhabitation perish‟d” 
(1509, 1511-12).  The Chorus and Manoa have no way of knowing what that second 
noise signified, or who caused it, until a Hebrew messenger finds them in the street.  The 
messenger‟s first answer to their questions is simply that “Gaza yet stands, but all her 
Sons are fall‟n, / All in a moment overwhelm‟d and fall‟n” (1558-59).  Further learning 
                                                 
57
 Michael Bryson, among others,  points to the dangers associated with emphasizes the 
difficulties associated with Samson‟s final moments and his claim to be acting according to the will of 
God.  For Bryson, “what we think we know about God can always only be provisional, and this lesson 
must be kept in mind especially at the point where such knowledge enters the realm of violent certitude, 
the conviction that the „Infidel‟ deserves death at one‟s own hand” (38).  Dennis Brown makes a similar 
argument about Samson‟s interpretation of God‟s will, suggesting that Samson is “overhasty in equating 
his impulses with God‟s will” (101), such that his tragic flaw is not his weakness with women (as he 
thinks), but rather “the deeper sin of hubris—equating his own whim with God‟s will” (102).  Bryson and 
Brown, and other revisionst critics such as Feisel Mohamed, are particularly concerned to show that 
Milton calls into question the justificaiton for Samson‟s violence at the end of his life, but to do so is in 
part to ignore Milton‟s Christian interpretation—especially a typological one—of the events of Samson‟s 
life and the Old Testatment at large.  Even more importantly, the drama itself suggests that Samson made 
the mistake of assuming his own will was God‟s will—in his marriage to Dalila.  Samson has paid a 
horrible price for that mistake, and he does not want to make that same  mistake again.  Therefore, when 
he brings the house down upon the Philistians and himself, he pauses to reflect and discern that it is God‟s 
will that he do so, and not merely his own. 
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that Samson brought forth this utter destruction of the people of Philistine, Manoa and 
the Chorus find a reason for joy rather than sorrow, but the messenger is forced to relay 
the remaining details of Samson‟s victory over the Philistines.  Manoa is confused 
initially when the messenger reports that Samson fell by his own hands.  Manoa laments 
that Samson was “lastly over-strong against thy self” (1590), but he then asks the 
messenger for a full description of Samson‟s final moments.  The messenger describes 
Samson‟s entrance to the theater and the feats of strength he performed—notably 
without any combatant because no one dared to be his opponent.  Samson was finally 
given an opportunity to rest, and he is placed between the two pillars which support the 
roof of the theater.  The messenger claims he was standing near enough to be able to 
hear Samson conversing with his guide, asking if he could rest his arms on the two 
pillars, to which request the guide conceded, without any suspicion of what was to come.  
The reader is given only two clues into Samson‟s final state of mind.58  The 
messenger offers the reader some insight as he reports Samson‟s demeanor between the 
time at which he was brought to the pillars and when he began his final speech to the 
Philistines.  They report that Samson, with the pillars in his hands, stood “with head a 
while enclin‟d, / And eyes fast fixt he stood, as one who pray‟d, / Or some great matter 
in his mind revolv‟d” (1637-39).  Though we cannot know with any real certainty what 
Samson was thinking at these moments, it is reasonable to accept the messenger‟s 
descriptions as accurate—that Samson was indeed praying, and he was indeed resolving 
                                                 
58
 Paula Loscocco laments that “however carefully we trace the evidence of Samson‟s 
recuperation, we are never sure that such recuperation takes place.  Samson rarely speaks.  When he does, 
it is often in ways that are inexplicably different from previous ways he has spoken.  And his late speeches 
are often ambiguous or …riddling” (192). 
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some great dilemma in his mind.  Samson‟s words to the Chorus as he departed with the 
officer already told us that he had a sign from God that there was some purpose for him 
to go to the festival.  In being given such an opportunity as he obviously had in resting 
himself between the pillars, Samson would want to be certain that this was what God 
intended, that in acting in such a way, he would in no way be violating God‟s law. 
The reader is also given Samson‟s final words to the Philistines, but there is as 
much vagueness in them as there was in the messenger‟s report.  Samson reminds his 
audience that he has performed the tasks asked of him thus far, but he now offers them 
“of my accord such other tryal / … to shew you of my strength, yet greater; / As with 
amaze shall strike all who behold” (1643-45).  Samson must have felt confident that he 
was doing God‟s will, as he announces that he acts according to his conscience and with 
his own free will. 
Though there are questions even within the text about the legitimacy of Samson‟s 
decision to bring the house down upon himself as well as on the Philistines, he does not 
seem to choose to do so out of the despair that drove him throughout the poem to wish 
for death.
59
  Instead, he makes the choice out of a reassurance from God that he is still 
                                                 
59
 Several critics—including Feisel G. Mohamed, Dennis Brown, and Michael Bryson-- in recent 
years have questioned the legitimacy of Samson‟s final decision and have related Samson‟s violence at the 
end to the religious violence in the Middle East and terrorist attacks on the United States and England.  
Dennis Brown emphasizes that Samson Agonistes is “a tragedy rather than a morality play” (100), in part 
because it presents an ethical problem—the hero is also a mass-murderer—”that must divide our sympathy 
from our moral responsibility” (101). 
 Baruch suggests that the questions arise out of the Chorus‟s failure to understand what Samson 
has done, arguing that “Milton has of course intended Samson‟s bodily strength and the physical 
dimension of his final act to be only signs of his spiritual state, so he controls the development of the final 
choral passages … in order that they may suggest the failure of the Danites to probe the spiritual reality of 
what they have just heard related by the messenger, and to learn from that insight and become absorbed 
actively into that experience in the Temple of Dagon” (328).  For this reason, Baruch insists “we will not 
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able to fulfill the work of God which God intended him to complete, despite being blind 
and imprisoned.
60
  His friends and father also interpret Samson‟s final events in this 
way.  They believe that “Living or dying [Samson] hast fulfill‟d / The work for which 
[he] wast foretold / To Israel” (1661-63).   
The Chorus also imagines Samson as the phoenix: 
But he though blind of sight, 
Despis‟d and thought extinguish‟t quite, 
With inward eyes illuminated 
His fierie vertue rouz‟d 
From under ashes into sudden flame. 
(1687-91) 
Though blind, Samson‟s “inward eyes”—his mind and reason—were illuminated by 
God‟s grace that revived Samson‟s virtue out of his despair to allow him to fulfill God‟s 
                                                                                                                                                
see the ending correctly unless we read it in the light of Milton‟s lifelong concern for individual, active, 
relentlessly committed questing after truth, by means of reason informed by grace” (338). 
Caroline McAlister likewise admits that “after extensive searching, after the opening to view of 
[Samson‟s] tenderest parts, we are denied a view of his inner self at the crucial moment.”  And yet, she 
goes on, she sees Milton as “suggest[ing] that occasionally there are outward signs [of the internal action 
of grace], and the burden rests on the viewer to perceive and interpret this kind of evidence” (64).  
Moreover, she concludes that “[t]he ability to recognize signs of grace in others requires in itself a special 
insight into the workings of things, a special insight into things spiritual and internal.  In other words, the 
perception and interpretation of the action of grace in another sets off a similar action within the viewer.  
The action of grace is thus reciprocal, and it is reciprocated through interpretation” (65). 
60
 William Kerrigan criticizes Mary Ann Radzinowicz‟s claim that in his final actions Samson 
“goes to do what his will directs in obedience to his reason,” suggesting that Radzinowicz “has shifted 
ground from the sort of reason, right reason, that counts in this interpretive debate, and might distinguish 
one reading of the play from another, to the sort of reason without which, in the Renaissance view of man, 
no one could get up in the morning” (223).  And yet Kerrigan‟s own claim that Samson “cannot by 
unaided reason get the idea of destroying the temple because a forbidding law stands between him and 
toppled pillars,” with the point that “God put the illumination there” (223), would seem to support the 
notion of right reason.  That is, the use of “pure reason” would not enable Samson to make such a choice, 
but his use of “right reason”—reason informed by God‟s grace and his own conscience—allows him to 
judge what right actions to take in the theater that will be in accord with God‟s will. 
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purpose for his life, even in his broken state.  Such a comparison between Samson and 
the phoenix, and more generally, Samson‟s process of temptation and redemption, 
reveals that even when the believer falls into temptation and loses a spiritual battle, all is 
not lost.  Believing and repentant persons can still be redeemed through the work of 
God‟s grace in their lives.61  And that redemptive grace likewise enables their reason to 
work as God intended it to work—to direct the human will ever to the eternal goods of 
the God‟s will—especially when the benefits of grace and right reason are kept properly 
in the memory, ready for use at any time. 
 
                                                 
61
 Philip Dust, in concluding his analysis of Samson‟s penitence, writes that “[h]aving found 
grace with God through penitence, Samson also regains his God-given strength to bring the temple of 
Dagon crashing down on the heads of the Philistines” (19). 
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CHAPTER V 
THE HEIGHTS OF HUMAN REASON 
 
For warfaring Christians in the fallen world, the outcome of spiritual warfare is 
never entirely certain, for there is always the possibility of falling yet again into sin, 
despite whatever virtue one has attained in life.
1
  The representations of spiritual warfare 
in the previous chapter, though dealing with the work of reason in the fallen world, were 
focused on the successful work of reason (though that success is never guaranteed) with 
the aid of divine grace.  This chapter will consider a more particular aspect of spiritual 
warfare in the fallen world by looking at two texts which insist that spiritual combatants, 
even reduced to positions of extreme weakness physically, may yet ascend to the 
greatest spiritual heights by virtue of their mental activity, and therefore may finally 
enter into the presence of God.
2
 
The opening consideration of this chapter is Milton‟s depiction of Christ in 
Paradise Regained.  Set in the desert where Christ has fasted for forty days and nights, 
Paradise Regained puts a clear emphasis on Christ‟s physical weakness.  But Milton‟s 
emphasis on Christ‟s physical weakness from so much fasting and deprivation serves to 
                                                 
1
 Benjamin Myers writes about the Reformation theologians‟ conception of “conversion as a 
process that continues throughout the Christian life. … [R]epentance is not a single isolated event but a 
race in which believers must „run throughout the whole course of their lives,‟ so that regeneration is 
accomplished  not „in a moment, a day, or a year,‟ but only by a long process. … [T]he human beings who 
have experienced conversion remain always subject to the possibility of falling again” (30). 
2
 Myers continues, “Even for those who have been converted by grace, the goal of salvation is by 
no means assured.  Human beings do not yet possess the security of salvation; they are on the way to 
eternal life, but are not yet „safe,‟ and have not yet „arriv[d].‟  Persistence is therefore necessary—a 
persistent choice to follow the internal light of conscience, a persistent exercise of freedom in which the 
human agent turns away from sin and toward God.  In short, a moment-by-moment conversion is 
necessary if the individual is finally to „arrive‟ safely at the bliss of eternal salvation” (31). 
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stress, complementarily, Christ‟s reliance upon right reason, for it is by the use of right 
judgment that he is able to resist the temptations placed before him by Satan.  Given his 
state of almost complete physical vulnerability, Christ‟s strength and power of mind 
comes more clearly into focus as the proper means to win in spiritual warfare.  His 
victory over temptation, wherein he expresses and attains the very heights of human 
reason, is to serve as the ideal model which all humans should attempt to realize relative 
to their own temptations, even and especially in positions of extraordinary weakness.   
Following Christ‟s example is John Bunyan‟s allegorical representation of the 
spiritual battles of Christian in Pilgrim’s Progress.3  Bunyan‟s allegory is significant for 
its portrayal of spiritual battles as partly physical battles in light of the allegory‟s 
personification of ideas such as Despair or Shame.  In every one of these virtually 
physical moments—battles which often take the form of bewildering conversations or 
outright captivity—Christian‟s primary recourse is to the proper use of his mental 
activities, particularly memory and reason, in order to triumph over those traps and 
finally enter the City of God at his journey‟s end.  Though Christian does not 
immediately attain the perfection of reason that Christ exhibits in Paradise Regained, his 
progress from sinner to saint exhibits the gradual perfection of a fallen human to “make” 
his soul and restore him to communion with God.
4
 
 
                                                 
3
 In Bunyan‟s allegory, we see the culmination of the use of reason in spiritual warfare in the 
fallen world.  This distinguishes Pilgrim’s Progress from other works addressed in previous chapters, as 
those works depicted spiritual battles which required reason for victory, but which also resulted in states in 
which the warfaring person was yet subject to fail again in some future test. 
4
 See John Hick and G. R. Evans for their discussions of the Augustinian notion of “soul-
making.” 
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“To vanquish by wisdom hellish wiles”: The Son’s Victory over Satan 
Though Samson Agonistes followed Paradise Regained in publication, it is 
useful to think of Samson Agonistes as an intermediate text between Paradise Lost and 
Paradise Regained.  Samson‟s spiritual battles are both reminiscent of the spiritual 
warfare in Eden in Paradise Lost and anticipatory of the spiritual battles which Jesus 
faces in the desert in Paradise Regained.
5
  But the progression from Paradise Lost, to 
Samson Agonistes, to Paradise Regained is not only a linear one.  As its title suggests, 
Paradise Regained circles back to Paradise Lost, so that humankind comes full circle 
since paradise was lost with the fall of Adam and Eve.  It is there in the desert, a locale 
entirely opposed to the garden of Eden, where Christ overcomes Satan‟s temptations by 
upholding perfect reasoning.  Christ would eventually suffer, die, and be resurrected, but 
in Milton‟s estimation, it is, in essence, then and there in the desert that Paradise is 
regained.  Christ restores for humankind the state of perfection lost by Adam and Eve 
due to their failure to use proper reason.  Milton signals this return when he begins his 
minor epic on the redemption of humankind with references to the actions described in 
Paradise Lost: the happy garden lost because of “one man‟s disobedience” (1.2).  He 
will argue that Eden is regained or recovered “By one man‟s firm obedience fully tried / 
Through all temptation” (1.4-5).  What was lost through Adam‟s succumbing to 
                                                 
5
 There are also significant parallels between the stories of Samson and Jesus: the same narrative 
model, the appearance of an angel to announce their births, the promise of deliverance, their pious 
upbringings, a divine mission, a self-sacrifice for the good of their people.  Feisel G. Mohamed, Nancy 
Rosenfeld, and Dennis Brown have all suggested ways in which this typology is complicated in Milton‟s 
poetry and in theology in general, particularly because of Samson‟s violence.  Brown explores the 
parallels between Samson and Christ to consider the different moral effects of the deaths of Samson and 
Jesus, such that the “postmodern reader” questions the revenge-morality offered by the traditional reading 
of Samson Agonistes in favor of the pacifistic morality offered by the Son. 
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temptation, due to a failure of reason and will, is regained through Christ‟s resistance of 
temptation, achieved by the proper use of reason and will.  Human nature does not return 
to a state of innocence, of course, for that particular aspect of Adam and Eve‟s state 
cannot be regained.  But the power of death over humans as their punishment comes to 
an end with Christ‟s sacrifice of himself and his resurrection.  More importantly, Christ‟s 
triumph over Satan in the desert, and then ultimately his Crucifixion and Resurrection, 
makes it possible for humans to come once again into the presence of God.  But Milton 
ingeniously emphasizes the thesis of the proper use of reason in the desert.  Christ‟s 
employment of right reason to resist the temptations in the desert was the condition for 
the possibility of the fullness of Christ‟s later soteriological labor. 
In systematic Christian thought, Christ is understood to be the mediator between 
God and humans.  Augustine writes in On the Trinity that Christ is “the one mediator of 
life, … through whom alone is wrought the true cleansing of the soul” (4.1, headnote).  
Milton certainly shares that view in Book III of Paradise Lost wherein the Son offers 
himself as the mediator between God‟s just anger and human sinfulness, and again in 
Book IX when the Son offers Adam and Eve‟s repentance to God.  And in Paradise 
Regained, the temptation of Christ is the primary of many operating premises relative to 
Christ‟s role as mediator.  In Paradise Regained, Milton in essence seconds Augustine‟s 
treatment of the temptation of Christ in On the Trinity.  Augustine argues that Christ 
allowed himself to be tempted by Satan so as to prove worthy of being the mediator 
between God and man.  Moreover, in resisting the most daunting temptations, especially 
by the use of reason, Christ provides the supreme example as to how to overcome 
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temptations, especially when a person is in an extremely weakened position, as Christ 
was after forty days in the desert.  And following Augustine, Calvin also expresses the 
same ideas that Milton will express in Paradise Regained: that “Christ, therefore, holds 
himself out as the goal to which our faith ought to be directed, and by means of which it 
will easily find that on which it can rest. … It is one of the leading articles of our faith, 
that our faith ought to be directed to Christ alone, that it may not wander through long 
windings; and that it ought to be fixed on him, that it may not waver in the midst of 
temptation” (qtd. in Edmondson 182).6  Yet, Milton is more elaborate than Calvin.  For 
Milton, a fixed focus on Christ, coupled with a determined effort to act according to 
reason, is the key to victory in spiritual warfare.   
One of the functions of Christ as mediator, of course, is that of restorer.  Given 
the status of fallen humanity, Christ allows the relationship between God and humans to 
be restored.  This restoration is the reason Christ was willing to endure temptations and 
suffer as a human being.  Augustine emphasizes the extent to which humans are unfit to 
know God and to be in His presence without the intercession of God-made-man: “God, 
made a righteous man, interceded with God for man the sinner.  For the sinner is not 
congruous to the righteous, but man is congruous to man.  By joining therefore to us the 
likeness of His humanity, He took away the unlikeness of our unrighteousness; and by 
being made partaker of our mortality, He made us partakers of His divinity” (On the 
Trinity 4.2.4).
7
  This line of thinking in Augustine—which argues that Christ‟s 
                                                 
6
 From Calvin‟s Commentary on John. 
7
 Wendy Miller Roberts likewise reminds us that “it is virtue alone that elevates a person in 
Christ‟s economy, and this virtue grows most clearly out of one‟s unity with Christ‟s identification with 
humanity.  To be like Christ is to be like Christ literally—poor, despised, and powerless” (23). 
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incarnation, suffering, death, and resurrection are the sole means by which humans can 
find unification with God—would be echoed in other forms of systematic Christian 
theology for centuries.
 8
 
Milton‟s reasons for choosing the temptation of Christ in the wilderness rather 
than the Crucifixion and Resurrection as his subject matter in his minor epic on the 
redemption of humankind have often been discussed by critics.
9
  But I argue that the 
substance of Milton‟s reasons for choosing the temptation episode in the life of Jesus 
centers on both Milton‟s understanding of Christ‟s role as mediator and the fundamental 
importance for Milton of the use of reason in spiritual warfare.
10
  While systematic 
Christian thought, which Augustine articulated so extraordinarily and which Milton 
knew well, argues that the fullness of Christ‟s work as mediator requires the totality of 
the events of incarnation, suffering, death, resurrection, and ascension, the genius of 
Milton is such that he argues, by his poetry, that the crux of all of these events can be 
gleaned from the episodes of the temptations of Christ in the desert.
11
 
                                                 
8
 Edmondson describes Calvin‟s intentions in terms similar to Augustine: “When Calvin sets out 
to describe Christ‟s office as Mediator, he begins with our estrangement from fellowship with God, a 
fellowship in which we dare not hope because we in our sin perceive that we have cut ourselves off from 
God—we are like Adam hiding in the garden, fleeing from God‟s approach.  So Christ, for Calvin, is the 
one in whom God has drawn near and touched us” (202). 
9
 Regina M. Schwartz questions why Milton would choose the temptation as the defining moment 
for Christ‟s salvation of humankind, when it “has not, in any theological tradition, been called upon to 
suffice as the definition of the redemption of mankind” (27).  She argues, however, that Milton chose the 
temptation because, “for Milton, salvation is a mystery, the mystery of a divine goodness unmerited by 
man, and he is careful to maintain that mystery as such” (27).  Kari Boyd McBride and John C. Ulreich 
argue that “the agon in the wilderness represents even  more starkly than the agony on the cross what 
Milton called „Christs comming in the flesh against the flesh” (351). 
10
 His choice, I think, also reflects his understanding of the relationship between the Father and 
the Son.  Since the Son, as man, does not share in the foreknowledge of the Father, as Milton understands 
it, Jesus is not completely aware of what he will have to do to redeem humankind.  He knows that God is 
his Father, but he does not know what redemption for God‟s people will cost him.   
11
 Amlan das Gupta argues for a similar treatment of Christ in Milton‟s Paradise Regained and 
Augustine‟s City of God: in having Christ regain paradise “by asserting spiritual values, by rejecting 
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No less a person than Milton‟s God speaks about the necessity of the Son‟s 
temptation, and His conversation with Gabriel reminds the reader of the purpose of all 
spiritual warfare for believers.  God is allowing Jesus to be exposed to and tempted by 
Satan as a form of spiritual exercise whereby “he shall first lay down the rudiments / Of 
his great warfare, e‟re I send him forth / To conquer sin and Death the two grand foes” 
(1.157-59).  The temptation in the desert is intended by God to be a preparation for 
Jesus, an exercise that will prepare him for the final battle he must wage against Satan, 
Sin, and Death.
12
  Even in a state of physical weakness, induced by his forty-day fast in 
the wilderness, Jesus will yet prevail over Satan‟s power and strength, for his strength of 
mind will penetrate the deceptions and temptations Satan delivers. 
While the temptation of Jesus is in part a means of preparing for the final battle 
against Satan, it is through Satan‟s failure to bring Jesus to sin that Satan will come to 
understand that his rule is near its end.  Moreover, without this extraordinary temptation 
in the wilderness, Christ‟s actions on earth, while alive, would have been rendered 
virtually meaningless.  Though Jesus has been pronounced the Son of God upon his 
baptism, such a pronouncement would lack credibility unless his goodness and virtue 
were proven through incredible tests and trials.
13
  Likewise, in winning these battles 
                                                                                                                                                
worldly action, and the various temptations that Satan holds forth,” Milton, like Augustine, “reject[s] 
miraculous and millenarian solutions to historical problems, in order to underline the importance of the 
human role in this process of transformation, and put forward an ideal of personal reform.  Paradoxically, 
human action is defined in terms of abstaining, of waiting upon God‟s will: in the process both Milton and 
Augustine reject the splendours of the world; military glory and power; earthly kingdoms; oracular 
wisdom and pagan learning” (87). 
12
 It is one of the great paradoxes of Christianity that humans have nothing to fear in death 
because it is the moment of physical death that allows one to enter into eternal life, so that again we can 
see the correspondence between the weakness of the body and the strength of the mind/soul. 
13
 Though God knows through his foreknowledge that His Son will succeed in his spiritual trials, 
that he will always obey what God commands, the test must still be undertaken to enact that obedience.  
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against Satan, Jesus is virtually confirmed as the victor in the final battle, as Satan 
realizes.  Jesus‟s victory over Satan will therefore confirm who and what he is and what 
he will be able to do, even before his actual death and resurrection, so that paradise is, 
indeed, regained through the Son‟s victory in the desert. 
Being told the reasons for this testing of the Son‟s virtue and mind, and despite 
being virtually assured of the outcome of the temptations, the heavenly choir yet prays 
for the Son‟s pending triumph over Satan: 
Victory and Triumph to the Son of God 
Now entring his great duel, not of arms, 
But to vanquish by wisdom hellish wiles. 
The Father knows the Son; therefore secure 
Ventures his filial Vertue, though untri‟d, 
Against whate‟re may tempt, whate‟re seduce, 
Allure, or terrifie, or undermine. 
(1.173-79) 
The heavenly choir, too, realizes the nature of this battle to take place between the Son 
and Satan in the desert, reiterating for the reader that this battle is not going to be a 
physical battle in the same way that the War in Heaven (described in Book VI of 
Paradise Lost) was concluded.  This will be another “great duel” between the Son and 
Satan, but in emphasizing that this is a duel “not of arms” and that Satan will be 
                                                                                                                                                
God‟s foreknowledge of Jesus‟s obedience does not, of course, take away from his freedom to obey or 
disobey.  As Milton describes in Book III of Paradise Lost, God also foreknew that Adam and Eve would 
fall without taking away their free choice to stand or fall. 
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“vanquish[ed] by wisdom,” Milton makes us mindful of the differences between these 
two duels.  The Son in Heaven exhibited a magnificent physical strength when he threw 
Satan and his army out of Heaven and into Hell; as man, the Son is physically weak, but 
he will win this battle by wisdom—by his strength of mind rather than his strength of 
body.
14
  The angels also understand that Jesus has been “untried” until now—his virtue 
has not been tested.  And though they are rather certain that he will be victorious in this 
trial, it is apparent that they recognize the need for such virtue to be proven rather than 
assumed, in both Heaven and on earth.  Thus, they appear to prepare to watch and wait 
until the coming battle is completed and Jesus triumphs over Satan‟s temptation. 
Jesus‟s temptation in the desert immediately follows his baptism.  Jesus‟s 
baptism is important to Milton for several reasons, but primarily because it marks 
Jesus‟s entrance into public life; this is the moment he begins to walk the path he was 
born to take.  Though Jesus‟s life up until this point has primarily been private and 
contemplative, his baptism enters him into a public life, and his coming temptation 
enters him into an active life.  But Jesus‟s public and active life are still largely 
determined and guided by his mental activity and spiritual virtue, as his public work as 
king and savior of God‟s people is consistently, if paradoxically, done by putting himself 
into positions of extraordinary physical weakness, even to the point of death. 
                                                 
14
 Indeed, Jesus‟s mind seems to grow stronger even as his body grows weaker through his long 
fast in the wilderness.  Steven Goldsmith responds to some critics‟ attention to Jesus‟s passivity, arguing 
instead that, while “his style remains temperate and succinct, the Son steadily speaks at greater length and 
in the process of debate consistently renders Satan mute until the adversary‟s final silence is the emblem 
of nonexistence, spiritual substancelessness” (125).  Mary Ann Radzinowicz  argues that Milton “gives to 
the Son an inspired hermeneutic to defeat Satan‟s strategy, opposing higher reason to common sense or 
sophistry” (99). 
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Christ‟s baptism and the pronouncement which followed it also mark the 
moment, in Milton‟s mind, that Satan becomes truly invested in what Jesus is doing.15  
While Satan therefore resolves to tempt the Son, Jesus himself is led into the desert by 
the Holy Spirit to begin preparations for this battle with Satan.  Milton wastes no time in 
setting up the terms of this coming battle, framing the temptation in the desert in terms 
of war and glorious warriors: “this glorious Eremite” has been led by the Holy Spirit 
“Into the desert, his victorious field / Against the spiritual foe” (1.8-10).  Yet the very 
fact that the Son‟s “deeds / Above heroic” are “in secret done” points to the far-reaching 
spiritual implications of this battle.  These battles are not undertaken for personal glory, 
but to redeem humankind.  Though it is undertaken in private, it will affect all.  It is not 
necessary that humans observe the battle Jesus waged, but it is absolutely necessary that 
Jesus experience the same kinds of trials and tribulations as his fellow human beings if 
he is to fulfill his role as mediator between them and God.  Of course, the crucial 
difference is that he stands while they fall over and over again, in many forms and 
fashions replicating the fall of Adam, but always with the same efficient cause, the 
failure of right reason to guide their wills to God. 
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 Satan suggests he has been long aware of the promises surrounding Jesus since his birth, but 
until now, Satan saw nothing remarkable in the life of Jesus that would make him suspect he actually has 
anything to fear from this low-born man.  Now, however, he realizes that Jesus has become a man 
“displaying / All vertue, grace and wisdom to atchieve / Things highest, greatest” (1.67-69), and Satan 
becomes truly worried about his own defeat.  At God‟s pronouncement of His pleasure in His Son, Satan 
is overcome with fear and wonder at the recognition that Jesus truly is his long-promised foe.  He thus tells 
his comrades: “Who this is we must learn, for man he seems / In all his lineaments, though in his face / 
The glimpses of his Fathers glory shine” (1.91-93).  Satan suggests to the other fallen angels that he should 
tempt Jesus in the desert in order to learn more about his new foe, but he does not yet realize that this is 
the same Son who vanquished him once before in the war in Heaven. This meeting among the fallen 
angels must also necessarily recall their first meeting in Hell in Paradise Lost.  Here, like there, the fallen 
angels agree with whatever Satan recommends.  While Satan has maintained the appearance of a 
democratic government among the fallen angels, with the appearance of a fair vote, in truth, the fallen 
angels continue to do Satan‟s bidding. 
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Though everyone—God, Satan, the Holy Spirit, the Heavenly Choir, the narrator, 
the reader—seems to know what is about to commence almost immediately after Jesus‟s 
baptism, Jesus himself does not understand why he has been led by the Holy Spirit into 
the wilderness.  Jesus‟s state of mind when he enters the desert shows that he is confused 
to some extent about what is to be expected of him from this point on.  He describes “a 
multitude of thoughts [that] at once / Awakn‟d in me swarm” (1.196-97).  A substantial 
part of his confusion concerns the differences between “What from within I feel my self” 
and “what from without comes often to my ears” (1.198-99).  Stemming from his almost 
Arian understanding of the Trinity, Milton again emphasizes how little Jesus, as man, 
knows what he will have to do.
16
  Yet Jesus is not completely without any understanding 
of what awaits him, as he has spent substantial time reading and studying the Holy 
Scriptures.  He is aware that he is the Messiah and that “my way must lie / Through 
many a hard assay even to the death” (1.263-64).   
Jesus intuits that the time has come for him to do God‟s work, but he is not 
completely certain what he is supposed to do from this point after he is led into the 
desert.  Unlike Samson‟s swarming thoughts at the beginning of Samson Agonistes, 
however, Jesus is able to find peace and put those swarming thoughts to rest.  He finds 
comfort in the thought that he is led by the Holy Spirit and needs nothing else: 
And now by some strong motion I am led  
Into this Wilderness, to what intent 
                                                 
16
 In Milton‟s conception of the Trinity, the Son as Christ (the Son Incarnate) does not share the 
Father‟s knowledge.  Jesus would have no memory of the conversation that he (as the Son) had with the 
Father in Heaven in Book III of Paradise Lost. 
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I learn not yet, perhaps I need not know; 
For what concerns my knowledge God reveals. 
(1.290-93) 
Jesus‟s statement here reveals in part what was lacking in Adam and Eve‟s failure.  They 
believed themselves “sufficient to stand”—but on their own rather than with God‟s help.  
But despite his own virtue, the Son realizes that he has no strength or knowledge 
independent of God‟s power.  He acknowledges that he is in a position of weakness, 
even as he accepts that he can trust the Father to reveal to him whatever he needs to 
know about this moment or his future when he needs to know it. 
For forty days, then, Jesus pursues “His holy Meditations” (1.195).  He reflects 
upon his childhood spent not in play but in learning and the pursuit of knowledge of God 
and His Laws.  He recalls his time spent in the Temple when his parents could not find 
him and, more significantly, his realization that he is the promised Messiah and will 
have to endure a “hard assay even to the death” (1.264).  He also reflects upon the period 
in which he waited for the promised time for his work to begin, the time which has 
finally come with his baptism when God “pronounc‟d me his, / Me his beloved Son, in 
whom alone / He was well pleas‟d” (1.284-86).  Even here we see a function of reason.  
In remembering constantly what he has learned thus far in his life, Jesus is preparing 
himself for the battles to come.  It is no minor function for Christ to keep in mind what 
he knows about his task: he knows that this knowledge itself constitutes his relation to 
God, and he knows that his relation to God will be his strength against Satan‟s 
temptations.   
  214 
 
For forty days, then, Jesus is consumed with thoughts of “things past and to come 
/ Lodg‟d in his breast” (1.300-1).  It is this maintenance of high thought that sustains 
him, for he is untouched by hunger for those forty days.  At the end of these forty days, 
however, he is hungry for the first time since he entered the wilderness, and in this 
weakened state he is also greeted by the first person he has met in the desert—Satan in 
disguise.
17
  He sees “an aged man in rural weeds” who appears to be searching for a 
stray sheep or kindling (1.314).  But the old man‟s very first words suggest he has 
something sinister in mind: “what ill chance hath brought thee to this place / So far from 
path or road of men” (1.321-22)?  Though Satan‟s question and his description of the 
isolated and desolate land which follow seem innocuous enough, the implications of 
what he suggests are not missed by the Son.  Jesus responds with a clear statement of his 
faith that God will bring him out of this wilderness: “Who brought me hither / Will bring 
me hence, no other Guide I seek” (1.335-36).  While Satan insinuates that Jesus had poor 
luck in being brought to this wretched state and that he is likely to die there, Jesus 
maintains that he has been led there for a reason and will be led out again when the time 
is right. 
In the initial parts of this conversation with Jesus, Satan also implies that he 
recognizes Jesus from Jesus‟s baptism, after which he was proclaimed the Son of God.  
But Satan quickly reveals his true motives, to test whether or not this man is the Son of 
God, when he turns almost immediately to appeal to the Son‟s appetite after forty long 
days in the desert.  Satan suggests that Jesus “Command / That out of these hard stones 
                                                 
17
 Compare Comus‟s similar use of disguise when he first greets the Lady. 
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be made thee bread; / So shalt thou save thy self and us relieve” (1.342-44).  Satan‟s 
motives here are twofold.  First, Satan either knows or assumes that Jesus is terribly 
hungry after his time in the desert where food is scarce, and thus he urges Jesus to use 
his power as the Son of God to turn stones into bread to abate his hunger.  But that also 
leads to a second possible motive for Satan‟s suggestion.  Satan does not only seek to 
bring about Jesus‟s fall; he also desires to know exactly what his position as Son of God 
entails, what the Father meant in proclaiming this man the Son of God. 
Jesus is not at all fooled by Satan‟s suggestion.  His answer is based on Scripture:  
 “Think‟st thou such force in Bread?  is it not written 
(For I discern thee other than thou seem‟st) 
Man lives not by Bread alone, but each Word 
Proceeding from the mouth of God 
(1.347-50)
18
   
Jesus sees through Satan‟s deception, and he does so through the use of reason.  Jesus‟s 
discernment that Satan is other than what he seems is not grounded in his assessment of 
Satan‟s appearance but in his assessment of Satan‟s arguments.  With his perfect use of 
reason, Jesus discerns what is false and dangerous in what Satan is saying, and therefore 
asks, “Why dost thou then suggest to me distrust, / Knowing who I am, as I know who 
thou art?”  (1.355-56). 
 Satan immediately sheds his disguise, but he begins a circuitous and winding 
statement about his relationship with God and with humankind.  He insists that he is not 
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 Jesus refers to Deuteronomy 8:2-3. 
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truly the foe of humankind, since it is through their sins that he has gained power in the 
world.  He even suggests that he has often helped them by offering “my advice by 
presages and signs, / And answers, oracles, portents and dreams, / Whereby they may 
direct their future life” (1.394-96).19  Satan concludes his speech with a plea for pity: 
“This wounds me most (what can it less) that Man, / Man fall‟n shall be restor‟d, I never 
more” (1.404-5).  Though human beings are Satan‟s companions in sin, humans will be 
redeemed, while he will suffer for eternity. 
Jesus responds “sternly” to Satan‟s speech, declaring that “Deservedly thou 
griev‟st, compos‟d of lyes / From the beginning, and in lies wilt end” (1.406-8).  Though 
Jesus is presumably talking about Satan‟s speech as composed of lies, there is also a 
sense that he is referring to Satan‟s entire existence (as Satan, rather than Lucifer) which 
began and will end in his lies.  Indeed, Jesus insists that Satan‟s entire existence depends 
upon his lies, “For lying is thy sustenance, thy food” (1.429). 
Jesus proceeds to answer each part of Satan‟s preceding argument, but focuses 
especially on Satan‟s claims for helping humans through signs and oracles.  Jesus first 
emphasizes the ambiguity of meaning in Satan‟s signs.  Again, we see an emphasis on 
Jesus‟s ability to reason.  Satan‟s signs are so ambiguous that few if any who consulted 
the demons‟ shrines or oracles ever “Return‟d the wiser, or the more instruct / To flye or 
follow what concern‟d him most, / And run not sooner to his fatal snare” (1.439-41).  
Jesus does concede the point that God has allowed Satan to influence humans in this 
way, but even then there is an implied emphasis on the importance of reason.  If humans 
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 Even here Milton has not entirely left his concern for the effects of Satanic dreams on human 
beings and the temptations therein offered to humans. 
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used right reason, they would be able to see Satan‟s deceits for what they are, as many 
forms of idolatry: “For God hath justly giv‟n the Nations up / To thy Delusions; justly, 
since they fell / Idolatrous” (1.442-44).  Adam and Eve‟s idolatrous fall began a cycle of 
idolatry that would pervade humankind until the coming of the Son of God.  Jesus 
thereby leads Satan to recognize that Satan has power over human beings only because 
people allow themselves to be deceived by the failure to use right reason.  While God 
has therefore allowed this condition to exist for a time, in truth, Satan‟s deceptions are 
yet a means to work God‟s justice.  Jesus then announces that the time is near when  
    this thy glory shall soon be retrench‟d; 
No more shalt thou by oracling abuse 
The Gentiles; henceforth Oracles are ceast, 
And thou no more with Pomp and Sacrifice 
Shalt be enquir‟d at Delphos or elsewhere, 
At least in vain, for they shall find thee mute. 
God hath now sent his living Oracle 
Into the World, to teach his final will, 
And sends his Spirit of Truth henceforth to dwell 
In pious Hearts, an inward Oracle 
To all truth requisite for men to know. 
(1.454-64) 
Though Satan has been able to claim an uncertain power over humankind, Jesus makes it 
clear that Satan‟s power is soon to be rendered void.  Humans will no longer have to 
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seek the oracles of the pagan gods, because Jesus himself is God‟s living oracle, sent to 
teach God‟s will to humans.20  Humans will no longer have to seek elsewhere for 
knowledge of what is to come, for the Holy Spirit will dwell in their hearts, giving them 
knowledge of the truths humans need to know—namely, knowledge of God and his 
redeeming grace.  Jesus also seems to allude to the idea that conscience, informed by 
grace and proper knowledge, will enable human beings to make proper choices 
according to reason, and they can do so with the knowledge that they will come into 
eternal life.  Excessive concern for matters of this world, which excessive concern first 
drove people to idolatry especially in the forms of the pagan oracles, will be obliterated 
by the use of right reason, and the retention of thought that the use of right reason, in the 
imitation of Christ, will secure their knowledge that eternal life awaits them. 
Jesus‟s calm answer “inly stung [Satan] with anger and disdain” (1.466).  But 
Satan, ever subtle, continues his lies and replies with “Answer smooth,” as he argues that 
he simply wants to be in the presence of the ever-virtuous and wise Jesus (1.467).  
Though Satan continues to taunt Jesus with numerous lies, Jesus responds only by 
saying, “Thy coming hither, though I know thy scope, / I bid not or forbid; do as thou 
find‟st / Permission from above; thou canst not more” (1.494-96).  There is much 
implied in Jesus‟s simple answer to Satan.  Jesus does not even bother to address the 
absurdity of Satan‟s arguments, but he emphasizes again that he knows Satan for what 
he is.  More particularly, Jesus reiterates that he knows why Satan is present, despite 
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 Milton makes a similar statement in “On the Morning of Christ‟s Nativity” about the pagan 
oracles, which he sees not as being empty but as being occupied by fallen angels.  In the earlier poem, 
Milton suggests that with the birth of Christ, “The oracles are dumm, / No voice or hideous hum/ Runs 
through the arched roof in word deceiving” (173-75), then proceeds to catalog the laments of various 
pagan gods and fallen angels. 
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whatever claims Satan makes about being there from a love of virtue.  No matter what 
Satan says, Jesus knows it is a lie, and whatever logic lies behind Satan‟s lies, Jesus sees 
through it.   
Yet Jesus also seems to concede to Satan‟s final plea—Jesus will make no effort 
to escape or force Satan to leave.  Jesus will permit Satan‟s presence before him, though 
he neither called him to his presence nor forbade his being there, because Jesus knows 
that Satan has no real power.  The only power Satan has in his confrontation with Jesus 
is that which God allows him.  Jesus accepts Satan‟s presence here, then, because he 
understands it must be ordained.  But he also knows that Satan will not be able to do 
more to him than God allows, and he trusts that God will not give Satan the power to do 
more than Jesus will be able to overcome.  Thus, with an infallible strength of mind and 
faith in the Father, Jesus mentally dismisses Satan and all his false arguments.  Satan has 
no answer, so he “bow[s] low” and “disappear[s] / Into thin Air” (1.497-99). 
After Satan leaves him, Jesus resumes his meditations which continue to feed his 
spirit as he waits for Satan‟s expected return.  Satan is no longer certain of his victory 
over Jesus, so he briefly returns to his comrades to warn them that he may very well be 
defeated in this temptation.  Having “found him, view‟d him, tasted him,” Satan 
recognizes that the temptations he offered Eve, and the temptations she offered Adam, 
will not work for this man (2.131).  He realizes that the reason for this is that they were 
far inferior to Jesus, as he is not simply human, but possesses certain gifts bestowed 
upon him by Heaven: “Perfections absolute, Graces divine, / And amplitude of mind to 
greatest Deeds” (2.138-39).  For the first time, we see Satan begin to doubt himself and 
  220 
 
his powers; where he once “Thought none my equal,” he worries that he will “now be 
over-match‟d” (2.146).  He thus tells his fellow fallen angels that he may need their 
assistance to assure their victory over the Son.
21
 
Belial understandably suggests that they entice Jesus with women, but Satan 
intuits that such will have little effect on Jesus.  He points out that “Beauty stands / In 
the admiration only of weak minds / Led captive,” but Satan has already learned just 
how strong Jesus‟s mind is (2.220-22).  Satan concludes that they should find a more 
subtle form of temptation, “that which only seems to satisfie / Lawful desires of Nature, 
not beyond” (229-30).  Satan is intelligent enough to know that obvious temptations, as 
with beautiful women, will not be successful, but he yet hopes to persuade Jesus to sin 
by offering him things that are not obviously sinful, and indeed are lawful, if taken in the 
proper mind and spirit.  Knowing Jesus is hungry and there is no food to be found, Satan 
resolves to tempt Jesus once more with food. 
After Satan‟s deliberations with his comrades, the action in Milton‟s epic returns 
to Jesus‟s isolation in the wilderness.  Again Milton emphasizes Jesus‟s hunger, since 
that state of deprivation will be the focus of the coming temptation.  Milton tells us again 
that Jesus has endured these forty days without eating, not through the virtue of fasting, 
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 This is an important change in Satan‟s demeanor.  He has asked the other angels for 
suggestions in the past, but it has been only nominally.  Perhaps it is a nominal plea for help here as well, 
for Satan does refuse the suggestion that Belial offers, but there is a stronger sense that Satan is not 
completely sure that his plan to tempt the Son will actually work or that he can succeed alone.  Even if he 
does not take Belial‟s suggestion here, he still asks that the demons be ready to assist him in the temptation 
at any moment, for he cannot risk taking all the glory for himself if there is also such a strong chance of 
failure. 
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but because he never felt the natural need to eat.
22
  Now, however, Jesus is actually 
hungry for the first time, and his hunger puts him in a state of weakness and 
vulnerability in light of Satan‟s intended temptation with food.  But as Jesus employs 
and maintains right reason from the start and throughout, his thoughts about his hunger 
help anticipate the kinds of arguments Satan will make in his temptation: 
But now I feel hunger, which declares 
Nature hath need of what she asks; yet God 
Can satisfie that need some other way, 
Though hunger still remain: so it remain 
Without this bodies wasting, I content me, 
And from the sting of Famine fear no harm, 
Nor mind it, fed with better thoughts that feed 
Me hungring more to do my Fathers will. 
(2.252-59) 
Using right reason a priori in relation to the passions, Jesus essentially works through 
the temptation Satan is about to offer even before it is offered.  Though Jesus is 
physically hungry, he resolves in his mind to let God satisfy his hunger as He sees fit, 
finding his holy meditations to be a more substantial food for his mind than any food he 
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 Jesus says, “that Fast / To Vertue I impute not, or count part / of what I suffer here; if Nature 
need not, / Or God support Nature without repast / Though needing, what praise is it to endure?” (2.247-
51).  Milton thus reveals that the mere fact of Jesus‟s fasting is of far less importance than the fact that he 
was sustained by God through those forty days.  Though it would have been natural to have been hungry, 
Jesus felt no hunger because he was fed by his “holiest meditations” (2.110).  Milton does not want Jesus 
to be praised for his fasting, because his fast was not done through sacrifice on his part but through God‟s 
support for him.  The praise is properly reserved for Jesus‟s victory over Satan‟s temptation when he is 
hungry. 
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could provide for his body.  His spiritual food is the proper food as it feeds his desire to 
do his Father‟s will, no matter the circumstance. 
When Satan returns to Jesus, Satan now appears in courtly array rather than as a 
rustic shepherd.  Satan immediately addresses Jesus with “fair speech” as he recalls 
several Biblical figures (including the entire race of Israel) who wandered the desert but 
had food provided them by God (2.301).  Jesus responds simply that “They all had need, 
I as thou seest have none” (2.318).  Satan questions how Jesus can say he has no need 
for food when he has been without food for forty days and is even now hungry, and he 
then asks, “if Food were now before thee set, / would‟st thou not eat?”  (2.321-22).  But 
Jesus responds, “Thereafter as I like / The giver,” insisting that he would only eat food 
placed before him by God (2.322-23).
23
 
Satan, ever subtle, immediately invites Jesus to claim his power over the natural 
world so that food would not actually be placed before him by Satan but of Jesus‟s own 
will and desire.  He shifts quickly, however, to suggest quite slyly that the food he 
himself would offer Jesus would not be “proferr‟d by an Enemy” (2.330), though he yet 
qualifies that with an added question of “who / Would scruple that, with want opprest?” 
(2.330-31).  With this series of questions, Satan has moved quickly from trying to 
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 Here, Jesus seems to recall his dreams of food from the previous night‟s sleep, before Satan 
returned.  His dream might be misread as a tempting dream wrought by what his appetite wanted, but 
really Jesus has had a dream that prepares him for or shows him the way through this temptation by Satan.  
He dreamt first of standing by Elijah who was, “Though ravenous, taught to abstain from what [the 
Ravens] brought” (2.269).  He then dreamt of Elijah fleeing from the ravens into the desert where he fell 
asleep under a juniper tree only to find food prepared for him by the angel when he awoke.  Though this is 
a dream of food in the midst of Jesus‟s hunger, it is also a dream of resisting the wrong kinds of food and 
of God providing for His chosen ones.  Jesus must follow the example of Elijah when he is tempted by 
Satan, trusting that God will provide him the sustenance he needs. 
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legitimize Jesus‟s desire for food, and Jesus‟s rightful power to provide it for himself, to 
suggesting that Jesus could lawfully accept food from Satan himself.  
Parts of Satan‟s arguments are indeed legitimate.  It is possible that Jesus could 
command the natural world to provide food for him.  However, it would be a sin were he 
to do so to the extent that he did not trust that God would provide him what he needs.  
Satan seems to know that, while his own argument‟s premise is correct—that Jesus 
could command the natural world to provide him food instantaneously—his argument on 
the whole will not persuade Jesus to act accordingly.  Yet, all along in this particular 
temptation, Satan‟s real aim is to entice Jesus with a banquet of foods offered by the 
enemy, although, of course, Satan denies that he is Jesus‟s enemy.   
With that aim in mind, Satan “spake no dream” (2.337), but the words which he 
speaks to Jesus are immediately materialized before him: “A Table richly spred, in regal 
mode, / With dishes pil‟d, and meats of noblest sort / And savour” (2.340-42).  Milton 
contrasts the sumptuous feast placed before Jesus with “that crude Apple that diverted 
Eve” (2.349), pointing out how much more tempting this feast is than the apple which 
enticed Eve to eat—the sensual appeal of the apple is nothing compared to the delicacies 
of the table Satan offers.  The comparison of this feast in the desert to the apple in the 
garden emphasizes the greater temptation Jesus faces and the greater fall of Eve.  Jesus 
is much more vulnerable than Eve was—he actually needs bodily sustenance to satisfy 
his hunger—while Eve had no real physical need to eat the fruit.  If Eve could not 
withstand the temptation of the apple, she could never withstand this temptation.  Her 
fall is therefore worse because it comes after the appetite and desire of something as 
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simple and “crude” as an apple.  Jesus‟s ability to withstand this temptation emphasizes 
his greater virtue and the glory he deserves for his ability to maintain his mind and 
reason despite his physical vulnerability.
24
 
To further his aim of enticing Jesus to eat the food before him, Satan renews his 
invitation to eat by arguing for the naturalness and even rightness of eating such food: 
These are not Fruits forbidden, no interdict 
Defends the touching of these viands pure, 
Thir taste no knowledge works, at least of evil, 
But life preserves, destroys life‟s enemy, 
Hunger, with sweet restorative delight. 
(2.369-73) 
It is natural for Jesus to be hungry after forty days without food.  And eating when the 
body feels hunger, in itself, is not an unlawful act.  But Jesus has already resolved to 
trust that God will provide him the food he needs, and he understands that taking the 
food Satan offers is not God‟s provision for his sustenance.  He also recognizes that 
eating such food offered in the spirit in which Satan offers it would be in violation of his 
relationship with and trust in the Father.  Satan‟s own references to the apple in the 
temptation of Adam and Eve serve to emphasize this element.  Satan alludes to the fruit 
forbidden to Adam and Eve was from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, but he 
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 Emilie Babcox, noting that this banquet temptation and the temptation of classical learning in 
Athens have a history of troubling readers, argues that these two extra-biblical temptations are “connected 
in purpose and in their identification of hunger and curiosity, and together illuminate a definition of Jesus 
as the satisfaction of a hunger that has its source in Adam‟s eating of the apple in Eden.  Since physical 
hunger has been associated with intellectual and spiritual hunger since the garden of Eden, it is appropriate 
to find them woven together in the texture of Paradise Regained” (36). 
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chooses to ignore the actual implications of eating that fruit—knowledge of good lost 
and evil gained.  Though this food does not carry the same official title, eating such food 
would have similar implications for Jesus.  Not eating the food Satan offers is as much a 
test of obedience for Jesus as the apple was for Adam and Eve, and in remaining 
obedient where they failed, Jesus regains what they lost.   
Jesus answers Satan with temperance.  Seeming to concede that he does indeed 
have the right to all things in the world, he asks Satan, “who withholds my pow‟r that 
right to use?  / Shall I receive by gift what of my own, / When and where likes me best, I 
can command?” (2.380-82).  He then claims he could, just as easily as Satan, command a 
table to be presented before him, but a table would be brought to him by angels rather 
than demons.  And even though Jesus could command such a table, he also knows that it 
is not yet the proper time for him to eat and satisfy his hunger.  He then denounces 
Satan‟s attempt to offer him food, asking, “with my hunger what hast thou to do?” 
(2.389), and condemning “thy pompous Delicacies … / And count[ing] thy specious 
gifts no gifts but guiles” (2.390-91).   
Upon Jesus‟s rejection of the sumptuous feast, Satan is forced to admit that 
Jesus‟s temperance makes him impervious to the temptation of food, “For no allurement 
yields to appetite, / And all thy heart is set on high designs, / High actions” (2.408-10).25  
Satan is correct in his realization that Jesus will not be persuaded by mere appetite to eat 
what he should not, but Satan misjudges Jesus yet again in turn.  Satan presumes, 
                                                 
25
 Aquinas‟s conception of temperance is pertinent here, as he also emphasizes this virtue as 
related to the work of reason: “temperance withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from 
obeying reason” (ST 2.141.2). 
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because Jesus is not interested in eating, that Jesus‟s heart is set on much higher designs 
and actions, so Satan will make magnificence the focus of his next temptation.   
Jesus does indeed aspire to the highest designs—to do the will of His Father—
but his aspirations do not lie with the kinds of vain desires with which Satan associates 
success.  Satan erroneously believes that because Jesus was not so interested in merely 
eating, he must be concerned with ostentatious deeds.  Satan argues that “Great acts 
require great means of enterprise,” and he sees that Jesus lacks significant means in 
every area of his life (2.412).  Satan suggests that Jesus will need great wealth to do 
great things, and Satan is prepared to provide it.  Satan even goes so far as to argue that 
the world will be deprived of the goods of Jesus‟s soul if there is not first an abundance 
of wealth out of which they might operate: “Virtue, Valour, Wisdom sit in want,” unable 
to achieve anything without a foundation in great wealth (2.431). 
But Jesus is patient and resolute.  Jesus argues in response to Satan‟s arguments 
that wealth alone, unaccompanied by virtue, valor, and wisdom, is powerless in the 
world, or if it gains power, is helpless to keep it.  He then offers examples of men 
(Gideon, Japhtha, and David) who moved from poverty to “highest deeds” when 
endowed with virtue and wisdom.  Yet his most pronounced rejection of Satan‟s 
argument comes when he deems riches to be 
the toyl of Fools, 
The wise mans cumbrance if not snare, more apt  
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To slacken Virtue, and abate her edge,  
Then prompt her to do aught may merit praise.  
(2.453-56) 
Jesus insists that he will be much better served, much better able to do his virtuous work 
in the world, if he eschews the empty promises of wealth and fortune, which will only 
distract him from his virtues and render him foolish rather than wise.  Remaining in this 
position of seeming weakness in terms of the temporal world‟s value will allow Jesus to 
gain more fully the victory in the spiritual, eternal world. 
And even though Satan has promised Jesus his own kingdom, Jesus argues what 
being a true king entails: 
His Honour, Vertue, Merit and chief Praise, 
That for the Publick all this weight he bears. 
Yet he who reigns within himself, and rules 
Passions, Desires, and Fears, is more a King; 
Which every wise and virtuous man attains: 
And who attains not, ill aspires to rule 
Cities of men or head-strong Multitudes, 
Subject himself to Anarchy within, 
Or lawless passions in him which he serves. 
(2.464-72) 
True kings are rulers of themselves—their passions, desires, and fears—before they are 
rulers of others.  People who do not aspire to or attain such virtue do not make good 
  228 
 
rulers, as their souls are subject to the kind of anarchy to which they abandon their 
subjects.  It is therefore more desirable to aspire first and foremost to be virtuous and 
wise rather than to aspire to be a king. 
And yet knowing that he is to be king, though not of any earthly city but rather of 
the heavenly city, Jesus describes the true function of the office of a king: 
But to guide Nations in the way of truth 
By saving Doctrine, and from errour lead 
To know, and knowing worship God aright, 
Is yet more Kingly, this attracts the Soul, 
Governs the inner man, the nobler part, 
That other o‟re the body only reigns, 
And oft by force, which to a generous mind 
So reigning can be no sincere delight. 
(2.473-80) 
Insofar as the best rulers are first good rulers of themselves, it is also their duty to care 
not for their subjects‟ bodies, but for their souls, the “inner man, the nobler part.”  
Making this the priority and function of kingship, the king will be able to lead the 
people, and thereby the nation, to God and truth.  Underlying this part of the debate 
between Satan and Jesus is the reader‟s knowledge that Jesus would derogatorily be 
called “king of the Jews” and would have a crown of thorns placed upon his head at his 
Crucifixion.  At that moment of Christ‟s greatest weakness, dying upon the cross, when 
he will have committed his mind and spirit completely to the will of God and sacrificed 
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himself completely for the souls of his subjects, Jesus‟s power as king, savior, and 
mediator will be completely, fully realized. 
With that argument, Jesus renders Satan confounded and silent.  Satan does not 
know “what to say, / What to reply, confuted and convinc‟t / Of his weak arguing, and 
fallacious drift” (3.2-4).  When he manages to gather his thoughts again, Satan attempts 
to soothe Jesus, admitting that he “see[s] thou know‟st what is of use to know, / … / Thy 
actions to thy words accord” (3.7-9).  What Satan is really admitting, however, is that 
there is no hypocrisy in Jesus for Satan to exploit, so Satan must change tactics yet 
again.  This time Satan urges Jesus to seek glory and fame before he is too old to gain it.  
Satan asks why Jesus is hiding in the wilderness where he “deprive[s] / All Earth her 
wonder at thy acts, thy self / The fame and glory” (3.23-25), and he suggests that Jesus‟s 
“years are ripe, and over-ripe” for winning such glory (3.31).  Satan‟s examples for this 
part of his argument are Philip of Macedonia and Julius Caesar, both of whom won glory 
among men in their relative youth, though Caesar laments the years that he lived 
ingloriously, according to Satan. 
Jesus yet remains calm in the face of this new assault upon his mind, replying, 
“Thou neither dost perswade me to seek wealth / For Empires sake, nor Empires to 
affect / For glories sake by all thy argument” (3.44-46).  Jesus realizes there is a kind of 
logical progression in Satan‟s temptations from the previous book to this one, but Jesus 
is no more persuaded by these most recent temptations than he was by the previous ones.  
Jesus claims that Fame among the many is insignificant: the “miscellaneous rabble, who 
extol / Things vulgar, & well weigh‟d, scarce worth the praise, / They praise and they 
  230 
 
admire they know not what” (3.50-52).  Jesus continues his rebuttal by pointing out how 
so few among that rabble are intelligent and wise, and how even fewer of them are 
praised in glory by the rabble.  Jesus thus dismisses entirely the need for an earthly fame 
and instead argues that he is seeking a heavenly fame:  
This is true glory and renown, when God  
Looking on the Earth, with approbation marks 
The just man, and divulges him through Heaven 
To all his Angels, who with true applause 
Recount his praises. 
(3.60-64) 
For Jesus, it is preferable to be “Famous … in Heaven, on Earth less known,” as Job was 
(3.68), the “just man” among the “rabble.”26  Jesus continues by defining what glory on 
earth entails—“a false glory, attributed / To things not glorious, men not worthy of 
fame” (3.69-70)—and points out that anything good in glory could also be attained by 
other, more virtuous means, “Without ambition, war, or violence; / By deeds of peace, 
by wisdom eminent, / By patience, temperance” (3.89-91).  Moreover, if the great deeds 
which earn humans glory on earth are done only for the sake of gaining glory and fame, 
then the very deeds are rendered inglorious and are not worthy of praise.  So Jesus asks 
Satan another question that emerges through his initial reactions to Satan‟s suggestion 
that he seek fame: “Shall I seek glory then, as vain men seek / Oft not deserv‟d?  I seek 
not mine, but his / Who sent me, and thereby witness whence I am” (3.105-7). 
                                                 
26
 Blake Greenway discusses the significance of the “one just man” in Milton‟s thought and 
writing, but focuses on the historical and political implications of being the “one just man.” 
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Jesus‟s response to Satan‟s temptation proves to be a temptation Satan himself 
cannot resist.  Satan‟s inclination to curse God for all of the ills that befall him brings 
Satan back to his old “murmuring[s]” against God in Heaven (3.108).27  But most 
importantly, Jesus is moved to a fervent reply by the ridiculousness of Satan‟s arguments 
against the Father.  Jesus‟s first words in response to Satan‟s cursing of the Father are 
“And reason” (3.122): There is good reason for God to be glorified and to exact such 
glory even from the fallen angels.  He reminds Satan that God created the world not for 
His own glory but “to show forth his goodness, and impart / His good communicable to 
every soul / Freely” (3.124-26).  Even then, however, Jesus insists that such glory is not 
demanded, but that God only asks that he be given thanks by the angels and humans 
whom He has created.  And Jesus is exacting in stating again the nature of the crime 
Satan first committed against God, and urged human beings to commit as well.  God‟s 
rational creatures should be giving consistent thanks to God for His creation, as such 
gratitude is  
The slightest, easiest, readiest recompence  
From them who could return him nothing else,  
And not returning that would likeliest render  
Contempt instead, dishonor, obloquy.  
(3.128-131) 
                                                 
27
 The word “murmuring” always suggests a certain dangerous quality to what Satan says—
something that is said in the shadows because not dared to be uttered in plain sight.  Satan‟s words echo 
his arguments against God in Paradise Lost.  Satan has not forgotten that he believes God‟s actions are 
based on a desire for his own glory rather than love.  Nor does Satan believe that God actually deserves 
glory and praise from his subjects, insisting that such glory is demanded rather than earned.  In recalling 
the depths of his jealousy and hatred of God, Satan forgets, at least momentarily, what he seeks to achieve 
in tempting the Son. 
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Rational creatures could and should give thanks to their Creator by giving him the glory 
due Him for His good works.  If humans or angels withhold that gratitude, which is 
otherwise easy to demonstrate, then they are holding God in contempt and dishonoring 
Him.  And such a refusal to show God the proper honor and glory renders them “recreant 
to God, ingrate and false, / And so of all true good himself despoil‟d” (3.138-39).  With 
a statement pointed directly towards Satan‟s own particular sins against God, Jesus 
argues that it would be sacrilege to seek for himself the fame and glory that he would 
deny God, to Whom all glory should rightly belong.   
Yet Jesus also insists that God is generous insofar as it is a sign of His grace and 
goodness that He is willing to share his glory with those “who advance his glory, not thir 
own, / Them he himself to glory will advance” (3.143-44).  If glory is sought for God 
rather than oneself, then God will bestow glory upon his people.  Even more 
importantly, Jesus knows that he does not have to pursue great power in order for God to 
be glorified through his life and works; indeed, God is more properly glorified through 
his utter subjection to the will of God, even to the point of abject weakness and death. 
Jesus‟s fervent reply again renders Satan speechless.  Satan becomes even more 
aware of his own guilt for his sin, as it was precisely for his own glory that he fought the 
war in Heaven.  Yet Satan is not finished.  He challenges Jesus with a reminder that 
Jesus has been promised a kingdom, which he will not be able to attain by sitting still in 
the wilderness.  That is, Satan suggests that Jesus should possess a certain zeal and duty 
to reclaim the throne of David for his people—the “Zeal of thy Fathers house, Duty to 
  233 
 
free / Thy Country from her Heathen servitude” that should inspire him to hurry and 
perform those feats for the people of God (3.175-76).   
Jesus, however, feels no pressure of time to fulfill the duties for which he was 
incarnated.  He reminds Satan that “All things are best fullfil‟d in their due time, / And 
time there is for all things” (3.182-83).  He also acknowledges what Satan wishes to 
deny, that God is in control of all things, that His hand rules all seasons and determines 
the proper time for all actions.   
Jesus then asks Satan why he should be willing to do things on his own time 
when God knows the proper time for all things, including these very temptations from 
Satan:  
What if he hath decreed that I shall first 
Be try‟d in humble state, and things adverse, 
By tribulations, injuries, insults, 
Contempts, and scorns, and snares, and violence, 
Suffering, abstaining, quietly expecting 
Without distrust or doubt, that he may know 
What I can suffer, how obey?  who best 
Can suffer, best can do; best reign, who first 
Well hath obey‟d; just tryal e‟re I merit  
My exaltation without change or end. 
(3.189-97) 
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Again, Milton‟s almost Arian inclination comes to the fore, as Milton does not believe 
that the Son shares the omniscience of the Father.  While the Son is told in Book III of 
Paradise Lost what will be expected of him in his sacrifice for humankind, Jesus, the 
Son incarnate, does not know or remember what he will actually have to do to redeem 
humanity.
28
  Yet Jesus has studied the Scriptures and already knows that his “way must 
lie / Through many a hard assay even to the death” (1.263-64).  From that knowledge, 
combined with his faith in his Father, Jesus is prepared to trust that there is a purpose for 
these temptations.  And because of his diligent study and his trust in the Father, Jesus 
has resolved to endure the temptations patiently.   
There is also an added purpose for Jesus‟s spiritual temptations.  Though spiritual 
warfare aims at reestablishing the relationship between God and humans, fallen humans 
are always going to fail at some point in their spiritual battles.  No matter what or how 
many spiritual battles they win, humans can never be redeemed through their own merit.  
Though Jesus‟s spiritual battles serve to cement his relationship with God, they serve 
another deeper purpose as well.  Jesus‟s relationship with God is never in question the 
way it is for other human beings, but Jesus must demonstrate that he deserves the 
exaltation bestowed upon him by the Father.  Jesus recognizes that his present 
temptations are preparing him for his reign in Heaven.  In his victory over these spiritual 
temptations, and the ones to come, Jesus reveals that he alone can merit the exaltation 
and redemption from death, so that he alone can atone for the sins of humankind.   
                                                 
28
 This understanding of the Son is also supported earlier in Paradise Regained where only 
Jesus‟s diligence in studying the Holy Scriptures allowed him to know that the way before him would 
include great suffering and pain.  Milton also emphasizes in Book III of Paradise Lost that the Son will 
have “been found / By merit more then Birthright Son of God, / Found worthiest to be so by being Good” 
(3.308-10). 
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Momentarily diverted, Satan soon continues his attacks on Jesus by insinuating 
doubts on the part of Jesus: “Perhaps thou linger‟st in deep thoughts detain‟d / Of the 
enterprise so hazardous and high” (3.227-28).  Satan again points out that Jesus has led 
an essentially private rather than a public life.  Therefore, as Satan‟s argument goes, 
Jesus must necessarily doubt that he can achieve what he has been sent to do, as he is so 
fundamentally unaware of the ways of the world.  To remedy that lack of knowledge 
which Jesus could presumably have attained from empires, kings, and courts, the “Best 
school[s] of experience, quickest in sight / In all things that to great actions lead” (3.238-
39), Satan resolves to bring before Jesus all the kingdoms of the world. 
Thus entering another phase of his temptation of Jesus, Satan takes Jesus up to 
the highest point on a mountain from which to view simultaneously all the glory of the 
kingdoms of the world.
29
  But this temptation, like the others, finds no weakness in 
Jesus.  Though Jesus is himself unmoved by the view of the military glory of the earthly 
kingdoms, the sight so moves Satan that he “yet more presum‟d, / And to our Saviour 
thus his words renew‟d” (3.345-46).  Satan‟s presumptions are many, but they are the 
same that he has had throughout these temptations.  He again presumes that Jesus‟s 
kingdom will be an earthly kingdom as these before him are.  He presumes that Jesus 
will have to undertake military endeavors to become king of the Jews and to obtain his 
promised kingdom.  And he presumes that Jesus will have to choose between winning by 
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 At this point, Milton inserts a commentary by the narrator which serves to remind the reader of 
the limitations within which Satan functions at this moment—and has functioned since his fall from 
Heaven.  Satan takes Jesus up the mountain with “such power was giv‟n him then” (3.251).  Like the 
moment in Paradise Lost when Satan is enabled to rise from the fiery lake, he is only able to do so 
because God allows it.  Thus we are forcibly reminded by Milton (in the voice of the narrator) that Satan is 
allowed to tempt Jesus in this way only because God allows it, so that even now, as always, Satan is 
fulfilling God‟s purposes and plans. 
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conquest or by joining in league with one of the earthly kingdoms in order to regain the 
throne of David. 
Jesus is unmoved by Satan‟s arguments and again discerns the hypocrisy in 
Satan‟s presumptions.  Jesus first argues against Satan‟s apparent desire to help him free 
the people of Israel from their captivity to the Roman Empire.  Jesus recalls the many 
times in the past when the work of Satan has rendered Israel captive and near 
destruction, knowing that “such zeal / to Israel then, the same that now to me” (3.412-
13).  But that recollection is even secondary to Jesus‟s real argument against Satan‟s 
temptation in this case, and in all of the other cases: one has to wait for God‟s time for 
all things.  Jesus claims that the people of Israel have “wrought their own captivity” in 
the vain worship of idols and their refusal to be humble and penitent (3.415).  He 
therefore claims that it is not his business to free the people of Israel on his own terms 
and time, when they would yet remain “Unhumbl‟d, unrepentant, unreform‟d” and only 
return to their old, sinful ways (3.429).  Instead, however, if he waits for God‟s time, 
Jesus knows without a doubt that God “by some wond‟rous call / May bring them back 
repentant and sincere” (3.434-35), so that the only real choice is to leave the people of 
Israel, and his role in their redemption, “To [God‟s] due time and providence” (3.440). 
Upon that statement by Jesus, Milton concludes this book by recalling what Jesus 
has already said about true kingship: “So spake Israel’s true king, and to the Fiend / 
Made answer meet, that made void all his wiles.  / So fares it when with truth falshood 
contends” (3.441-43).  Milton does not leave much room for the reader to question the 
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nature of Jesus‟s arguments against Satan.  The Son‟s exemplar use of reason exposes 
the poor logic of all of Satan‟s wiles and arguments. 
As Book IV begins, Satan finds himself “Perplex‟d and troubl‟d at his bad 
success / … / Discover‟d in his fraud, thrown from his hope” (4.1-3).  Satan had earlier 
presumed in his typical self-deception that he would be proven stronger than Jesus, but 
now he is truly aware of Jesus‟s strength and that Jesus is “far his over-match” despite 
all of the apparent weaknesses of Jesus (4.7).  Despite what he now knows to be the 
case, that he will be defeated by Jesus, Satan yet resolves not to leave the fight.  Instead 
he maintains his “Vain battry” if only as a salve for his own pride and out of spite at the 
pending loss (4.20). 
Thus resolved, Satan essentially continues where he left off earlier—with the 
notion of kingship.  Satan obviously believes that Jesus‟s purpose on earth is to gain an 
earthly throne, for he now shows Jesus the glories of Rome, suggesting that with the help 
of Satan‟s power, Jesus could remove the current emperor of Rome from the throne and 
assume it for himself.  But Jesus remains, as always, unmoved by Satan‟s appeals to 
power and grandeur: 
Nor doth this grandeur and majestic show 
Of luxury, though call‟d magnificence, 
More then of arms before, allure mine eye, 
Much less my mind. 
(4.110-13) 
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Jesus‟s mind remains untouched, untempted by all that Satan offers.  He reiterates for 
Satan what Satan has failed to do in this temptation—that which Satan succeeded so 
easily in doing with Adam and Eve.  Satan has always sought to undermine human 
virtue and obedience by appealing to the senses, but Jesus points out that he has failed 
even in appealing to his sight and other senses, much less in appealing to his mind and 
reason.  Jesus is not to be tempted as Adam and Eve were. 
Jesus then answers some of Satan‟s temptations more specifically, particularly 
that he would be able to overcome the emperor of Rome and take his place.  While Satan 
has suggested that Jesus could “expel / A brutish monster” (4.127-28), Jesus offers 
another hypothetical possibility: “what if I withal / Expel a Devil who first made him 
such?” (4.128-29).  While resolving to let the Emperor‟s “tormenter Conscience find 
him out” (4.130), Jesus‟s rhetorical question does not leave Satan much room to worry 
about what Jesus intends to do, indeed what his very purpose in coming to earth is.  
Satan knows as well as Jesus does that he, Satan, is the devil who helped to make the 
Emperor the sinful man he is.  He is the same devil who helps make all human beings 
the sinful creatures they are.  The work of Satan has rendered the Emperor what he is, 
and Satan, as the source of sin and darkness in the world, will be cast out rather than the 
sinful humans alone. 
Jesus therefore reveals more fully to Satan that his objectives in coming to earth 
were not to rid the earth of sinful humans, nor to free the vile and base people who 
deserve to be vassals to such an Emperor.  It is not within Jesus‟s power at this point to 
free such people because they are not simply physically enslaved, but spiritually and 
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mentally enslaved.  It would do no good for him to free their bodies, because his concern 
is not for their bodies but for their souls, and he cannot free their souls unless they are 
willing to be so freed.
30
  Jesus knows that there will be a time when his eternal and 
heavenly kingdom will be obtained, but “what the means, / Is not for thee [Satan] to 
know, nor me to tell” (4.152-53).  And until the time for his kingdom comes, his true 
strength comes from his humility before God and his acknowledgement of his own 
weaknesses in light of God‟s strength. 
Irritated by Jesus‟s refusal to consider his offer, Satan becomes “impudent” in his 
demands, telling Jesus that he would not offer all these kingdoms and power without 
something in return.  But what Satan demands is absolutely outrageous:  
On this condition, if thou wilt fall down, 
And worship me as thy superior Lord, 
Easily done, and hold them all of me; 
For what can less so great a gift deserve? 
(4.166-69) 
Satan seems quite desperate at this point, for he cannot imagine that such demands 
would not be persuasive.  He momentarily loses his composure and his subtlety, instead 
baldly revealing what the cost of succumbing to his temptations would be. 
                                                 
30
 Milton must necessarily link the Rome of the ancient world to Catholicism of his own time, 
particularly in terms of what he saw as the Catholic Church‟s suppression of free thought.  Laura Lunger 
Knoppers reads this part of Paradise Regained as a sustained and profound critique of Catholicism: 
“Aligned with Reformation polemic, Milton targets the history of the Roman Catholic Church and points 
his attack in part at the golden age of the papacy, marked by the rebirth of art and learning.  The painting, 
sculpture, and architecture of Renaissance Rome, along with the rediscovery of Greek and Latin learning, 
helped to shape and promulgate the imperial and ecclesiastical mission of the papacy.  The poverty and 
humility of the Son of God in the wilderness and his rejection of satanic offers of wealth, power, glory, 
and learning boldly redefine spirituality as the inner discipline of hearing and obeying the word of God” 
(70). 
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Jesus‟s disdain is immediate in reaction to Satan‟s demand: “I never lik‟d thy 
talk, thy offers less, / Now both abhor, since thou hast dar‟d to utter / The abominable 
terms, impious condition” (4.171-73).  Though Jesus has patiently endured Satan‟s 
temptations up to this point, he cannot endure Satan‟s blasphemous suggestion that he 
would ever worship Satan as if he were God.
31
  Jesus then presents Satan with the many 
reasons that his argument is weak and sinful.  Jesus‟s first recourse in his answer to 
Satan comes in the appeal to God‟s law.  The first commandment demands that a person 
have no other gods before God, so Jesus finds it ridiculous that Satan would suggest that 
the Son of God should worship Satan as a god.  The absurdity of the suggestion is 
increased with the reminder that Satan is accursed already, for his own fall and for the 
fall of Adam and Eve.  And Jesus suggests that Satan will find himself even more 
accursed for this attempt against the Son of God because it is even bolder and more 
blasphemous than his temptations of Adam and Eve. 
Jesus then reminds Satan more precisely of the nature of Satan‟s power in the 
world.  The kingdoms of the world were not given to Satan outright, so such kingdoms 
are not really Satan‟s to give away.  But Satan has been permitted by God to usurp those 
kingdoms for a time because of the failure of subjects or citizens to discern right rule 
from wrong.  Upon that point, Jesus triumphantly declares the absurdity of Satan‟s 
presumption to offer Jesus that which already belongs to Jesus as the Son of God: 
 
                                                 
31
 Jesus has denounced Satan for his blasphemous and idolatrous demands, yet he also admits that 
he will continue to endure Satan‟s outrageous sinfulness for the period of time that Satan “hast permission 
on [him]” (4.175).  Jesus understands that God has permitted Satan to tempt him for a time, so that he 
must continue to endure that trial with patience and strength of mind. 
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Wert thou so void of fear or shame, 
As offer them to me the Son of God, 
To me my own, on such abhorred pact, 
That I fall down and worship thee as God? 
(4.189-92) 
Jesus clearly discerns Satan for what he is: “That Evil one, Satan for ever damn‟d” 
(4.194). 
It seems that this is the moment when Satan finally recognizes that this Son of 
God is the same Son of God who vanquished him during the War in Heaven, that same 
Son from Paradise Lost.  Satan is truly fearful and abashed for the first time since we 
have seen him.  He immediately attempts to soothe the Son‟s ire.32  He again attempts to 
persuade Jesus that he had virtually no choice in offering these temptations, for he 
needed to know whether Jesus was the Son of God in a sense greater than the typical 
understanding of the children of God—both angels and humans.  He claims that it was 
also of great concern to him to find out who the Son is, since his “coming is foretold / To 
me so fatal” (4.204-5).  Moreover, Satan argues that he has gained no advantage in this 
temptation, since he failed in his goals.  And Jesus is in no way damaged or endangered 
for the attempt and, indeed, has rather gained honor and esteem for it.   
Satan also seems to intuit correctly that Jesus will not be seeking the worldly 
thrones with which Satan has tried to tempt him, for he “seem‟st otherwise inclin‟d / 
                                                 
32
 It is significant here that Satan now fears the Son‟s ire, when earlier he claimed to hope that 
Jesus would serve as a mediator between him and God‟s ire.  Now, Satan is aware that he has just as much 
to fear from the Son as he does from the Father. 
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Then to a worldly Crown, addicted more, / To contemplation and profound dispute” 
(4.212-14).  In claiming an “addiction” on Jesus‟s part for contemplation, then, Satan 
also finds the source of his final temptation of Jesus—a temptation of wisdom. 
Satan admits that Jesus is already quite wise, but he suggests that Jesus could 
gain fame and power if he were to assume something of a divine knowledge: “as thy 
Empire must extend, / So let extend thy mind o‟re all the world, / In knowledge, all 
things in it comprehend” (4.222-24).  Satan questions how Jesus would be able to rule 
his people “by persuasion” if he were not familiar with their modes of learning (4.230): 
“How wilt thou reason with them, how refute / Thir Idolisms, Traditions, Paradoxes?” 
(4.233-34).  Implying that Jesus‟s knowledge is insufficient for the task Satan claims is 
before him, that Jesus‟s strength of mind is deficient, Satan offers to share with Jesus all 
the wisdom of the world, associated primarily with Athens, the seat of classical learning 
in the ancient world.  There, Satan suggests, Jesus could learn the power of music, 
tragedy, oration, philosophy, the contemplation of which, either in Greece or at home, 
would “render thee a King compleat / Within thy self, much more with Empire joyn‟d” 
(4.283-84). 
Jesus answers Satan‟s suggestions “sagely,” with the wisdom and knowledge he 
already possesses in perfect abundance (4.285):
33
 
Think not but that I know these things, or think 
I know them not; not therefore am I short 
                                                 
33
 Milton‟s use of the word “sagely” here is recorded in the OED, which also gives the following 
definition of “sage”: “A.1) Of a person: Wise, discreet, judicious.  b) Of advice, conduct, etc.: 
Characterized by profound wisdom; based on sound judgment.”  Both senses of the word sage reflect the 
position of wisdom and judgment with which we already associate Jesus in this encounter with Satan. 
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Of knowing what I aught: he who receives 
Light from above, from the fountain of light, 
No other doctrine needs, though granted true; 
But these are false, or little else but dreams, 
Conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm. 
(4.286-92) 
Rejecting essentially all of the philosophical schools and knowledge with which Satan 
tempts him, Jesus dismisses the knowledge they might offer to him.
34
  He points out the 
many ways in which Satan errs in his assumption that Jesus needs these kinds of 
knowledge.  It matters not whether Jesus has knowledge of these matters.  Any 
knowledge Jesus might attain on Earth through these various philosophical schools will 
appear as dim knowledge when compared to that which he knows from the light and 
truth of God.  The philosophers, “Ignorant of themselves, of God much more, / And how 
the world began, and how man fell / Degraded by himself, on grace depending,” can 
teach humans little and mislead them greatly (4.310-12).  Jesus echoes here what we saw 
is the case for all fallen humans: human reason, when it attempts to work alone, is 
fallible.  It must be assisted by divine grace in order to be an effective tool in spiritual 
warfare.  Whatever work reason is able to do in this world, it must be joined by a “spirit 
and judgment equal or superior” (4.324). 
With Jesus‟s response, grounded in reason and truth, Satan finds himself “Quite 
at a loss, for all his darts were spent” (4.365).  Satan essentially surrenders in disgust, 
                                                 
34
 Jesus appreciates only Socrates‟ admission that the only knowledge he has is that he knows 
nothing.  Jesus especially rejects the Stoics‟ definition of virtue. 
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asking rhetorically why Jesus has come into this world at all since he has rejected all that 
it has to offer.  And yet Satan is not completely finished.  His final statements to Jesus, 
however, are less a temptation than a sign of his own confusion.  Satan suggests that 
Jesus will have cause to regret rejecting Satan‟s offers, for he has seen visions of what 
will befall Jesus: “ Sorrows, and labours, opposition, hate, / Attends thee, scorns, 
reproaches, injuries, / Violence and stripes, and lastly cruel death” (4.386-88).  This is 
perhaps truly spoken by Satan—perhaps he has had visions of what will happen to 
Jesus—but in the typical ambiguity associated with demonic visions, Satan does not 
completely understand what such a death will mean, even for himself.  He does not 
comprehend at this point that Jesus‟s sinless death will render Satan‟s reign over humans 
void. 
Returning Jesus to the wilderness where he found him, Satan “feign[s] to 
disappear” (4.398).  Milton emphasizes that Satan has not actually left Jesus alone, 
though Jesus remains “meek, and with untroubl‟d mind” when he prepares to rest for the 
night (4.401).  Yet Jesus will not find the rest he seeks in sleep, for Satan watches and 
waits for the opportunity to plague Jesus‟s sleep in various ways.  He first bothers 
Jesus‟s sleep “with ugly dreams” that wake Jesus from his sleep (4.408).  Satan then 
controls nature to work against the eternally patient Son, so that rain is pouring down, 
thunder is bellowing, and the winds are howling.  But Jesus “only stoodst / Unshaken” in 
the face of the terrors that Satan brings upon him (4.420-21).  And so Satan‟s terrors 
continued: “Infernal Ghosts, and Hellish Furies, round / Environ‟d [Jesus], some howl‟d, 
some yell‟d, some shriek‟d, / Some bent at [him] thir fiery darts” (4.422-24).  Even 
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surrounded by demons and in a miserable physical state, Jesus can yet sit “unappall‟d in 
calm and sinless peace,” his mind unbothered by the assaults upon his person (4.425).35 
After the night of terrors has passed, Satan returns one final time with “his last 
affront resolv‟d” (4.444), but his intention is primarily “to vent his rage, / And mad 
despight to be so oft repell‟d” (4.445-46).  Yet, as always, Jesus rejects Satan‟s final 
attempts “in brief” (4.485).  Jesus maintains that he is nothing worse than wet for having 
endured the night‟s storm.  While Satan might argue that such things were signs of the 
harms to come, Jesus knows that such false portents are the work of Satan rather than 
God.  Jesus concludes his argument with a command that Satan “desist, thou art 
discern‟d / And toil‟st in vain, nor me in vain molest” (4.497-98). 
Jesus‟s dismissal enrages Satan to such an extent that he reveals that he has been 
watching Jesus throughout his entire life, since the annunciation by Gabriel.  He also 
admits that he has been trying throughout these temptations to discern in just what sense 
Jesus is the Son of God—for Satan himself could be considered a son of God, as indeed 
are all men.  In recognizing through the course of the temptations that Jesus is his mortal 
enemy, he therefore also sought to understand his adversary more completely—“who / 
And what he is, his wisdom, power, intent” (4.527-28)—while also trying “to win him, 
or win from him what I can” (4.530).  Satan has been able to win nothing from Jesus.  
All he has really discovered is that Jesus is “Proof against all temptation as a rock / Of 
                                                 
35
 We are reminded again of the demons in Norwood‟s dreams, and we can compare Norwood‟s 
reactions to Jesus‟s reactions here.  The key difference is that Jesus remains calm in the face of the 
demonic assault, while Norwood moves to despair.  But the moral implications of their respective assaults 
also differ because Jesus is sinless where Norwood was not. 
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Adamant, and as a Center, firm / To the utmost of meer man both wise and good” 
(4.533-35). 
Satan therefore resolves to make one final attempt to determine what is meant by 
Jesus‟s designation as the Son of God.  He takes Jesus to the highest point in Jerusalem 
and demands that he throw himself to the ground with the expectation that angels will 
save him from harm.  Jesus‟s response is his simplest response throughout these 
temptations, but it also the most profound: “also it is written, / Tempt not the Lord thy 
God, he said and stood” (4.560-61).  While Adam and Eve were created “sufficient to 
[stand] but free to fall,” Christ alone remains standing when faced with the determined 
temptations of Satan.  Though Jesus has seemed to be weak—in his lowly birth; his 
quiet, removed life; his unwillingness to pursue what Satan deems he needs to achieve 
great things—his strength of mind and his constant virtue render him the stronger and 
Satan the weaker for his attempts.  Satan, rather than the human, falls again.  Jesus 
remains standing after all Satan‟s attempts, but Satan, in his own false pride, “Fell 
whence he stood to see his Victor fall” (4.571).  Though Satan has imagined himself 
supreme in his power over humans, Jesus‟s resolute and reasoned victory over Satan‟s 
temptations renders Satan‟s fall to hell complete.  Now, Jesus is ready to enter “on [his] 
glorious work / … and begin to save mankind” (4.634-35), for his victory over 
temptation firmly marks his entry into his public life and into his work of the salvation 
of humankind, even as he knows and accepts that great suffering awaits him. 
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“Take heed that thou turn not aside again”: Christian’s Progress to the Celestial City 
One subtle appeal of Paradise Regained is how the poem invites the reader to 
conceive of the near impossibility of any human other than Christ overcoming moments 
of marked physical weaknesses to resist the temptations offered by Satan in the desert.  
And, given the setting of Paradise Regained, the harshness of the desert, we also see that 
an appreciation of the strength needed in spiritual warfare must take into account an 
awareness of human weaknesses out of which great strength can emerge.  Yet, the point 
of this minor epic is quite evident.  In observing the Son‟s use of perfect and steadfast 
reason, we are to realize the ways in which human reason can (again) function properly, 
at least potentially, with the attendant aid of God‟s grace.  Christ‟s triumph in the desert 
against Satan‟s temptations, and then his crucifixion and resurrection, creates the 
condition for the possibility of the Christian to realize fully the triumph over temptation, 
even in the face of great weakness.   
Yet John Bunyan‟s The Pilgrim’s Progress is also suggestive of the work of 
perfect, or virtually perfect, reason in a fallen world, and the work of reason in a setting 
suggestive of debilitating human frailty.  Though Christian‟s use of reason in The 
Pilgrim’s Progress cannot attain the heights and perfection of reason that the Son 
reaches in Paradise Regained, in this allegory of the Christian‟s progress to Heaven, 
Christian actually makes it to the Celestial City.  But in Bunyan‟s allegory, Christian‟s 
spiritual journey is represented as an actual one.  Likewise, his numerous spiritual battles 
are rendered as physical, and his spiritual weakness are personified or manifested in the 
people he meets and the places he travels.  This allegory thus offers a look at the 
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culmination of the work of reason in spiritual warfare.  In Christian, we see a man who is 
limited and marked by the sins of Adam and Eve.  He struggles through many kinds of 
spiritual battles—internal and external.  Sometimes he temporarily fails, but through his 
continued use of reason and memory and his will to reach the Celestial City, he is able to 
attain that perfection that was lost to humanity with the fall of Adam and Eve.  Here, we 
see a man who has completed the process of soul-making that Augustine identifies as the 
aim of all spiritual warfare. 
Bunyan attempts to justify his choice of allegory in the prefatory poem to his 
prose.
36
  He argues that there is truth to what he says, even if it is wrapped in the 
“swaddling-clouts” of allegory, and that truth, he argues,  
Informs the judgement, rectifies the mind, 
Pleases the understanding, makes the will  
Submit; the memory too it doth fill 
With what doth our imagination please, 
Likewise it tends our troubles to appease. 
(“Apology” lines 147-52) 
Bunyan introduces a number of important themes in these few lines, themes that 
resonate throughout his text and with Christ‟s temptation in the desert.  These themes are 
                                                 
36
 Bunyan‟s narrator begins The Pilgrim’s Progress by telling the reader that the allegory is 
written “in the similitude of a dream” (11).  This dream, without question, is a divine rather than demonic 
dream; it is a vision granted by God to the narrator of the allegory.  It is intended not as a temptation itself, 
but as a means to overcome the temptation with which humans are presented.  It shows the ways in which 
humans should respond to temptations, even when they first seem too weak to withstand those 
temptations. Thomas H. Luxon and Brenda Machosky discuss what Bunyan means when he says that he 
“Fell suddenly into an allegory” (“The Author‟s Apology,” l.9).  Machosky writes, “the fall into allegory 
is analogous to the fall from the realm of heaven and true light into the dark and profane world in which 
we live, implying that the fallen world is always already allegorical” (179). 
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aligned with key words: judgment, mind, understanding, will, and memory.
37
  His 
intentions are to show how a Christian believer is to make the journey to Heaven, and 
what strength of mind is required to make that journey successfully and to overcome the 
necessary spiritual battles.   
In The Pilgrim’s Progress, there are concerning the use of reason two ideas in 
particular, actually intertwined, that are quite pronounced.  One has to do with the 
importance of memory; the other has to do with the mind proper and its faculties, 
including both understanding and judgment.  Christian and his fellow pilgrims are 
continuously being urged to remember the lessons they have learned.  But when they fail 
to remember properly, they usually find themselves in situations of grave physical 
danger and weakness.  When they finally do remember what they ought to know, the 
dangers and weaknesses are diminished as their minds become stronger.  Memory, 
therefore, has much to do with the work of reason in the progress toward the Celestial 
City, as its function is tied to the capacity for genuine understanding and right judgment.  
Moreover, each spiritual battle the pilgrims endure provides a unique lesson that gives 
the pilgrim a greater understanding of both himself and God, especially God‟s grace, and 
prepare the pilgrim for his entrance into the Celestial City.  Genuine understanding and 
                                                 
37
 Augustine discusses the trinity of the memory, understanding, and will extensively in On the 
Trinity.  In the final book (15), Augustine states, “if any one intelligently regards [the memory, 
understanding, and the will] as by nature divinely appointed in his own mind, and remembers by memory, 
contemplates by understanding, embraces by love, how great a thing that is in the mind, whereby even the 
eternal and unchangeable nature can be recollected, beheld, desired, doubtless that man finds an image of 
that highest Trinity” (15.20, pp. 220-21).  For Augustine, reflecting upon the nature of human memory, 
understanding, and will become a means to understand more profoundly the nature of the Holy Trinity.  
For Bunyan, Christian must employ the trinity of memory, reason, and will in order to use the knowledge 
and virtue he has gained to come before the presence of God. 
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right judgment are to accrue from this progressive collection of lessons won by the use 
of right reason and retained in the mind by diligent memory. 
In addition to remembering and recollecting what has already been learned from 
previous moments of weakness, Bunyan also insists that the Christian pilgrim should 
take care to remember the weaknesses themselves.  In this, Bunyan‟s allegory is 
thoroughly Puritan in its theology, for he emphasizes that true conversion begins with 
the conviction of one‟s own sinful nature.38  Recognizing his own weaknesses, then, 
Christian, Bunyan‟s hero, has a “tremendous need to find a righteousness not his own by 
which to be saved,” which need serves as Christian‟s impetus for leaving his family and 
friends in the City of Destruction to seek out the Celestial City.
39
  In the end, Christian 
finds his own righteousness, of course, not merely on his own but by the grace of God in 
conjunction with his progressively astute memory of the lessons he learns in his ongoing 
spiritual warfare.  And in finding that righteousness, he finds a strength of mind he did 
not realize he possessed all along, but which he realizes he perfected in some sense.
40
  
Bunyan‟s position here echoes Augustine in On the Trinity, where he insists that 
                                                 
38
 Faithful‟s discussion with Talkative later in the allegory echoes these points.  Faithful points 
again to that first step in the process of Puritan conversion: the first revelation of the work of grace is the 
conviction of sin and the recognition of the fallen state of humankind.  But he qualifies that to some extent 
by describing what often happens next in the mind and heart of the sinner: “though I say it discovereth 
itself thus unto him yet it is but seldom that he is able to conclude that this is a work of grace, because his 
corruptions now, and his abused reason makes his mind to misjudge in this matter; therefore in him that 
hath this work there is required a very sound judgement before he can with steadiness conclude that this is 
a work of grace” (74).  The human who is suddenly aware of the corruption of the soul is also newly aware 
of the corruption of reason, which causes doubts about the ability to judge what is true and false.  To make 
the right judgment that the work of grace is the cause of this very awareness, reason clearly needs the aid 
of grace.  Thus, the work of grace is twofold for Christian believers—to give the believers the conviction 
of sin and to help their faculty of reason to make the correct judgment of what that conviction means. 
39
 Roger Sharrock, Introduction to Bunyan, The Pilgrim’s Progress, xi.  One is reminded of 
Augustine‟s The City of God, which also imagines the distinctions between the earthly city and the 
heavenly city in similar ways. 
40
 In this, Christian can be contrasted to the poor character, Ignorance, who makes it all the way 
to the portal of the Celestial City, but does not make it into the Celestial City, and in the end is damned. 
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knowing we can never merit God‟s gift of grace, “we shall not trust in ourselves; and 
this is to be made weak,” but this weakness will not be to our detriment, for “He so dealt 
with us, that we might the rather profit by His strength, and that so in the weakness of 
humility the virtue of charity might be perfected” (4.1.2). 
When the reader first meets Christian, Christian is dressed in rags and possesses 
a great burden upon his back.  The reader learns as the allegory continues that this 
burden is Christian‟s consciousness and conviction of his own sinful nature—that first 
crucial step in the process of conversion.  Given the conviction of his own sinful nature, 
brought about by reading the Bible, Christian is rendered unable to act.  Though 
Christian has made that first fundamental step in his progression to the Heavenly City, in 
accordance with the Puritan model of conversion—his awareness of his sins and his 
inherently sinful nature—he does not know what he should do to have that burden eased 
or which way he should go to escape the destruction he knows awaits those in the City of 
Destruction.  The Evangelist, representative of Bunyan‟s ideal of the Christian minister, 
comes to Christian‟s aid, pointing him to the Wicket Gate, the gate through which 
Christian must pass in order to set himself upon the path to Heaven, or the Celestial 
City.
41
   
Yet even at this early point in his journey to the Heavenly City—he has barely 
started—Christian succumbs to his fears and doubts, and he soon falls into the Slough of 
Despond.  Help, who pulls Christian from the Slough, describes the Slough of Despond 
                                                 
41
 Bunyan alludes here to Luke 13.24: “Strive to enter through the narrow gate, for many, I tell 
you, will attempt to enter but will not be strong enough” (New American Bible).  Though Christian has 
become aware of his sinfulness, he has not proven strong enough to enter the gate and thereby truly 
received God‟ grace. 
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as “the descent whither the scum and filth that attends conviction for sin doth continually 
run, … for still as the sinner is awakened about his lost condition, there ariseth in his 
soul many fears, and doubts, and discouraging apprehensions, which all of them get 
together, and settle in this place” (17).  According to Help, the fears and doubts from 
which Christian must emerge are a direct result of the new awareness of his fallen 
condition, but represented in the allegory, Christian is literally trapped and drowning in 
his own despair, and it is only with Help that he is able to overcome these fears that he 
will never be worthy of entering the gates of the Heavenly City.  Like Samson, Christian 
will have to battle his despair at various times in his journey, and those battles will be a 
significant part of his spiritual growth.  He will have to recall God‟s promises to mind in 
order to bring himself out of despair time and time again. 
When Christian makes it to the wicket gate, he is admitted through it by Good 
Will.  Good Will asks Christian to recount the trials he has endured thus far in his 
travels.  This is the first of many times throughout Bunyan‟s allegory that Christian will 
be asked to recount what he has experienced thus far.  Far from being mere repetitions of 
the events which have passed, these retellings of the battles fought serve an important 
thematic purpose in Bunyan‟s allegory and his theological position.  Being continuously 
asked to recall his mishaps, the dangers he has encountered, and the means by which he 
overcame them, Christian is invited to remember what has been learned thus far along 
the journey and to keep what he has learned in mind to prepare him mentally for what 
yet lays ahead.  Each battle teaches a particular lesson, and it is the crucial task of 
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memory to keep those lessons in mind so reason and judgment can keep the pilgrims on 
the straight and narrow path which they have been instructed by Good Will to follow.
42
 
Good Will also directs Christian to the House of the Interpreter, who will “show 
him excellent things” (27).  Like Good Will, the Interpreter also hints at the joint work 
of memory, understanding, and will.  When the Interpreter shows Christian the man in 
the iron cage of despair, he tells Christian, “Let this man‟s misery be remembered by 
thee, and be an everlasting caution to thee” (33).43  When he has shown Christian all he 
needs to show him, the Interpreter reminds Christian to “keep all things so in mind, that 
they may be as a goad in thy sides, to prick thee forward in the way thou must go” (35).  
Christian leaves the Interpreter, singing this song: 
Here I have seen things rare, and profitable; 
Things pleasant, dreadful, things to make me stable 
In what I have begun to take in hand: 
Then let me think on them, and understand  
Wherefore they showed me was.  (35) 
                                                 
42
 Good Will teaches Christian about the narrow path he must follow: “Look before thee; does 
thou see this narrow way?  That is the way thou must go … and it is as straight as a rule can make it.”  
Given his past that he is supposed to remember, to say nothing of his awareness of his fallen state, 
Christian is rightfully worried that he might lose his way along the path.  But Good Will reassures him, 
“Yes, there are many ways butt down upon this; and they are crooked and wide; but thus thou may‟st 
distinguish the right from the wrong, that only being straight and narrow” (27).  When Christian fails to 
remember to stay on that path, diverted from what he should remember by his physical pain and fatigue, 
he puts himself into further spiritual dangers. 
43
 Bunyan, 33.  George Butler suggests that “Bunyan‟s concern with „the unpardonable sin‟ was 
constant.  In his spiritual autobiography, … he reviews his wrestling with the question of whether he had 
committed this offense, and reveals its deep significance for him” (34).  Butler further explains the dangers 
of despair, which “prevents the sinner from asking forgiveness.  The voluntary rejection of grace, with the 
inevitable consequence of damnation, was a conventional interpretation of blasphemy against the Holy 
Spirit” (36). 
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By thinking upon the things he has been shown and gaining a better understanding of 
what they mean, Christian rightfully expects that these things should stay within his 
memory to help him fight the coming spiritual battles, but he will find at various crucial 
moments that he does forget these lessons, and the consequences of that forgetfulness 
put him in grave spiritual danger. 
Leaving the House of the Interpreter, Christian makes his way to the Wall of 
Salvation, where he sees a Cross.  The sight of this Cross loosens the burden from his 
back until it drops into a sepulcher, never to be seen or felt upon his back again.  
Christian is also stripped of his ragged clothing and given new clothes.  Furthermore, he 
is given a mark upon his forehead, and a scroll with a seal that will get him entrance into 
the Celestial City.  No longer burdened by his sins, Christian is ready to continue his 
journey to the gates of Heaven, but his first task is to climb the Hill of Difficulty, where 
he falls asleep where he was intended only to rest  momentarily in the midst of those 
difficulties.  Here he learns an important lesson about the dangers of sleeping at the 
wrong time and wrong place, for he very nearly lost the precious scroll.  Christian 
laments “his evil of sleeping,” saying, “That I should sleep in the midst of difficulty!  
That I should so indulge the flesh as to use that rest for ease to my flesh which the Lord 
of the Hill hath erected only for the relief of the spirits of pilgrims!” (41).44  Christian 
must remember later the costs of sleeping “in the midst of difficulty.”  He learns that he 
                                                 
44
 Implied here is that sleeping poses such particular dangers because one cannot then be 
spiritually and mentally alert to the dangers around one.  The lapse in mental alertness (when reason is 
asleep) makes one potentially vulnerable to satanic dreams, as well as other spiritual troubles. 
  255 
 
should stay awake during crucial times so as not to leave himself spiritually and 
mentally vulnerable to even more kinds of spiritual dangers. 
Christian is punished for sleeping in the wrong place at the wrong time by having 
to continue his journey in darkness, in which darkness he grows fearful from the noises 
in the dark and comes close to despair once again.  Finally, however, he reaches the 
Castle Beautiful where he will be able to rest for the night.  Before being allowed 
entrance, however, Christian must first answer the questions of Discretion, “a grave and 
beautiful damsel” and a virgin belonging to the castle Beautiful (43).  Once he satisfies 
her questions, she calls to others in the family—Prudence, Piety, and Charity—who then 
catechize Christian further, as did Good Will at the wicket gate.
45
  Like Good Will, they 
ask him what he has learned, what he remembers, as well as questions about the life and 
family he left behind.  It seems that these ladies already know what Christian has 
endured, as when Piety asks, “But you saw more than this, did you not?” (45).  But the 
aim of the questions is directed less toward their need to know what Christian has 
endured, and more toward forcing Christian to keep these events fresh in his memory.  
These questions give Christian the occasion to use his memory and to reflect upon what 
he has done, so he will be better prepared for battles still to come.  The women of the 
castle also prepare Christian for the coming battles by taking him into the armory and 
fitting him with the spiritual armor provided by their Lord.   
                                                 
45
 This is not a catechism in the formal sense, but it might be considered such in its quick 
succession of questions and answers designed to help Christian remember what he needs to know.  Dennis 
Danielson, in “Catechism,” writes of Bunyan‟s interest in catechisms (having composed one) and his 
“emphasis on the process of acquiring knowledge” (47) 
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When Christian leaves the Castle Beautiful, he must immediately descend into 
the Valley of Humiliation.  Soon after leaving his hostesses, Christian there encounters 
the “foul fiend” Apollyon who seeks to reclaim Christian as one of his subjects or to put 
him to shameful death because he refuses to return to his service (51).  To escape 
Apollyon, Christian must engage in a tremendously difficult battle with the weapons just 
given him.  Apollyon first taunts Christian with reminders of Christian‟s failings on his 
journey, but most subtly of all, Apollyon suggests that Christian is “inwardly desirous of 
vainglory in all that thou sayest or doest” (53).  This is a subtle temptation because it 
would be a natural inclination to deny such a spiritual weakness, but Christian does not 
attempt to deny this or any of the other sins he has committed; he humbly admits his 
weaknesses and accepts Apollyon‟s humiliation of him: “All this is true, and much more, 
which thou hast left out” (53).  Admitting his weaknesses, Christian is able to rely more 
fully on God‟s strength and support in this battle. 
Apollyon desires to kill Christian, and Christian is wounded despite his efforts to 
use his new sword and shield to thwart the darts Apollyon throws at him.  Still, Christian 
resists succumbing to Apollyon, even though “this sore combat lasted for above half a 
day, even till Christian was almost quite spent.  For you must know, that Christian, by 
reason of his wounds, must needs grow weaker and weaker” (54).  Christian‟s 
humiliation and near-defeat by Apollyon emphasize again the weak state in which 
human beings encounter evil in the world.  But even in this weakened state, Christian 
trusts that he can rely on God‟s strength, for “the Prince whom I serve and honour is 
merciful and ready to forgive” (54).  Though Christian unfortunately takes “a dreadful 
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fall” and loses his sword, making him completely vulnerable to the wrath of Apollyon, it 
is here, at the moment of his greatest weakness, when he is closest to death, that 
Christian is given victory over Apollyon (54).  Just when Apollyon is preparing to strike 
his final blow, Christian finds his sword and delivers such a thrust that Apollyon flies 
away as though he had been given a mortal blow.  Because Christian accepted his 
weaknesses with proper humility and trusted rightfully in God‟s strength, God was able 
to use Christian‟s weaknesses to His advantage and to endow Christian with new virtue, 
just as Christ was able to do in the desert.  
Christian is given time to heal and be refreshed, but he soon must enter the 
Valley of the Shadow of Death.  Though surrounded by physical dangers in the valley, 
the most dangerous aspect of this trial are the fiends and demons which surround 
Christian and beguile his mind: 
Christian was so confounded that he did not know his own voice, … just 
when he was come over against the mouth of the burning pit, one of the 
wicked ones got behind him, and stepped up softly to him, and 
whisperingly suggested many grievous blasphemies to him which he 
verily thought had proceeded from his own mind.  This put Christian 
more to it than anything that he met with before, even to think that he 
should now blaspheme him that he loved so much before; yet could he 
have helped it, he would not have done it: but he had not the discretion 
neither to stop his ears, nor to know from whence those blasphemies 
came.  (57) 
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This is the most subtle of Christian‟s spiritual battles.  Christian essentially seems to lose 
his free will when he hears the voices of the demons—he might as well be asleep, given 
the power other forces have over his mind at this point, for he suddenly has no power to 
discern what is true from what is false.  He lacks the ability to know the origin of the 
blasphemies he is hearing in his mind, so he assumes they originate in him, even if he 
never before believed he would utter such blasphemies.  What brings Christian out of 
this desolate and disconsolate state is another voice—this time a voice uttering a Psalm 
of comfort: “Though I walk through the Valley of the Shadow of Death, I will fear none 
ill, for thou art with me” (58).46  Hearing that voice, Christian is reminded that he is not 
alone and that God is with him even here in the darkest and most dangerous valley, and 
he trusts once again in God‟s power to guide him through these evils.  Though he had 
forgotten this reassurance for himself, hearing it spoken aloud brings it back into his 
memory so that his mind can once again be calm and assured in his trust in God. 
When he emerges from the Valley of the Shadow of Death, Christian finally 
catches up with his fellow pilgrim, Faithful (whose voice brought Christian to recollect 
that he was not alone).  As he has been asked on several occasions to recount his own 
pilgrimage, Christian now asks Faithful to tell of his journey.  Faithful therefore tells of 
his meeting with Shame, who argued that “a tender conscience was so unmanly thing, 
and that for man to watch over his words and ways, so as to tie up himself from that 
hectoring liberty that the brave spirits of the times accustom themselves unto would 
make him the ridicule of the times” (65).  Faithful is initially shamed because he can find 
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 Faithful is reciting Psalm 23. 
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no response to Shame‟s argument that he is acting unmanly—unlike a man who prides 
himself upon his conceptions of his own freedom and bravery.  But Faithful recalls that 
God cares nothing for the things of men, so he is finally able to respond to Shame‟s 
argument by pointing out that “what God says is best, though all the men in the world 
are against it.  Seeing then that God prefers his religion, seeing God prefers a tender 
conscience, seeing they that make themselves fools for the Kingdom of Heaven are 
wisest” (65-66).  There is a telling correspondence here between being foolish and weak 
in the eyes of the temporal world and being wise and strong in the eyes of God.  Faithful 
comes to see the truth of this paradox: that those who seem foolish according to men are 
wise according to God.  If humans consider a tender conscience—a conscience that 
guides one to virtue and is affronted by movements toward sin—unmanly, then Faithful 
realizes he does not want to be held to the standards of the world, but only of God.  He 
therefore sings to himself, “O let the pilgrims, let the pilgrims then / Be vigilant, and quit 
themselves like men” (66).47  Faithful recognizes that the truly vigilant pilgrims, those 
who will act according to their own consciences and strive to enter the heavenly 
kingdom, must act not as mere men, but as the children of God they desire to be.  
Making the choice to act in such a way will leave him weak in the eyes of other 
humankind, but strong in the eyes of God. 
Continuing on their journey, Christian and Faithful eventually meet Evangelist 
once again.  Christian is happy to see the minister whose “countenance brings to my 
remembrance thy ancient kindness and unwearied laboring for my eternal good” (76).  
                                                 
47
 The sense of “quit” here seems to be “To abandon, relinquish, or renounce; to give up the use, 
possession, or benefit of” (OED, 10a). 
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Again, the work of memory is so very important.  Remembering the good shown him 
thus far will enable Christian to continue in his pursuit of the good.  And once again, the 
pilgrims are asked to recall their travels and the difficulties they have faced.  When they 
finish narrating what has passed, Evangelist says to them, “Right glad am I … not that 
you have met with trials, but that you have been victors; and for that you have, 
notwithstanding many weaknesses, continued in the way to this very day” (77).  
Evangelist‟s words reveal again that Bunyan‟s allegory stresses human weaknesses, and 
yet the strength they might find, by grace, in and through that weakness.  Through their 
steady progression, through these battles, they will eventually find the strength and attain 
the perfection to enter the Celestial City. 
Yet Evangelist also warns them that their weaknesses will soon be tested again, 
for one of them will die in the next town of Vanity.
48
  Upon their arrival in that town, 
Christian and Faithful are caged and beaten.  But the words of Evangelist seem to have 
put them in the proper mind for withstanding their imprisonment, and their words and 
manners yet reflect what they have learned on their journey, for they “behave[e] 
themselves all the while very wisely and soberly” (81).  Here, at least, Christian 
remembers what he should know and all that he has learned; he is not overcome with 
doubts and fears, but acts instead with wisdom in the face of vanity.  As Evangelist 
foretold would happen, Faithful is sentenced to death, and he is beaten, stoned, and 
burned at the stake in the town of Vanity.  Though he dies a terrible death, his death also 
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 Bunyan alludes to another temptation of Christ in the town of Vanity: Christ is tempted by 
Beelzebub who “showed him all the kingdoms of the world in a little time,” but Jesus “had no mind to the 
merchandise” (79). 
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signifies the completion of his journey.  Christian witnesses the angels ushering Faithful 
to the Heavenly City with some small regret that he could not be so ushered in as well, 
but his journey and growth is not yet complete.  Through God‟s providence, Christian is 
eventually able to escape from Vanity to continue and complete his spiritual journey to 
the Celestial City, and he is now joined by Hopeful, who witnessed the words and 
actions of the pilgrims in Vanity with new understanding of their truth. 
In continuing on their journey, Christian and Hopeful once again find themselves 
in the midst of difficulties: “the way from the River was rough, and their feet tender by 
reason of their travels; so the soul of the pilgrims was much discouraged, because of the 
way” (97-98).  At just that moment when they have “wished for better way,” there is a 
stile to the left side the path which leads to By-Path Meadow.  Christian is so overcome 
by the physical difficulties he faces along this rough path that he forgets what the 
Interpreter told him at the very beginning of this journey about staying on the straight 
and narrow.  Hopeful is yet hesitant to take this path, fearing that they will be taken out 
of their way, but Christian is able to persuade him to leave the difficult path on which 
they find themselves to take the easier path through the meadow.  Christian‟s 
misjudgment and his failure to remember the advice he had been given, however, will 
lead the pilgrims to the gravest dangers yet. 
It is not long, actually, before Christian realizes his error.  As they walk along 
this new path, they see a fellow pilgrim, Vain-confidence, walking ahead.  When it 
becomes dark, however, Christian and Hopeful hear Vain-confidence fall into a deep pit.  
At that point, they become aware that they have strayed from the true path.  Hopeful‟s 
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earlier fears are realized, but Christian is completely distraught by his own foolishness: 
“Who could have thought that this path should have led us out of the way?” (98).  
Christian intuits that he should have thought so, which makes him even more distraught 
by the danger into which he has brought his fellow pilgrim.  He repents of that sin, and 
Hopeful forgives him, but it is too late to remove them from the dangers that await them 
on this path though they prepare to return to the proper path. 
Christian insists that he should be the one to lead them back to the proper path; 
should there be any dangers, he thinks they should befall him rather than his companion.  
But Hopeful‟s response is telling: “No, said Hopeful, you shall not go first, for your 
mind being troubled may lead you out of the way again” (99).  Hopeful‟s answer 
suggests the importance of a clear mind, of right reason to bring one out of danger, and 
Hopeful knows that Christian is so overwhelmed at the moment by what he has done to 
put them both in danger that his reason cannot function as it should.  More importantly, 
the cloudiness of his mind continues when the pilgrims are caught by the giant Despair 
and placed in the dungeon of his home, Doubting-Castle.
49
 
Their capture by Despair puts Christian in “double sorrow, because „twas 
through his unadvised haste that they were brought into distress” (100).  Thus, Christian, 
compared with Hopeful, is much more susceptible to the temptations of Despair when 
Despair attempts to persuade them to commit suicide to escape their imprisonment and 
torture.  Christian would readily seek death rather than life, but the importance of 
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 Struggling to make their way back to the path, the pilgrims are eventually forced to stop 
because of the dangers of darkness and flood.  Though their intentions were to rest and take shelter only 
briefly, they both fall asleep in their weariness.  Sleep, again, puts them in danger because of the place in 
which they sleep—the land which belongs to Despair. 
  263 
 
memory comes into play again.  Hopeful is able to recall the commandment not to 
murder, and he reiterates to Christian that self-murder is the worst form of murder, for 
“he that kills another can but commit murder upon his body; but for one to kill himself is 
to kill body and soul at once” (101).  Hopeful, urging patience, is therefore able to 
temper to some extent the despair of Christian and keep him from committing the sin to 
which he is sorely tempted.  Yet when Despair attempts a second time to persuade the 
pair to commit suicide, Christian is still too vulnerable to Despair‟s temptation.  Hopeful 
again has to make the counter-argument against what Christian appears to desire, but this 
time, Hopeful appeals more strongly to Christian‟s memories of what he has overcome: 
“rememberest thou not how valiant thou hast been heretofore?” (102).  He puts the 
various events of his journey into Christian‟s memory once again—his battle with 
Apollyon, his journey through the Valley of the Shadow of the Death—urging him to 
“bear up with patience as well as we can,” hoping that those memories will bring 
Christian out of despair and enable him to think rightly once again and look to God for 
deliverance (102). 
After being beaten yet once again the following day, Christian and Hopeful find 
themselves even deeper in despair, and they lay all day “in a lamentable case, as before” 
(103).  But something changes that night when the two pilgrims finally “began to pray, 
and continued in prayer till almost break of day, after which Christian suddenly 
remembers that he possesses a key, called Promise” (103).50  That key is supposed to 
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 George Butler links Christian‟s and Hopeful‟s imprisonment with the man in the iron cage of 
despair whom Christian met at the House of the Interpreter: “Like the desperate prisoner, Christian and his 
companion are confined by their own doubts.  But Christian has a key. … Though Christian and the 
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open the locks and set them free from Doubting-Castle, as indeed it does.  Christian had 
been so overwhelmed by his despair that it seems he was unable to pray and seek God‟s 
strength.  Remembering only his own weaknesses, Christian is left powerless, but when 
he recalls God‟s strength, and recalls that he can ask God to lend him some of that 
strength, Christian is also able to recall what he needed to know, indeed what he already 
knew but had forgotten.  All they needed to escape Doubting-Castle and its owner 
Despair, was the recollection of God‟s Promise, which frees them from the despair 
which has consumed and imprisoned them.
51
   
Christian and Hopeful are free to continue on their journey, and they soon find 
themselves at the Delectable Mountains where they meet the shepherds named 
Knowledge, Experience, Watchful, and Sincere.  These shepherds, who have been 
directed by the Lord of the Mountains “not to be forgetful to entertain strangers,” 
welcome Christian and Hopeful, so they welcome them to all they have to offer.  Here, 
too, however, the pilgrims are questioned about their journey, in particular the means by 
which they have persevered thus far, for the shepherds, impressed, know that “but few of 
them that begin to come hither, do show their face on these Mountains” (105).  But here, 
too, Christian and Hopeful will have things revealed to them that they will need to 
remember in order to complete their journey. 
The shepherds show the pilgrims various mountains, but they are especially 
moved by the sight of blind men stumbling among tombs, for they learn that these were 
                                                                                                                                                
desperate man are imprisoned by their own guilt, the key to each jail is as much a part of each prisoner as 
the despair that confines him” (37). 
51
 Samson‟s battles with despair in Samson Agonistes again provide a telling parallel—Samson 
also needed to recall God‟s promises to/for him in order to attain peace of mind at his death. 
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men captured by Despair and imprisoned in Doubting-Castle until they were blinded and 
left to wander among the tombs.  Christian and Hopeful are thus made even more aware 
of the dangers in which they had placed themselves, and the dangers they had escaped 
mainly by the grace of God.  The shepherds also offer Christian and Hopeful their first 
glimpse of the Celestial City through their “perspective glass,” but it is telling that the 
pilgrims “essayed to look, but the remembrance of that last thing that the shepherds had 
showed them made their hands shake; by means of which impediment they could not 
look steadily through the glass” (107).  Now, the effects and memories of their sins and 
mortal weaknesses prevent them from being able to see clearly the glory of their 
destination, whereas the proper memories would have prevented the very events that 
now cloud their memories and minds.   
Christian and Hopeful are nonetheless refreshed by the brief and blurry glimpses 
they are given of their final destination, and they are ready to continue their pilgrimage.  
Before they leave, however, the shepherds offer them several pieces of advice to help 
them complete their journey.  They are given a note with directions to take on the path.  
They are told to “beware the flatterer” and to “take heed that they sleep not upon the 
Enchanted Ground” (107).  Christian and Hopeful will need to remember what is said 
here, for they will face more temptations along the path to Heaven. 
Soon thereafter, the pilgrims come to a fork in the road where the two paths seem 
equally straight and narrow, and they stand in a quandary wondering which way they 
should go.  While they consider the matter, a “man black of flesh, but covered with a 
very light robe” comes toward them and says he will direct them down the correct path 
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(116).  The path down which he takes them, however, twists and turns so that very soon, 
the travelers are no longer turned toward the Celestial City.  Yet Christian and Hopeful 
do not think to refuse to follow this man, whom they do not realize is the flatterer about 
whom they were warned.  Soon, “before they were aware, he led them both within the 
compass of a net, in which they were both so entangled that they knew not what to do; 
and with that, the white robe fell off the black man‟s back: then they saw where they 
were” (116).52  As they are captured in this net set by this flatterer, Christian and 
Hopeful come to two important realizations related to what they have failed to remember 
at the appropriate time.  They have been temporarily blinded to where this man was 
leading them, or more pointedly, where he was not leading them, despite the shepherds‟ 
warning to beware of the flatterer.  And thus we see again the importance of memory: 
Christian and Hopeful also realize the shepherds gave them a note that would have 
directed them down the correct path, but they forgot to read it.  These two failures of 
memory render the two pilgrims once again in a position of weakness and vulnerability 
to temptation, unable to continue on their journey to the Celestial City. 
With these realizations and remembrances which have come too late, Christian 
and Hopeful remain trapped in the net until a Shining One comes to their aid.  The 
Shining One tears the net and releases the pilgrims.  Their savior, however, is not happy 
with them when he hears their admissions that they forgot or did not think that such a 
fine man would be a flatterer.  For these admissions, Christian and Hopeful are told to lie 
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 Bunyan, 116.  This mirrors the ways in which Comus tempts the unwary travelers—the men 
whom he turns into beasts are not even aware of the peril in which they find themselves.  At least 
Christian‟s and Hopeful‟s blindness is only temporary, as they are able to see what the flatterer really, 
whereas the men/beasts in Comus‟s gathering never discover Comus‟s false nature. 
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upon the ground, “which when they did, he chastised them sore, to teach them the good 
way wherein they should walk” (117).  Though Christian and Hopeful have failed to 
remember properly, all is not lost.  They are rebuked and chastised by him who loves 
them, and he gives them a chance to repent and be redeemed as they continue on their 
journey.  Next time, though, they are expected to remember what they have been taught.  
Though they have had a temporary setback in their progress, this lesson too makes the 
pilgrims stronger and allows them to move closer to the perfection awaiting them in the 
Celestial City. 
Thus, when the pair come to the Enchanted Ground, “a certain country, whose air 
naturally tended to make one drowsy, if he came a stranger into it,” Christian does 
remember the warning given to them by the Shepherds, and he is therefore insistent that 
they do whatever is necessary to remain awake (118).  Hopeful is drowsy, but Christian 
reminds him, “Do you not remember, that one of the shepherds bid us beware of the 
Enchanted Ground?  He meant by that that we should beware of sleeping; wherefore let 
us not sleep as do others, but let us watch and be sober” (119).53  Christian has learned 
the lesson from his last failure to remember, and he keeps the shepherds‟ helpful words 
in mind in order to overcome this new difficulty.  Christian therefore suggests that the 
two of them “fall into good discourse” to keep themselves awake (119).  Their discourse 
in the Enchanted itself is an exercise in reason as they process what they have learned in 
their journey thus far. 
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 Again, the pilgrims are faced with the potential dangers of sleeping. 
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Christian asks Hopeful to tell his conversion story, which, like Christian‟s, 
mirrors the Puritan model of conversion.  It begins, typically, with an awakening 
awareness of his sins, quickly followed by doubts and fears that he is capable of 
redemption.  But Hopeful‟s story is remarkable for its vision of Christ.  Hopeful had 
prayed that the Father would show him the Son, and Hopeful did finally see him, not 
“with my bodily eyes, but with the eyes of mine understanding” (124).  Hopeful asks 
Jesus how he can be redeemed when he is such a great sinner, and Jesus tells him, 
“Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners.  He is the end of the law for 
righteousness to every one that believes.  He died for our sins, and rose again for our 
justification.  He loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood.  He is 
mediator between God and us.  He ever liveth to make intercession for us” (124).  With 
this vision of the Son, we return to the understanding of the Son as the mediator between 
God the Father and humans that we saw in Paradise Regained.  Because of his 
mediation via his perfection in overcoming temptation and his willingness to die, the 
Son pays the penalty for all human sins.  Because he is resurrected, he forever lives as 
the intercessor for humans.  Christian asks Hopeful what effect this vision of Christ had 
upon him, and Hopeful offers this answer: 
It made me see that all the world, notwithstanding all the righteousness 
thereof, is in a state of condemnation.  It made me see that God the 
Father, though he be just, can justly justify the coming sinner.  It made 
me greatly ashamed of the vileness of my former life, and confounded me 
with the sense of mine own ignorance; for there never came thought into 
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mine heart before now that showed me so the beauty of Jesus Christ.  It 
made me love a holy life, and long to do something for the honour and 
glory of the name of the Lord Jesus.  (125)
54
 
In being made more fully aware of his own ignorance and weakness, Hopeful comes to 
have a more profound knowledge of God and Christ, and he also finds new strength to 
do good rather than evil. 
Though Christian has not had the miraculous vision of Christ that Hopeful has 
had, Christian has yet also come to understand what is meant by a “true justifying faith” 
in the redeeming work of the Son, and his definition echoes what Hopeful has already 
said: “true justifying faith puts the soul (as sensible of its lost condition by the law) upon 
flying for refuge unto Christ‟s righteousness (which righteousness of his is not an act of 
grace by which he maketh for justification thy obedience accepted with God, but his 
personal obedience to the law in doing and suffering for us what that required at our 
hands)” (129).  The sentiments expressed by both Hopeful and Christian here also 
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 These last conversations in the allegory really serve as an opportunity for Bunyan to expound 
upon the tenets of his Puritan/Calvinist theology.  Here we have the necessity of the conviction of sin.  
Thereafter, Christian will discuss justification by faith rather than works.  Bunyan is going to great lengths 
to emphasize the Calvinist point about the depravity of human nature.  Humans must conceive of their 
own sinfulness and evil proclivities in order to judge themselves as God would judge them. 
This conversation about Hopeful‟s former ignorance calls to mind for both pilgrims their 
lingering companion, Ignorance.  So, they resolve to wait for him in order to talk with him and attempt to 
persuade him of the truths they know.  Offered the occasion, Christian asks Ignorance,  “How stands it 
between God and your soul now?” (125).  Ignorance foolishly argues that he has been redeemed because 
his heart has good thoughts, which have led him to live a good life.  But Christian argues that “it is one 
thing indeed to have these, and another thing only to think so” (126).  Christian‟s point is clear—
Ignorance thinks he has a good heart, good thoughts, a good life, but he has refused to judge himself as 
God and His Word might judge him.  The truly good thoughts human beings can have is to think of 
themselves as the sinners they are, not of the good that is in them, for “There is none righteous, there is 
none that doth good.  … [E]very imagination of the heart of man is only evil, and that continually.  … The 
imagination of man‟s heart is evil from his youth” (127).  When Ignorance insists that he has never 
believed and never will believe that he is thus deprived of all good, Christian tells him that he must never 
have had even one good thought, despite all his insistence otherwise. 
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resonate with Milton‟s sentiments that paradise is regained through Christ‟s victory over 
temptation.  Adam and Eve, and all humans, were asked to remain obedient to God, but 
have failed, temptation after temptation; Jesus alone has remained obedient throughout 
all temptations.  But despite repeated failings, Christian (and Hopeful) will finally be 
redeemed through the progress of this spiritual journey because of Christ‟s perfect 
obedience. 
Recognizing that humans always remain susceptible to sin and temptation, 
Christian and Hopeful turn their discussion to the reasons humans return to their sinful 
ways even after experiencing a conviction of sin.  Not having made their way completely 
across the Enchanted Ground, Christian and Hopeful continue their theological 
discussion.  They discuss again the conviction of sin, but now they talk about the cause 
of returning to sinful ways even after such a conviction occurs.  Christian offers four 
possible causes of backsliding, but eventually reduces them all to the issue that resonates 
repeatedly in this allegory, the failure of memory: “They draw off their thoughts all that 
they may from the remembrance of God, death, and judgement to come” (134).  Failing 
to remember what one has learned and what one ought to know leads one away from 
God and more firmly into temptations and sinfulness.  Implied here is the suggestion that 
remembering what one has learned leads one ever closer to God and to the attainment of 
that virtue and obedience that God desires from His people. 
With the conclusion of this conversation about the failure of memory, Christian 
and Hopeful leave the Enchanted Ground and enter Beulah where “they met with 
abundance of what they had sought for in all their pilgrimage” (135).  But this is not 
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their final place of rest, for the pilgrims must still pass through the river to make it to the 
gates of the Celestial City.  Christian in particular must again face his despair—he grows 
fearful even at the thought of passing through the river and seeks some means to escape 
that river crossing.  This becomes the most important spiritual battle the pilgrims will 
face as they are told that the depth of the river is inversely proportionate to the amount of 
faith they have in God to save them—the more faith they have, the shallower the water 
will be.   
As Hopeful begins to cross the river, he is able to feel the bottom and therefore 
offers comfort and reassurances to his struggling friend who feels despair as the thoughts 
of his sinfulness, even as visions of demons press upon and around him in the water.  
Memory comes into play once again.  Hopeful reminds Christian of the purpose of this 
spiritual test and indeed of all the tests they have endured thus far: “These troubles and 
distresses that you go through in these waters are no sign that God hath forsaken you, but 
are sent to try you whether you will call to mind that which heretofore you have received 
of his goodness, and live upon him in your distresses” (137).  Though Christian may yet 
be weak and vulnerable, he has only to look to God to find the strength to emerge from 
the depths in which he flounders.  Hopeful adds one more word of comfort—“Be of 
good cheer, Jesus Christ maketh thee whole,” and with those words, Christian 
remembers what he knows and so he believes he will find the strength to make it through 
these waters with the aid of grace. 
Christian and Hopeful lose their “mortal garments” in the river, and when they 
enter the gates, “they were transfigured, and they had raiment put on that shone like 
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gold” (138, 140-41).  They are greeted with all the joy of Heaven after enduring all the 
hardships that come with trying to maintain the straight and narrow path to the Celestial 
City.  They finally come into the presence of God, and their souls once again attain the 
glory that God had always wanted and intended for His human creatures. 
But Bunyan‟s final statements in the story are telling.  After entering the gates, 
Christian looks back to see Ignorance, another pilgrim, also crossing the river to get to 
the gates.  Ignorance had revealed to Christian and Hopeful earlier in the allegory his 
ignorance about crucial matters of faith, yet they see him cross the river much more 
easily than did Christian.  Rather than struggling through the water himself, Ignorance 
uses the ferry of Vain-hope.  However, having come to the straight and narrow path by a 
short-cut rather than through the wicket gate, Ignorance has nothing to show when he is 
asked for the certificate that he would have received at the wicket gate.  The same angels 
that brought Christian and Hopeful into the Celestial City therefore bind Ignorance and 
carry him to a door in the side of the hill.  Bunyan‟s dream vision ends with the image 
that “there was a way to Hell, even from the Gates of Heaven, as well as from the City of 
Destruction” (142).   
Bunyan‟s point in ending this allegory with an image of damnation rather than 
the image of Christian entering the Celestial City serves as one final reminder to his 
readers.  Bunyan has been invested throughout in the work of memory in relation to 
reason.  He wants his readers to keep their own weaknesses in mind and rely instead on 
the strength of Christ so as to gain the knowledge necessary to keep them from following 
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the path of Ignorance.  By not heeding memory and reason, they, too, can be cast down 
to Hell, even from the very gates of Heaven.   
Together, Milton‟s Christ and Bunyan‟s Christian reveal the ideal of the 
warfaring Christian that Milton admires.  Such Christians should strive to match the 
perfect reasoning and will of Christ, even if they are bound to fail, even as Christian 
does throughout the allegory.  But if they heed the work of reason and memory as they 
direct the will toward God, the warfaring Christians, like Bunyan‟s Christian, can 
complete the journey to the Celestial City and attain that glorious state won by Christ‟s 
suffering for humankind. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has traced the use of reason in conceptions and representations 
of spiritual warfare—from failures of reason in the fall of Adam and Eve to the triumphs 
of reason by fallen humans even to the point of soul-making and the final glorification of 
fallen humans who have been redeemed by Christ.  In these literary texts, we have seen 
how reason after the fall must be aided by grace in order to function as “right reason,” 
but when it does function as it should, such reason can enable spiritual combatants to 
emerge from moments of tremendous weakness revealing great strength of mind.  
Moreover, spiritual combatants should employ their memory to remember the 
knowledge gained from previous battles in order to be better prepared for subsequent 
ones, for those memories will also inform the work of right reason in spiritual warfare.   
Despite the general tendency of Reformation theology, especially in its Calvinist 
tenets, to discount or mistrust the use of reason because of its inherent fallibility, this 
study shows that there are yet some radical reform writers who share a remarkable 
emphasis on the use of reason in spiritual warfare.  These writers are even seen as 
celebrating the use of reason when it is informed by divine grace to approach its former 
function, especially in matters of spiritual warfare.  Faced with trials and temptations of 
sin and evil, the godly persons in these texts must rely on their ability to reason, as 
guided by grace, conscience, and their memories of what is good,  in order to discern 
what is good and to overcome what is evil. 
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This treatment of reformist writers opens the way for several further studies on 
this topic.  First, there are many more texts that could reveal the ways in which this 
emphasis on reason is borne out in the lived experiences of Christians.  There is a 
proliferation of spiritual autobiographies, advice manuals, sermons, political tracts, and 
much more, which suggest that such considerations of reason were not relegated only to 
the abstractions of theology but had real significance in the spiritual lives of Christians 
in the seventeenth century.
1
   
Second, though my study complicates the way in which we might conceive the 
theological relationships among Catholicism, Protestantism, and radical Protestantism, 
particularly as concerns the use of reason in the early- to mid-seventeenth century when 
the texts I address were written and published, these relations are further complicated in 
the late decades of the seventeenth century when there came to be a much more 
pronounced “rhetoric of „reason‟” in Anglican theology and in the anti-Catholic and 
anti-Puritan polemics issued by Anglicans.
2
  Raymond Tumbleson suggests that “in 
attacking Catholicism, Anglican theologians redefined religion itself as based more on 
reason than on faith, because Papists could lay equal claim to faith, but only the Church 
                                                 
1
 For example, Milton saw the battle against the corruption of the prelates as being fundamentally 
a spiritual battle against evil that demanded the use of reason to win. 
2
 Cf. Raymond Tumbleson, “„Reason and Religion‟: The Science of Anglicanism,” in Journal of 
the History of Ideas 57, no. 1 (Jan. 1996): 131-56.  Tumbleson argues that “apologists for the Church of 
England offered a … clinching argument against Catholicsm—that reason itself was with them.  They saw 
no contradiction between what Richard Sherlock calls a „scripture-based argumentative framework‟ and 
„the priority of natural reason‟” (131).  Yet I would suggest that such a response from the Anglican Church 
stems in part from two major cultural concerns: 1) the political and theological concerns that surrounded 
first the Restoration of the monarchy against the supposed irrationalism of the Interregnum and later the 
Catholicism of King James II in the 1680s, who was eventually deposed to allow his Protestant daughter 
and son-in-law to assume the English throne; and 2) the significant shift towards scientific 
experimentalism, which the Anglican theologians sought to appropriate in order to be seen as a religion of 
reason. 
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of England possessed reason as they defined it” (132).  Yet John Spurr points out the 
limited scope of reason for the English Protestant: “the Protestant had only to follow his 
own „reason‟ until he was persuaded of the truth of the scriptures….  [O]nce human 
reason has demonstrated that scripture is truly the Word of God, its work is done, 
scripture becomes the rule of the Protestant‟s faith and the mysteries which it contains 
remain beyond the ken of reason” (569).   
Though Anglicans would seek to show that Puritans are as irrational as the 
Catholics, I would point out that the Puritan texts I have examined here would suggest 
far otherwise, and that the Puritan reliance on reason is more profound than the kind of 
argument for the use of reason that Spurr suggests the Anglicans make.  Yet there is also 
a considerable trickiness to these appropriations as Anglican theologians simplify what 
they mean by “reason,” even as Anglican theology and the new scientific 
experimentalism share some complicated aspects.
3
  Most problematically for the issue of 
reason and religious experience, however, there seems to be a greater slippage in this 
later period in the distinctions between “pure reason” and “right reason.” 
These distinctions are crucial to conceptions of the proper use of reason in 
spiritual warfare, as my study has shown that concerns for the use of right reason in 
spiritual warfare are pervasive in radical reform accounts of spiritual battles and 
temptations.  Though the fall of Adam and Eve, through a tremendous failure of reason, 
results in a significant darkening of reason, these writers yet reveal that right reason, 
                                                 
3
 Tumbleson points out: “If experimental science in the late seventeenth century is deliberately 
incomplete in its assumptions, it parallels theological and political structures of thought confronted by the 
alarming demand that they construct a logic, whether of reason, spirituality, or government, deprived of 
former hierarchical absolutes” (156).  Spurr also talks about the different conceptions of reason which 
were at play in this period (569-71). 
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informed by grace and joined with memory and free will, are crucial tools if the 
Christian is to triumph over evil and temptations in the fallen world, to complete the 
process of “soul-making,” and finally to attain that state of glory in Heaven in the 
presence of God. 
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